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In October 1936, the British Resident Frederick Chapman, or “Freddie” as he was 
known by his close associates, received an invitation to a game of soccer from a 
team calling themselves Lhasa United. The British Diplomatic Mission in Lhasa, 
unable to resist such a summons, hastily cobbled together a team of four British 
officials, four of their Sikkimese clerks, and a few of their Tibetan servants. The 
Mission Marmots, as the British called themselves, quickly came together as a 
team ready for all challengers.1 When the British team arrived at the field, two 
miles past the Nörbulingka Summer Palace, they found a large crowd and a care-
fully marked out pitch as well as their opponents. Decked in “garish harlequin-
coloured silk shirts with the initials ‘L.U.’ sewn onto their pockets,” Lhasa United 
were, as one British official later observed, “a remarkable looking team, and cer-
tainly needed to be ‘United!’ There was a tough-looking Nepali soldier, a Chinese 
tailor, three bearded Ladakhis wearing red fezzes—the most hirsute being the 
goal-keeper, a Sikkimese.”2 The final score was 1–0 in favor of the British. That fall, 
a total of four teams organized themselves to play the occasional match. While 
British officials would later insist they remained undefeated, others remembered 
the results differently.3 In addition to Lhasa United and the Mission Marmots, a 
team of young Tibetan officials and clerks known as the Kudraks (Tib. sku drag), 
or the Aristocrats, joined the competition sporting silk uniforms adorned with 
a snow lion. The fourth and final team was composed wholly of Lhasa Muslims, 
referred to by the British simply as the “Lhasa Mohammedans.”
The four teams neatly reproduced Lhasa’s main social divisions, and the matches 
quickly turned into elaborate social affairs with several matches occurring in quick 
succession that fall. The impromptu matches were brought to an abrupt end late 
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one October evening when the wooden goalposts were pilfered–perhaps to be 
used as firewood. The missing goalposts aside, plummeting temperatures had 
made it too uncomfortable to play, so it was decided to wait until spring to find 
replacement goalposts and recommence the matches.
The following year the matches grew in popularity, attracting an ever greater 
number of spectators. Curious onlookers flowed out to the field near Tsidrunglingka 
Park (Tib. rtse drung gling ka) by the river in the southeast part of Lhasa to watch 
the foreign games. The season wore on until one day, just as a match was about to 
get under way, a rabbit ran onto the field. As this is deemed one of twenty-one ill 
omens (Tib. ltas ngan), several onlookers gasped and attempted to postpone the 
match. They were dismissed as being overly superstitious, however, and the game 
got under way with no immediate ominous consequences. In the second half, 
just as the Kudraks took a 2–1 lead over the Marmots, a fierce hailstorm abruptly 
 materialized. Great gusts of wind shredded the spectators’ large umbrellas. Hail 
pelted the area with pellets so large that nearby crops were seriously damaged.
Many officials, already disquieted by the growing popularity and influence 
of foreign pastimes, took this opportunity to bring the entire matter before 
The Lhasa United soccer team, composed of Tibetan Sikkimese, Ladhaki, and Nepalese players, 
whose league opponents were such teams as the Mission Marmots, the Aristocrats, and the 
Lhasa Muslims. October 20, 1936. Source: Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford.
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the government. The next day, the Tibetan Assembly (Tib. tshogs ‘du) formally 
 deliberated the issue. While advocates of the game argued its social and health 
benefits, its critics called it sacrilegious and expressed concern that such games 
disturbed the local gods. One official heatedly declared, “It was like they were 
kicking the head of Buddha around the field.” After several hours of debate, the 
regent’s secretariat (Tib. shöga) declared soccer improper, ordered that no 
further matches be permitted, and directed that the involved players be fined 
several sang of gold.4
The impromptu soccer league presents an enthralling snapshot of the rarely 
scrutinized divisions within twentieth-century Lhasa society: the Kudraks, young 
lay Tibetan officials, demonstrating a keen interest in a foreign sport  introduced 
by the British to the Lhasa valley; and the Lhasa United team,  composed of 
 unambiguously “foreign residents” but “united” and familiar enough to be 
 welcomed into the league. Yet it is the final team, the Lhasa Mohammedans, 
that is perhaps the most beguiling. Considered neither foreign residents, like the 
Ladakhi Muslims, nor nominal British subjects, like the Sikkimese, the Lhasa 
Mohammedan team was composed of Tibetan subjects who were almost certainly 
not foreign.5 The creation of the soccer league offers a valuable corrective to the 
frequency with which one encounters descriptions of Tibet as singularly Buddhist, 
isolated, and impervious to external influences. The organic manner in which the 
Lhasa Muslims and Ladakhi Muslims played on separate teams—one foreign 
and one Tibetan—also raises the question of how a Tibetan Muslim community 
thrived in a land so often portrayed as monolithically Buddhist.
Situated on a high mountain plateau bounded by steep peaks, Tibet is  undeniably 
remote. Despite this remoteness, Tibet has been, through a diverse set of  commercial, 
artistic, and cultural interactions, consistently and profoundly interconnected with 
the rest of Asia.6 Although the impression of Tibet as a “closed country” from the 
nineteenth century on lingers in the popular  imagination of Tibet, Armenian and 
Russian merchants in the sixteenth century regularly  crisscrossed Tibet to Lhasa, 
Shigatse, and Siling (Ch. Xining), as did half a dozen or so European  missionaries by 
the seventeenth century. Nor should we limit our definition of “foreigners” simply 
to non-Asians. More familiar to Tibetans but nonetheless undeniably foreign were 
the far larger numbers of trans-Himalayan peoples of Kashmir, Sikkim, Bhutan, 
and Nepal who contributed to shaping Tibetan society, as traders, religious 
scholars, architects, and myriad other specialists. Tibetan leaders welcomed 
 foreigners and their skills. Mongolians aided militarily; Nepalese, artistically; 
and Kashmiris, commercially. Foreigners in Tibet were embraced, accepted, and 
 appreciated, not reviled, vilified, or segregated.7
The Tibetan Muslim community, called Khache (Tib. khaché), reflects a  paradox 
of indigeneity. It comprises a people who indisputably originated outside of Tibet 
but who swiftly embraced Tibetan culture, excelled linguistically, artistically, and 
commercially as Tibetans, who settled in central Tibet and, from the seventeenth 
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century on, were accepted as Tibetan. It is a community that has its origins in 
the disparate cultural traditions of South, Central, and East Asia, yet remains 
 undeniably Tibetan; that was renowned among the Tibetan elite for its mastery of 
the elaborate honorific-laden Tibetan language, yet consistently classified as non-
Tibetan in foreign descriptions of Tibet. And finally, it is a community that strikes 
at the heart of most popular definitions of Tibetans as exclusively Buddhist.
Foreign travelers’ accounts also usefully augment Tibetan documents by 
highlighting the ethnic and racial diversity of daily life in Tibet. The French 
missionary Évariste Huc’s Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844–1846 is 
 perhaps the preeminent example of this genre. His account provides a dazzling 
portrait of mid-nineteenth-century Lhasa capturing the unique cosmopolitanism 
that typified the quotidian life of Tibet’s capital.
In the town [of Lhasa] itself, the nature of the population has an altogether different 
character; with shouting, a hustle and bustle, and pushing and shoving, with each 
person intent on pursuing their next purchase or sale with an ardent zeal. Commerce 
and sacred devotion tempting a steady stream of foreigners, rendering this city as a 
gathering point of all the peoples of Asia; the streets are constantly crowded with 
pilgrims, traders, so that one observes an endless variety of facial features, attire and 
languages. For the large part this immense multitude is transitory, renewing itself 
on a daily basis. The permanent population of Lhasa consists of Tibetans, Newaris 
[Nepalis], Khache [Muslims] and Chinese.8
Huc’s description of Lhasa’s vibrant street life is striking in its meticulous attention 
to the city’s ethnocultural diversity. Despite having arrived with almost no prior 
knowledge of Tibet and only a modicum of Tibetan, his sharp eye and his atten-
tiveness to the city’s rhythms and flows made his account of Tibetan life among the 
best records we have of daily life in Lhasa and central Tibet.9 He is also one of only 
a handful of foreigners who, prior to the twentieth century, both resided in Lhasa 
for an extended period and wrote about it. It is thus significant that Huc devotes 
considerable attention to the Khache and returns to them consistently as a refer-
ence point in descriptions of other groups and social activities.
Even though Huc’s description of Lhasa and Chapman’s account of the soccer 
matches were written nearly a century apart, they both demonstrate that far from 
insulated, Tibet had vigorous and active interactions with an array of polities and 
peoples from across Asia. As the anthropologist Enseng Ho has suggested in his 
reflections on Asia’s inter-Asian dimensions, the “inter-Asian world was suffused 
with such spatially broad and patterned engagements between mobile societies to 
a degree that we have forgotten and no longer know.”10
From a Tibetan perspective, the Khache’s conspicuous presence is not nearly 
as surprising. Geoffrey Samuel’s landmark study of Tibetan culture, society, and 
 religion, Civilized Shamans, advances just such a conclusion. His analysis is at its 
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core a multithemed soliloquy positing a single point–that “premodern Tibet con-
tained a greater variety of social and political formations than is often appreci-
ated.”11 Reflecting this ethnic and regional diversity, the Khache communities exist 
in virtually all areas of Tibet: as far west as Srinagar in Kashmir, as far east as 
Dartsedo (Ch. Kangding) in Kham, as far north as Labrang Monastery in Amdo, 
and as far south as the Himalayan hill towns of Kalimpong and Darjeeling in 
northern India.12 Similar to Samuel’s work, a central goal of this study is to pioneer 
a thick transregional history of the Tibetan Muslims written against the grain of 
state-based national histories of Asia’s past. While other histories of Asia have art-
fully demonstrated the distorting nature of such brittle nationalisms, by adopting 
a Himalayan-centered vantage point, this history of the Tibetan Muslims, and spe-
cifically the Lhasa Muslims, seeks to make visible what remained invisible under 
the more standard localist, nationalist, or global frames of analysis.13 When the 
Khache do appear in histories of Asia, they tend to be tinged by the preconcep-
tions of the center. While such descriptions may have made them more intelligible 
to the distant imperial or national audiences thousands of miles away, they rarely 
corresponded to local Tibetan realities. In the essentialized orientalist narratives 
written by most Westerners, the Khache appear as non-Tibetan foreigners; when 
seen through the idiosyncratic religioethnic lens of the Chinese state they appear 
as Muslim Chinese Hui; or when viewed through an irredentist Indian nationalist 
perspective they are cast as members of the Kashmiri diaspora. In these accounts 
Khache appear as foreign, separate, and mutually unrecognizable rather than as 
indigenous, integrated, and familiar. So while a history of Tibetan Muslims on 
the surface appears insignificant and peripheral, it is precisely their centrality to 
Tibet’s inter-Asian positioning that makes them an ideal subject. More than an 
isolated case study of a remote group, the history of the Tibetan Muslims allows 
startling new insights into the events of Asia’s past.14 It is my hope that this study of 
the Tibetan Muslims will join the numerous studies that already highlight Tibet’s 
diverse Mongolian, Bon, Newari, and Sherpa communities to further dispel the 
false notion of Tibet as a monolithic Buddhist society that remains so prominent 
in many mainstream accounts of Asia.15
BEING TIBETAN WHILE MUSLIM
A central obstacle to understanding the widespread presence of the Khache across 
Tibet has been the lack of clarity in previous studies between Tibetan Muslim per-
manent residents and Muslim sojourner communities within Tibet. As early as the 
eighth century, Islamic historians and geographers recorded numerous Muslim 
travelers, caravaneers, and merchants, even a mosque.16 While there is virtually no 
sustained documentary evidence—in Tibetan, Chinese, or any other language—
that traces the presence of the Muslim community prior to 1900, the fragmentary 
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details that do survive suggest that until the late sixteenth century few Muslims 
resided in Tibet permanently.
Some evidence for this can be inferred from the fact that in Tibetan documents 
Muslims were typically designated by a variety of more or less pejorative terms. 
In religious texts such as the Kālacakra Tantra, Tibetans referred to Muslims as 
outsiders (Tib. kla klo), from the Sanskrit term mlecchas, or as nonbelievers (Tib. 
mustegs pa). Less literary Tibetan texts employed the term “foreigner” (Tib. phe 
rang), analogous to the Persian term farangi. Informally, the most common term 
was simply “white hats” (Tib. mgo dkar).17 All these terms emphasized on some 
level the Muslims’ externality to Tibetan society and remained in use among 
educated Tibetans well into the twentieth century.18
By the fifteenth century, the Kashmiri were the first long-term Muslim 
 residents in central Tibet. The Nepalese chronicle Vamshavalis notes that the 
first Kashmiri settlers in the Kathmandu valley were Muslim Kashmiris traveling 
between Kashmir and Lhasa.19 They were known as Khache, a term soon adopted 
by Tibetans to refer to any Tibetanized Muslim who resided within Tibet. Over 
time, this term widened even further semantically to include other Muslims who 
traced their origins to China and Central Asia.20
The confusion over the Khache typically falls into two categories. First, 
 outsiders tended to adopt external, non-native terminologies that treated the 
Khache as foreign. Matters were further confused when foreign observers used 
such terms more or less interchangeably, sometimes calling the entire  community 
“Ladakhi,” at other times “Kashmiri,” and, in Chinese, glossing any Muslim in 
Tibet as “Hui”—a blunder that few Tibetans would make.21 Representative of just 
such a proclivity, the Indian government in 1959 in negotiating with the People’s 
Republic of China could not even settle on a single term for the Khache, some-
times referring to “Ladakhi and Kashmiri Moslems,” then just simply “Kashmiri 
Moslems,” and later “Kajis.”22 The Chinese for their part tended to simply call 
them Hui, a highly ambiguous term that, depending on the context, could mean 
Chinese Muslim, any Muslim, or members of the state-defined nationality 
(Ch. minzu).
Second, attempting to gloss the Khache unequivocally as Tibetan Muslim is 
hindered by the fact that there exists no single Tibetan word in the premodern 
era that is equivalent to the modern word böpa (Tib. bod pa) used in Tibetan to 
refer to “Tibetan.” To confuse the picture even further, in Tibetan a  considerable 
amount of slippage existed between the religious and ethnic registers. In this 
way, in Tibetan, Khache could, and sometimes did, simply mean someone who 
 practiced Islam. In other contexts, Khache acquired a more ethnic (or ethnoreli-
gious) connotation, referring to those Muslims who had lived in central Tibet for 
generations, were native speakers of Tibetan, and, in many cases, had  intermarried 
with local Tibetans. Finally, there remained a presumption among many non-
Tibetans that, even in the mid-twentieth century, the Khache were some sort of 
perpetual non-native.
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TO BE TIBETAN MUSLIM
It is often assumed that to be Tibetan is to be Buddhist and, axiomatically, that 
to be Muslim precludes one from being Tibetan. Yet from a Tibetan perspective, 
particularly in central Tibet, a Tibetan Muslim’s non-Buddhist religious beliefs 
did not preclude him from being considered active and full participants in local 
Tibetan society.23 Nor were Tibetan Muslims a small or insignificant part of that 
society. By 1950, about 10 percent of Lhasa’s roughly 30,000 lay inhabitants were 
Muslim.24 Lhasa alone had four mosques and two Muslim cemeteries, and by the 
early twentieth century mosques were present in every large central Tibetan city, 
including Shigatse, Gyantse, and Tsetang.25 During the Great Prayer Festival (Tib. 
smon lam) held at the start of the lunar new year, Khache were exempted from 
the strict rules governing the eating of meat imposed by the Buddhist monks who 
ruled Lhasa during the holiday. Similarly, Tibetan residents were tolerant of the 
early morning calls to prayer during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.26
Despite the characterization of the Khache as perpetual non-natives in many 
foreign accounts of Lhasa, Tibetan Muslims lived as Tibetans among Tibetans by 
the early seventeenth century. Most historical records point to the earliest perma-
nent Khache community as being established no later than the reign of the Fifth 
Dalai Lama (1617–82), when Tibet emerged as a major political force in Asia. The 
noted Tibet scholar José Cabezón suggests a strong linkage between the appear-
ance of this Muslim community and the Fifth Dalai Lama’s “invitation of the [non-
Tibetan] peoples” as “part of a larger policy of encouraging ethnic, cultural and 
economic diversity in Tibet.”27 Given the Fifth Dalai Lama’s leading role in estab-
lishing the Ganden Podrang, the political administration of central Tibet, and his 
interest in attracting a diverse array of artistic, intellectual, and religious influences 
to Tibet, it is not surprising that his rise to power marks the first period in which 
we see sustained evidence of a permanent Khache community. The vibrancy and 
political stability of the Fifth Dalai Lama’s reign enabled the Khache to habituate 
themselves to Tibet and its culture in ways that transformed them from a simple 
immigrant community to one deeply integrated in Tibetan society.28
Khache can be found in almost every segment of Tibetan life. They were 
acknowledged as among the most literate and multilingual lay segment of the 
society. Tibetans, including the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, often praise the Khache 
for their linguistic abilities, particularly their mastering of the elaborate Lhasa 
dialect (Tib. zhe sa). They were also renowned for their multilingualism, with 
many Tibetan Muslims speaking Chinese, Hindi, Urdu, and Arabic, fostered 
by their prominent role in Tibet’s trade with their Himalayan neighbors. What 
many regard as the most important secular Tibetan literary work ever written, the 
Khache Phalu’s Advice on the Art of Living (Tib. Kha che pha lu’i ‘jig rten las ‘bras 
rtsis lugs kyi bslab bya), was penned by a Tibetan Muslim.29 As a result of these 
skills, Khache served as advisers to a succession of Dalai Lamas and operated as 
key brokers promoting Tibet’s inter-Asian ties.
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By the twentieth century, central questions about the Khache’s precise his-
tory, their position in Tibetan society, and their transnational identity remained 
obscured, ambiguous, and largely undocumented in Chinese, Indian, and Western 
sources as a result of external political claims on Tibet. The extended post- 
independence / post-liberation diplomatic tension between China and India 
usefully illustrates what Akhil Gupta has noted are the limits of modern concepts 
of citizenship to define those people who occupy “diversely spatialized, partially 
overlapping or non-overlapping collectivities.”30 A history of the Tibetan Muslims 
highlights these early twentieth-century concerns while starkly demarcating the 
limits of the nonaligned, anti-imperialist, and pro-Asian solidarity movements of 
the 1950s. These movements defined the euphoric post-independence / post-liberation 
period of India and China. The nature of Khache integration into Tibetan  society 
also speaks to the large inter-Asian diasporic communities and to the strong 
 financial and political ties these communities had to their ancestral countries of 
origin, primarily India and China.
As discussed in greater detail in later chapters, the traditional political, cul-
tural, and commercial Himalayan relationships between Tibet and the neighbor-
ing states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim remained far more resilient than initially 
understood in Beijing and Delhi, which by the early 1950s began to see Asia in a 
distinctly postcolonial, Cold War manner. Yet political unrest across the Himalayas 
played out in unexpected and nonlinear ways that suggest the Khache were not 
alone in their experience. The trepidation surrounding the People’s Republic of 
China’s occupation of Tibet and ongoing ambiguity surrounding China’s ultimate 
goals in the Himalaya region created uncertainty that was manifested in a vari-
ety of ways from Kalimpong to Kathmandu and most visibly in Lhasa. Tracing 
these Himalayan connections, which continued to function years after the arrival 
of the People’s Liberation Army in Lhasa, disrupts the supposedly stable, continu-
ous, and overarching control often attributed to China’s occupation of Tibet in 
1950. The complex interrelationships, circulation, and transregional mobility so 
common in this area force us to look below the standard narratives of Indian and 
Chinese actions and throw into sharper relief the messy cosmopolitan intercon-
nections that typified society across the Tibetan and Himalayan worlds well into 
the 1950s.
KASHMIRI  INDIAN OR TIBETAN CHINESE
The meaning and power of such historical events are enhanced when seen through 
the eyes of individuals who lived them. With the Dalai Lama’s flight to India and 
the subsequent 1959 March Uprising against Chinese control, the entire Tibetan 
Muslim community’s status was irrevocably altered. Fearful of retribution, several 
Tibetan Muslim leaders, including one named Habibullah Naik, demanded that 
by virtue of their historical ties to Kashmir they be treated as foreign residents 
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(like the Nepalese, Bhutanese, and other foreign residents of Lhasa who were also 
scrambling to be allowed to migrate back to their home countries in the wake of the 
1959 March Uprising). The local Chinese authorities, deeply unnerved by any signs 
of dissent, arrested over a dozen Tibetan Muslim leaders, including Habibullah 
Naik, charging them with inciting the Khache to “claim a foreign nationality.”31
The Khache’s claims were not unusual for the period. Similar to many  diasporic 
communities across Asia in the post-colonial period, the Khache asserted that 
their Kashmiri ancestry gave them the right to classify themselves as Indian 
citizens. They rallied as a community and began to assiduously avoid any actions 
that would identify them as Chinese. The difficulty arose in the very basic contra-
diction that most Khache had up until that point adamantly asserted themselves 
to be Tibetan. The Chinese state, playing its own game of  self-deception, namely, 
that Tibet had always remained Chinese, saw the Khache’s declaration of being 
Tibetan as tantamount to declaring oneself a citizen of the People’s Republic 
of China.
Outside of Tibet, the Khache’s situation was poorly understood. The New York 
Times in 1960 ran an article chronicling their plight with the headline “India’s 
Traders held by Chinese.” In the retaliatory Cold War logic of the period, many 
assumed the Khache were Indian nationals simply caught out by the abruptly 
shifting political winds. As the article was quick to point out, however, the “Indian 
traders” were not unequivocally Indian citizens. Described by the Indian govern-
ment as “Kashmiri Muslims,” the group arrested by the Chinese was part of a com-
munity that had resided in Tibet for generations and by their own admission had 
“never carried [Indian] travel documents and identification certificates,” yet now 
“wanted to register themselves as Indian nationals.”32
The New York Times’ terminological ambiguity is unsurprising. By virtually 
every measure, Habibullah Naik was Tibetan. Born in Lhasa at the turn of the 
twentieth century, he grew up living above his store in central Lhasa where his 
family had resided for generations. He spoke the pure Lhasa dialect of Tibetan, 
dressed in Tibetan clothing, and revered the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibet. He 
and the other Khache, prior to 1950, had long been considered Tibetan subjects by 
the Tibetan government. Tibetan Buddhist pilgrims circumambulating the sacred 
inner pilgrimage circuit streamed past the front gates of the mosque where he 
prayed daily. His relatives had, over the generations, intermarried with Tibetans, 
blurring any lingering divisions—physical, ancestral, or imagined—between his 
Buddhist and Muslim neighbors.33 Until the Dalai Lama’s decision to flee to India 
in 1959, Habibullah Naik was undeniably Tibetan and was treated as such by the 
Tibetan government and his Tibetan neighbors. In order to verify their Kashmiri 
ancestry, the Tibetan Muslim leaders were informed by the Chinese authorities 
that all claims of foreign citizenship would require “fresh documentary proof.”34 
When the Chinese government’s stern cautions went unheeded, they deemed Naik 
and other Khaches’ efforts to declare themselves foreign as seditious activities and 
10    CHAPTER 1
imprisoned them. The Tibetan Muslim community as a whole faced daily harass-
ment, middle-of-the-night interrogations, and starvation-level rations.
As Naik and his fellow Khaches had discovered, the ability of Himalayan states 
like Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim to defy the hardening boundaries of post-
liberation and postcolonial Asia was quickly coming to an end. Under both inter-
national pressure from India and domestic pressure to resolve the diplomatic 
crisis, the Chinese government abruptly acquiesced. All Tibetan Muslims who 
“voluntarily stat[ed] that they wanted to change their nationality from Chinese to 
Indian” would be allowed to resettle in India.35 By late 1960, nearly one thousand 
Khache demonstrated adequate proof of their Kashmiri, and thus “Indian,” ances-
try and were issued exit permits.
The Chinese did not extend this amnesty to individuals, like Naik, who had 
committed offenses against the state.36 However, on March 29, 1961, with no expla-
nation, the Chinese made a single exception and released Naik. Alone of those 
arrested, he was escorted by Chinese officials from his Lhasa prison cell to a truck 
waiting outside the prison and transported to the southern Tibetan border town 
of Dromo (Ch. Yadong). There he joined one of the last convoys of Nepalese, 
Khaches, and other Tibetans, who by virtue of their foreign ancestry were issued 
Chinese exit visas and allowed to leave Tibet after the violent crackdown on 1959 
March Uprising. Habibullah Naik would never again step foot in Tibet. He and 
the other Khaches crossed into India, acquired Indian citizenship, and began their 
new lives.
The emigration of Habibullah Naik and several thousand other Khaches offers 
a little-known coda to the history of the Khache in central Tibet. On the sur-
face, the Khaches’ return to India and Kashmir is founded on the false premise 
that the Khache had retained their distinct and separate Kashmiri identity across 
several centuries and thus returning to their country of origin. But under closer 
examination, the 1960 Khache Incident is only the most recent example of the 
Khache challenging the ostensibly hard boundaries of imperial / national identity 
and subjecthood / citizenship. A history of the Khache experience in central Tibet 
underscores how the ethnic, religious, and political categories of modern Asian 
nationhood conceal significant dimensions of Asia’s past and the significant rela-
tionships between numerous Himalayan states and Tibet up to the present.
Habibullah Naik’s assertion that he should be allowed to declare himself a citi-
zen of India emerged out of a much larger constellation of events, modalities, and 
peoples than just the proximate issues surrounding the 1959 March Uprising in 
Lhasa. The Khaches’ demands for Indian citizenship strike at the heart of how 
postcolonial regimes erected new boundaries of national citizenship at variance 
with those inherited from the earlier, imperial regimes. Numerous diasporic com-
munities were confronted with a choice between allegiance to their ancestral home 
or citizenship in a newly formed nation-state that had emerged out of the former 
colonial state where their families had lived for generations.
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Nor was this a question only for small populations like the Khache, Nepalese, 
or Bhutanese who discovered themselves at odds with the Chinese government 
in Tibet. As the sociologist Itty Abraham has pointed out, “Within Asia, the pres-
ence of Indians and Chinese outside their traditional homelands had been a part 
of the local social and cultural and economic landscape for long enough that their 
nationality was quite ambiguous.”37 The difference for the Khache was the fact that 
simmering tension between these “foreign” communities and the “local” popula-
tions was not the primary factor in their decisions. Instead, the decision of many 
Tibetan Muslim individuals to declare themselves Indian was a direct result of 
the Chinese government’s questioning of the community’s political loyalties in the 
wake of India offering the Dalai Lama asylum in 1959. In this light, the question 
of the Khaches’ national identity, or loyalty, offers an alternative understanding of 
inter-Asian relations. The Khaches’ predicament demonstrates the experience of 
many Asians when questions of ancestry and citizenship were imperfect solutions 
to the question of national identity in a Himalayan context.
To appreciate the complexities of the Khache past we need, on the one hand, 
to pay attention to the processes that reterritorialized, relabeled, and renational-
ized the Khache as “Kashmiri Muslims.” On the other hand, we must examine the 
manner by which the Khache had, in time, space, and memory, become incon-
trovertibly Tibetan. The history and memory of the Khaches’ past have interacted 
in unusual ways with mainstream Tibetan and Asian historiography, making it a 
particularly elusive narrative to reconstruct.
ARRESTED HISTORIES?
Even the briefest introduction to the Khache demonstrates that to grasp their 
complex position is to grapple with multiple overlapping misconceptions. Just as 
“Kashmiri” was an imperfect term to refer to the Khache living in Tibet, across 
Asia questions were being asked about the status of the resident “Indian” or 
“Chinese” populations who had resided outside their country of origin, in many 
cases for generations.
The seemingly innocuous labels for such communities hid highly fraught 
undercurrents and prejudices. The depth of emotion that such terms elicited in the 
postcolonial era caught many unaware. For as Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing reminds us:
Words in motion surprise us. Their far-flung antics interrupt conventional intellec-
tual history, with its assumption of stable genealogies of thought. They are spread too 
far for the boundaries of national history; they ricochet too widely to follow strictly 
colonial geographies. Words in motion urge us to consider multiple linguistic and 
cultural legacies in dialogue.38
The power of the Tibetan Muslims to serve as an analytical lens lies in its ability to 
capture in unexpected ways the changing relationship of space and identity that 
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accompanied the decolonialization and reterritorialization of Asia across the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. In this light, the evolution of the Khache identity 
is emblematic of a much broader dilemma occurring across postcolonial Asia over 
hardening conceptualizations of “nation” and “citizen.”
If the Khaches’ transnational and inter-Asian positioning masked their 
Tibetan identity, Carole McGranahan’s concept of arrested histories provides a 
 constructive way to delineate how their position in Tibet’s history remains intact 
but  inaccessible. The Khaches’ historical position in Tibet parallels that of the 
Tibetan people more generally, in that it “is more complicated than a sweeping 
under the rug of inconvenient past and politics; it is a delay or postponement of 
histories for the present only.”39 Not abandoned or erased, the Khache have always 
remained in plain sight, yet never quite in focus. They have been screened off 
within the official chronicling of the past since they do not fit comfortably in the 
historical narrative of Tibet.
It is in this awkward space—never entirely ignored but never fully integrated—
that the Khache have persisted in the historical narrative for over three  centuries. 
Virtually every Western visitor who passed through Tibet, from the earliest Jesuits 
to Heinrich Harrer, Lhasa’s most famous foreign resident, noted in some manner 
the presence of the Khache.40 Chinese sources follow a similar pattern, recording 
the size and number of mosques in Lhasa, describing Khache routes, and enumer-
ating the Khache communities across Tibet.41 To grasp the complex nature of the 
Tibetan Muslim community, one must first address the means by which the Khache 
so successfully integrated themselves into Tibetan society. How they retained the 
hybrid influences of Tibet’s external neighbors—South Asia, Central Asia, and 
China—as well as Tibet’s complex internal intricacies is part of this  history. While 
the Tibetan Muslim communities across the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and 
Kham shared many qualities with those described below, above all else, this study 
seeks to provide an alternative history of Himalayan Asia that is positioned in and 
around the experiences of the Lhasa Khache.
While this work is the first book-length study of the Lhasa Khache, it is not a his-
tory of Islam in Tibet. Rather it engages the cosmopolitan nature of the Khache by 
attempting to situate them within Tibet and its relationship across the Himalayan 
world. Although it explores many new sources, its value lies less in the unearth-
ing of new manuscripts or detailing hitherto unexplored religious networks than 
in considering the latent intersectional identity of the Khache as a means to offer 
a new approach to Tibet’s past and look with fresh eyes upon a place and era we 




On November 30, 1943, two American pilots, Robert Crozier and Harold “Mac” 
McCallum, eased their C-87 plane into the air carrying a load of ammunition, 
fuel, and supplies from an American air base in northeastern India to the south-
western Chinese city of Kunming. The U.S. Air Force had deployed these modified 
B-24 bombers along a 530-mile corridor since April 1942 after Japanese troops 
had  overrun the Burma Road, the Allies’ last significant land route supplying 
the Nationalist Chinese forces based in western China.1 With President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s call to transport ten thousand tons of cargo a month from India 
into China, hundreds of aircraft were plying this route, maintaining a  desperately 
needed air link, known as “the Hump,” in the battle against Japanese forces 
 occupying much of eastern China.
Both pilots were experienced, and this had been a routine trip into Kunming. 
After a brief respite to unload, refuel, and allow the crew to eat a hasty meal, 
they returned to the plane, only to be told they needed to first offload supplies in 
Yunnanyi, a town some 150 miles due west of Kunming. Flying at night and slightly 
north of their usual route to India, the Americans encountered completely differ-
ent conditions from those on the flight up.
The greatest obstacle to flying the Hump came from the constantly changing 
weather conditions, monsoon rains in the summer and blizzards in the winter. The 
flight crew had few navigation tools at their disposal other than a method known 
as dead reckoning, whereby the navigator, knowing his point of departure and 
compass heading, would calculate time, air speed, and approximate distance  traveled. 
By 1943, several radio beacons had been placed along the route to guide pilots, 
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and finally they could communicate with the control towers at the bases in both 
India and China for updates on their positions.
As they took off from Yunnanyi, the crew encountered heavy turbulence, and 
frigid temperatures caused the plane to begin icing up. The pilots, looking for  better 
conditions, took the plane up to 24,000 feet. Unable to get a reading from any of 
the radio beacons for several hours and running low on fuel, the pilots’  anxiety 
grew. For reasons still unclear, when the pilots called in and asked for a compass 
heading to their base in Jorhat, the control tower miscalculated and told them to 
continue to fly along its westerly heading. Unbeknownst to the flight crew, their 
plane had encountered 100-mile-an-hour headwinds, causing them to fly several 
hundred miles north of their intended flight path. Still believing they were headed 
southwest toward India, they decided to drop down from their  cruising altitude, 
expecting to break through the cloud cover and locate their air base visually. With 
the plane’s altimeter reading 17,500 feet as they broke through the clouds, instead 
of another 10,000 feet of air below them, McCallum exclaimed, “Damit, that’s not 
a cloud it’s a mountain.”2
Tibetan Muslim Sanaullah (third from right) next to Harold McCallum (fourth from right) 
posing with the American flight crew in traditional Tibetan hats and coats at the British 
Consulate in Lhasa, December 1943. Sanaullah would die the following year from  pneumonia. 
Credit: Reproduced with permission from Richard Starks and Miriam Murcutt, Lost in Tibet: 
The Untold Story of Five American Airmen, a Doomed Plane, and the Will to  Survive, 2004, and 
from the family of William Perram.
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Now nearly out of fuel, in the middle of the night, and with few other options, 
the crew decided to bail out and parachute to safety. Having all survived the 
much shorter than anticipated jump, the crew found themselves scattered 
across the side of a steep river ravine, with temperatures well below freezing.3 
As the New York Times recounted, “When their feet touched earth they were 
in ‘Shangri-La’—the forbidden land of Tibet of the novel ‘Lost Horizon’—and 
they were starting one of the strangest adventures ever to befall United States 
Fliers.”4 Initially unable to find their entire crew, McCallum, Crozier, and the 
radio operator followed a small trail for some distance, when they  encountered 
a 6-foot-tall Tibetan. Approaching the American air crew, he called out, 
“As salaam alaikum” (May peace be upon you). McCallum, having taken a 
few language and culture classes while in India, offered the appropriate reply: 
“Alaikum as salaam” (And with you).5 After this exchange, McCallum and the 
Tibetan began to converse in broken Hindi. Asked where they were, India or 
Tibet, the man replied, “Tibbat” in Hindi, confirming to the Americans that 
they had landed not in India but in Tibet.
The story of McCallum and his crew flying wildly off course, being forced to 
bail out of their airplane, and being rescued from Tibet has been retold numer-
ous times. Yet little emphasis has been given to the fact that the first greeting the 
crew received was the Islamic salutation, “May peace be upon you,” and not the 
traditional Tibetan greeting, “Tashi delek” (lit., “Good wishes”).6 The incongruity 
of such a greeting between an American pilot and Tibetan trader perhaps explains 
why the New York Times, Collier’s Magazine, and Reader’s Digest omitted the detail 
in their telling of the story. That absence reflects a much larger erasure of Tibetan 
Muslims, or Khache, from almost all accounts of Tibet.
As the American crew would later piece together, their plane had crashed sev-
eral miles outside of the Tibetan town of Tsetang, roughly 100 miles southeast 
of Lhasa. Sanaullah, the man who befriended the American flight crew, was a 
prominent member of Tsetang’s vibrant Tibetan Muslim community. His ability to 
communicate in Hindi with McCallum was a result of his frequent trips as a trans-
Himalayan trader to Kalimpong and Calcutta. It was not until after the crash of the 
C-49 and in the aftermath of the 1959 March Uprising that the complex realities of 
the Tibetan Muslims’ role in Tibet came onto the international stage.
The account of the American pilots on one level is a standard white  intermediary 
tale similar to many firsthand British travelers’ accounts, as well as the  best-sellers 
Seven Years in Tibet by Heinrich Harrer and Out of This World: Across the Himalayas 
to Forbidden Tibet by Lowell Thomas. The danger of such an approach lies in 
the implication that we can only understand Tibet when the tale is told through 
the eyes of a white, often male, protagonist. It is included here for an entirely 
different reason.
Crozier and McCallum’s crash neatly exhibits that even when outsiders 
 unexpectedly find themselves in central Tibet, the first person they encounter 
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could be a Tibetan Muslim. Yet there is also a deeper significance. Sanaullah’s 
ability to recognize a white foreigner, attempt to speak to him in Hindi, and also 
have the wherewithal to make contact with the central Tibetan government all 
underscore the Khaches’ sense of place within a Himalayan world. The fact that 
Sanaullah was able to interact with Tibetan, British, and Chinese officials in Lhasa 
with no complications and that his Khache status was not flagged on some level 
to the Americans (indeed, in most accounts his status as a Khache, aside from 
the opening salutation to McCallum, is rarely mentioned) alert us to the seamless 
integration of the Khache in Tibetan society.
The American crew members were hardly the first outsiders to encounter and 
rely on the Khache to navigate their way in and out of Tibetan society. Due to 
their multilingualism, commercial expertise, and social ease within Tibet, Khaches 
had since the sixteenth century served as guides for outsiders in Tibet,  including 
the earliest Italian and Portuguese missionaries in the seventeenth century.7 The 
depth of missionary reliance on Khache assistance was so pervasive that, in the 
words of the French ethnographer Marc Gaborieau, Western missionaries came to 
see Tibet “through Muslim eyes.”8 The ways the Tibetan Muslims both facilitated 
and influenced early Western accounts is rarely engaged since the presence and 
role of Tibetan Muslims remains a rarely examined topic. Nor is the presence of 
Tibetan Muslims any less surprising for first-time visitors to Tibet today when they 
 encounter the centuries-old Grand Mosque just steps away from central Lhasa. 
What follows below and in the next chapters is an attempt to provide a  better under-
standing and delineate the central place of Tibetan Muslims in Tibetan society.
LHASA’S  MUSLIM L ANDSCAPE
Despite its cosmopolitan nature, Lhasa, awash in white, with eaves, doors, and 
windows framed in red and gold borders, remained a relatively small town until 
the mid-twentieth century. Lhasa’s lay population hovered between 25,000 and 
30,000 permanent residents.9 Its location—distant from military threats and pro-
tected by a high mountain plateau—precluded the need for city walls.10 Instead, 
Lhasa was organized both physically and spiritually by a set of concentric pil-
grimage circuits, or koras, emanating outward from the center of Lhasa. At the 
spiritual center of the city was the Nangkor, or inner kora (Tib. nang skor), that 
pilgrims traced around the Jokhang temple’s main chapel. The Barkor (Tib. bar 
skor), or outer kora, encircled the numerous sacred temples and shrines clustered 
around the Jokhang at the heart of Lhasa. The district bound by the circuit, also 
called the Barkor, served as the town’s central market area where for centuries 
merchants sold their wares. The third and outermost kora, the Lingkor (Tib. gling 
skor), ringed the entire town (prior to its post-1980s growth). Nearly 5 miles long, 
it cut in close to the eastern edge of Lhasa before looping out westward around the 
Potala Palace and other sacred sites.11
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If the description of Lhasa concluded here, it would suffice as a concise and 
quite standard summary of its sacred geography. Such a description, though 
 typical, omits the presence of a Muslim community. The omission is surprising 
in that their existence is difficult to ignore. The Tibetan capital has been home to 
four mosques for well over a century and Tibetan Muslims have been prominent 
there for well over three centuries.12 Positioned in and around Lhasa, the mosques 
not only were highly visible, but played an integral role in Lhasa’s social life 
(see map 2).
Lhasa’s first mosque, typically referred to by Tibetans as the Khache Lingka (Tib. 
kha che gling kha), traditionally dated to 1650, is situated in the Garden of the Far-
Reaching Arrow (Tib. rgyang mda’ khan) several miles west of Lhasa, just north of 
the Dalai Lama’s Summer Palace (Tib. nor bu gling kha).13 This small compound 
was a prominent feature in Lhasa’s religious and social sphere. As the Khache 
community grew, a second, larger mosque was erected just opposite the original 
mosque to accommodate the larger number of Khaches during religious holidays.14
The most prominent mosque in Lhasa is the Grand Mosque. Built no later than 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, it is situated at the southeastern edge 
of the city in the Wapaling neighborhood (Tib. wa pa gling).15 Over the  centuries, 
the Grand Mosque has been known by several names. Today in Lhasa, the most 
 common designation is Grand Mosque (Tib. lha khang chen) or simply the Chinese 
Mosque (Tib. rgya kha che lha khang).16 Less frequently, particularly prior to 1959, 
it adopted the name of the neighborhood in which it was located, the Wapaling 
Mosque (Tib. wa pa gling kha che lha khang).17
Located several miles across the valley north of Lhasa, the Dokdé Mosque 
(Tib. dog sde lha khang) lay adjacent to the Muslim cemetery.18 It is the least well-
documented of the four mosques. The Jesuit missionary Ippolito Desideri, in the 
early eighteenth century, remarked that the Wapaling Khache previously “had a 
small field close to Lhasa for burying their dead,” but the Tibetan government 
“forced [the Wapaling Khache] to vacate [their cemetery] and relocate it farther 
out in the uninhabited countryside.”19 The Dokdé valley, more isolated and less 
likely to draw attention to the Muslim custom of burying bodies, also became 
home to a small mosque that was attached to the cemetery. Some date this mosque 
to 1716, the year of Desideri’s arrival in Lhasa, which might explain his unusually 
detailed mention of the Tibetan government’s request to have the Muslims build a 
cemetery away from the city.20
In the early twentieth century, the fourth and final mosque was built in the 
Barkor neighborhood just within the southern edge of Lhasa’s sacred Lingkor 
 pilgrimage circuit. The mosque is most commonly referred to today in Tibetan as 
simply the Small Mosque (Tib. lha khang chung) but was also colloquially known 
to many Lhasa residents as the Barkor or Rapsel Alley Mosque (Tib. rap sel lha 
khang). While its exact date of construction remains debated, it likely was built in 
the early years of the twentieth century.21
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Aside from Lhasa, numerous other cities contained smaller though not 
 insignificant Khache populations. Shigatse, in many ways the only city rivaling 
Lhasa in terms of religious, political, and military prestige, by the early twentieth 
century was home to well over a hundred Khache households.22 Although some 
suggest the Shigatse mosque was originally constructed in 1443 (with some even 
suggesting as early as 1343), it seems more likely that it was built around the same 
time as the early Lhasa mosques and certainly no later than the late seventeenth 
century.23
Outside the larger urban centers of Shigatse and Lhasa, the Khache  communities 
tended to be composed of a handful of families. The one exception to this appears 
to be the Tibetan Muslims in Tsetang, the former pre-Buddhist Tibetan capital 
southeast of Lhasa near where the American crew crashed. Home to several 
dozen Khache households, the Tsetang Tibetan Muslim community remained 
highly active into the 1950s.24 Permanent Khache communities, almost all  having 
a mosque, existed across central Tibet, including Gyantse, Kuti, Lhatse, and 
Drigung.25
As the widespread presence of mosques suggest, Khache communities were 
common, integrated, and accepted elements of Tibetan society. Their communities 
also buttress claims of Tibet as multicentered, multiethnic, and multilingual. Given 
the complexity of Tibet’s political, ethnic, and linguistic makeup, it is prudent to 
begin by addressing exactly what we mean when we use the terms “Tibet” and 
“Tibetan.”
THE POWER OF DISAMBIGUATION
Most scholars of Tibet distinguish between “political Tibet,” the area historically 
controlled by the Dalai Lama’s government centered in Lhasa, and “ethnographic 
Tibet,” the broader stateless areas that fell outside the Dalai Lama’s control. By 
definition, political Tibet tends to be Lhasa-centric, although as Hugh Richardson, 
Gillian Tan, and others have suggested, Tibet “operated on a far more diverse 
political basis than simple allegiance to the rule of Lhasa.”26 Acknowledging the 
dangers of examining political Tibet to the exclusion of ethnographic Tibet, or 
of conflating the two, this study uses the term “Tibet” broadly while attempting 
to indicate specific regions when needed. It does not employ “Tibet” at any point 
to narrowly mean the People’s Republic of China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region, 
which was only formally established in 1965.
To the nonspecialist, emphasizing the fact that Tibet and Tibetans are not 
entirely coterminous may seem overly pedantic. However, given the  nonalignment 
of political and ethnic boundaries—and the inconstancy of such an alignment 
across history—the presence of Tibetans does not necessarily make any region 
a part of “Tibet.” Although previous scholarship has repeatedly noted a need to 
 differentiate between ethnographic and political Tibet, it has soft-pedaled the 
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complexities of using the term “Tibetan.” The following paragraphs are designed to 
throw into stark relief the need to interrogate what is meant by the term “Tibetan” 
so as to allow a clearer definition of what we mean when we speak of Tibetan 
Muslims.
Böpa (Tib. bod pa) is often suggested as the word most closely approximating 
the meaning of “Tibetan” in most Western languages. Like the distinction made 
above between a political and an ethnographic Tibet, however, the term böpa more 
often refers to Tibetans from the Tibetan central province of Ü-Tsang rather than 
all ethnic Tibetans.27 Outside central Tibet, most ethnic Tibetans rarely refer to 
themselves as “böpa” but rather “people of Kham” or “people of Amdo” (e.g., Tib. 
khams pa or amdo ba). Even here, these terms are not as all-inclusive as one might 
initially believe. One of the early pioneers of Tibetan Studies, Rolf Stein, in his 
classic work, Tibetan Civilizations, implored his readers to recall “that since at least 
the eleventh century ‘Tibetans’ (böpa) have been contrasted with ‘pasture-land 
people’ (Tib. ‘brog pa) as though the latter were foreigners.”28 In this light, böpa, 
perhaps the closest literal analogue to “Tibetan” in English, conveys in Tibetan a 
very Lhasa-centric quality that is narrower in meaning than the broader and more 
flexible meaning than the term has in English.
Colloquially, the Tibetan term that is closest to the Anglophone usage “Tibetan” 
is nang pa. Translated literally, nangpa (Tib. nang pa) simply means ‘insider”; 
however, it has a distinctly Buddhist overtone that is more accurately rendered as 
“Tibetan Buddhist.” In this manner, the usage böpa is limited territorially, while 
nangpa carries a decidedly religious connotation. Again, speaking colloquially, if 
one is not nangpa, one would be, by definition, chipa, an “outsider” (Tib. phyi 
pa). Such conflicting terminology has led scholars, such as the Tibetologist Robert 
Ekvall, to conclude over half a century ago that to be non-Buddhist (chipa) would 
make one “no longer recognized by the Tibetans as being unequivocally Tibetan.”29 
And yet Khache living in Kham or Amdo might not be either nangpa or böpa and 
still be ethnically Tibetan. The difficulty of finding appropriate cognates in English 
has led an increasing number of scholars to question more directly the imperfect 
nature of the term “Tibetan” as it is applied to the multiple terms employed by 
Tibetans themselves.
The Lhasa-centric nature of böpa and the Buddhist bias of nangpa are masked 
by the Anglophone term “Tibetan,” as both meanings are often implicitly  present 
in the popular conceptualizations of being Tibetan when outside of Tibet.30 Sara 
Schneiderman, in an effort to decouple being Tibetan and being Buddhist,  queries, 
“Just as there are Buddhists all over the world who are not Tibetan, why can 
there not be Tibetans who are not Buddhist?”31 In this way, similar to the need 
to  differentiate between ethnographic and political Tibet, although those from 
central Tibet would have called themselves böpa, they likely would not have 
applied the term to Amdo Tibetans and Kham Tibetans. In an eloquent critique of 
this unspoken bias, Françoise Pommaret observed that “one encounters an aspect 
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of the culture of central Tibet which has not been addressed much so far: a  certain 
condescending and despising attitude towards the surrounding regions which 
did not, in the eyes of the central Tibetans, reach what they considered to be the 
epitome of culture.”32
On many levels, the obstacle lies less in the Tibetan definitions than in the 
English terms “Tibet” and “Tibetan.” As Tsering Shakya has bluntly pointed 
out, the Tibetan language has “no indigenous term which encompasses the 
 population denoted by Western usage.”33 Nor are there any clear alternatives. 
Emily Yeh, in her study of Tibetan indigeneity, accentuates this by pointing out 
that even today the “term indigenous, after all, is not widely used by Tibetans either 
within Tibet or in exile.”34 Nor is this an either / or question. There is a growing 
consensus that non-Buddhist Tibetans, including Tibetan Muslims, were seen as 
culturally, socially, and politically part of the larger Tibetan whole, even as they 
remained religious outsiders. Crucial to this understanding is that in the case of 
many non-Buddhist groups, the designation “outsiders” (chipa) did not mean they 
were deprived of all rights and privileges as Tibetans. Nor were those labeled chipa 
collectively branded as foreigners.
Even as the deep definitional fissures that make the terms “Tibet” and 
“Tibetan” unstable and imprecise, the lack of practical alternatives dictates that 
simply  discarding them is equally impractical. Much like we knowingly accept 
the broad linguistic and regional diversity included in the label “Indian,” the 
 confusion unleashed by disposing of such a term hardly rectifies the situation. 
Instead, this brief examination cautions us to be mindful not to align the territory, 
the people, and the speakers of Tibetan under a single, unitary, and homogenizing 
umbrella of what it means to be Tibetan. More relevant to this study is the need 
to embrace this ambiguity in our efforts to delineate more carefully the category 
“Tibetan Muslim.” Simply put, if being Tibetan has no direct cognate that neatly 
corresponds to the English term “Tibetan,” similar regional and cultural biases 
have shaped the meaning of Khache and its English equivalent, “Tibetan Muslim.”
To avoid confusion and yet embrace convention, the term “Tibetan Muslim” 
acknowledges many of the terminological fault lines discussed above. In my 
usage, the term refers to all Khaches who have resided permanently in Tibet 
and were accepted as Tibetan. It encompasses great spatial, linguistic, and even 
ethnic  diversity. Though beyond the scope of this study, “Tibetan Muslims” can 
also refer to Tibetanized Chinese Muslims of Amdo, Tibetans who converted to 
Islam, or simply those communities of Kashmiri who have traveled to and from 
Tibet for centuries. Given the highly contested range of ethnic, religious, and 
cultural identities bound up in the term it is difficult to neatly align this process 
theoretically. Certainly, many of the traits raised below could be categorized as 
“invented traditions”’ in the sense of Hobsbawm and Ranger.35 Equally, the term 
is not meant to be employed strictly as an ethnonym suggesting Tibetan Muslims 
should be seen as an ethnic group, defined by Weber’s emphasis on “common 
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descent.”36 Historically the source base in Tibetan, Chinese, or any language 
remains so fraught that to engage in theoretical discussions of ethnicity, race, or 
identity becomes highly problematic particularly given the highly fragmentary 
and multilingual sources. The post-1950 situation of political and ethnographic 
Tibet has only clouded matters.
In light of the recent trend in Sinophone scholarship to employ the term “Zang-
Hui,” I agree with Gerald Roche that hyphenated terms, particularly those deployed 
along the Sino-Tibetan divide, tend to elide “local agency and  marginalizes 
local distinctions as incomplete, failed, or hybrid byproducts of distant centers 
of purity.”37 Tibetan Muslims maintained an identity as Tibetans through shared 
symbols, stories, and practices while simultaneously accentuating a highly honed 
sense of relational alterity by emphasizing their different religious practices.38
Indeed, much of the confusion over the status of the Khache in Tibet has its 
roots in which process one emphasizes. Foreign travelers’ accounts tended to stress 
identity maintenance through alterity, portraying the Khache as  foreigners based 
on their Muslim beliefs, whereas the Tibetan sources reveal a focus on their shared 
Tibetan traits to a degree that the Khache were rarely even identified as a separate 
community. And so it is with the Tibetan Muslims, as Frederik Barth noted in his 
late-life musings on ethnicity and ethnic boundaries: “In a hall of  mirrors, one 
needs to move with considerable circumspection.”39 My hope is that this study 
will orient future scholars with more familiarity of specific periods, areas, and 
groups within the Tibetan Muslim community to address the complex question of 
religious and ethnic identity.
TO BE KHACHE AND TIBETAN
Most narratives of Tibet’s past begin with one man, the Fifth Dalai Lama, in the 
early seventeenth century. With the military support of the Mongol leader Gushri 
Khan, the Fifth Dalai Lama not only unified Tibet, but became the irrefutable 
spiritual as well as a secular leader of Tibet. In the histories of Tibetan Muslims, as 
in the histories of their Buddhist Tibetan brethren, the “Great Fifth” Dalai Lama 
holds a central place in the mythos surrounding the Tibetan Muslims’ arrival and 
inclusion in the cosmopolitan world of seventeenth-century Tibet.40
Tibetan Muslim foundation myths tend to be gently elaborated versions of more 
or less orthodox Tibetan history. A common chronicle told by Tibetan Muslims 
plays off the well-documented policy of the Fifth Dalai Lama to encourage foreign 
artisans, scholars, and traders to come to Tibet. When interviewed today, Tibetan 
Muslims generally all point to arriving under the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama.41 
In a common telling, nearly fifty men and boys, sometimes more according to the 
teller, traveled to Lhasa as merchants. Upon demonstrating their skills, they were 
invited by the Fifth Dalai Lama to stay in Tibet and to receive a stipend to cover 
their expenses.42
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These Khache oral histories neatly parallel the documented efforts of the Fifth 
Dalai Lama to recruit foreigners to come to seventeenth-century Lhasa.43 All 
extant historical sources point to the Fifth Dalai Lama’s reign as being the period 
when the earliest permanent Muslim settlements emerged across central Tibet. It 
is these Khaches who established a permanent community that has survived from 
that point in time in a direct line to the present who we can properly refer to as 
“Tibetan Muslims.”
From the seventeenth until the twentieth century, the Khache consistently 
appear in foreign accounts of Tibet. During a multiyear sojourn in Lhasa, from 
1686 to 1691, the Armenian merchant Hovhannes Joughayetsi listed numer-
ous Khaches among his important clients.44 In 1775, when the British emissary 
George Bogle arrived in the court of the Panchen Lama in Shigatse, he remarked 
that the Khache had “been long settled in this country” and were “mostly the 
offspring of Tibetans.”45 Songyun, a mid-eighteenth-century Manchu official 
appointed to Tibet, commented on the large Khache community, specifically 
pointing out that they “had taken up residence in Tibet making a living as traders 
many years ago.”46 Chinese gazetteers not only noted the presence of Khache but 
also included the Khache Garden Mosque on maps of significant landmarks in 
and around Lhasa.47
Tibetan Muslims appear with less frequency in Tibetan accounts, but in part 
that is due to the fact that most of the extant sources are religious, or religiously 
oriented (e.g., written by elite Buddhists). Regardless, few Tibetans or Tibetan 
documents dispute their presence. The Khache’s linguistic facility made them 
highly sought after within the lay community, and it is not surprising that one of 
the greatest secular Tibetan works is Advice on the Art of Living. Almost certainly 
written by an eighteenth-century Tibetan Muslim by the name of Faizullah under 
the sobriquet Khache Phalu, it is among the most popular and classic Tibetan 
texts, remaining popular even today among Tibetans.
From the sparse details known about his life, Khache Phalu worked for the 
Seventh Panchen Lama (1782–1853), likely as the official in charge of the lama’s 
 stable of horses (Tib. chibs dpon).48 The relatively short volume, consisting of eleven 
short chapters and roughly fifty-five pages, emulates the philosophical  aphorisms 
of the Buddhist “Elegant Sayings” (Tib. legs bsha) literary tradition. Written in 
nine-syllable lines, it captures a quintessentially Tibetan view of the world, yet 
the author never seeks to conceal his Islamic beliefs. Unrivaled in its ability to 
create a hybrid of Islamic and Tibetan literary culture, it reflects the unique place 
that the Khache held in the Lhasa community, emulating but never becoming a 
lesser  facsimile of high Tibetan culture. In Advice on the Art of Living, Khache 
Phalu deftly adopts metaphors and language that could as easily allude to Buddhist 
teachings as they do Islamic ones.
Referencing central Tibetan tropes like joke telling, local gossip, and even  stories 
of immoral monks, it quickly became one of the most popular secular works in 
Tibet for well over a century.49 In several instances when the author emphasizes 
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his monotheism or invokes Allah, the tone of the text beautifully utilizes Tibetan 
patterns and allusions to make whatever might possibly be perceived as 
“ un-Tibetan” into something undeniably Tibetan. His commentary on Buddhist 
ideals is often sharp, but similar in tone to denunciations that Tibetans  themselves 
made, as when he laments at one point, “There are many who talk about the 
 pursuit of right actions, but true followers are as scarce as gold” (Tib. kha che 
pha’i sing gtam bshad yod do / nya na dang mi nyan so so’i bsam blo re). Nor 
do his Islamic beliefs prevent him from exhorting his readers, by appropriating 
language generally understood to be Buddhist, to “pray with your body, speech 
and mind or to rely on the ‘Three Precious Jewels’ [the Buddha, the Dharma and 
the Sangha].”50 More intriguing is when Khache Phalu seems to be defying both 
Buddhist and Muslim traditions. At one point he cautions against “eating the 
dirty food of the wicked butcher” (Tib. las ngan shan pa’i dreg khu bza’ ba la), 
which could narrowly be read as only eating meat properly butchered (halal), 
but the term “wicked” (Tib. las ngan) here has the Buddhist connotation of “bad 
karma” commonly associated with being a butcher. Given that butchers were 
almost exclusively Khaches, most Tibetans (or Tibetan Muslims) would see this 
as a veiled reference to the Khache.
The very ability of Khache Phalu to capture such a Tibetan voice caused many 
to doubt his Islamic identity and speculate that he was actually a highly placed 
official or even the Seventh Panchen Lama himself. The enduring incredulity that 
a Muslim could write such a quintessentially Tibetan text remained in place well 
into the modern era, with one commentator insinuating, as late as 1981, that the 
work was the product of the Seventh Panchen Lama:
The Panchen Lama had good relations with the Tibetan Muslims of Shigatse and 
since the Muslims had a very sweet style of speech that appealed to the masses, the 
Seventh Panchen Lama under the Muslim pseudonym deliberately wrote the book 
in their style of speech.51
The book’s persistent popularity among Tibetans unsettled the Twelfth Dalai Lama 
(1857–75) enough that he ordered that all lines directly invoking Islamic beliefs be 
expurgated.52 Such hearsay aside, the recognized literary prowess of Khache Phalu 
denotes a broader recognition of the Khaches’ literary skill.
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, even today the most common attribute ascribed 
to the Khache by Tibetans is their facility with the Tibetan language. The noted 
Tibetologist Charles Ramble elegantly alludes to the subtle ways in which Tibetan 
Buddhists routinely would invoke the Khaches’ Tibetan fluency as proof positive 
of their Tibetan identity, despite their religious differences:
Adherence to Buddhism (or Bon) is generally regarded as being an integral element 
of Tibetan identity, although an exception is made for the Muslim minority. (The 
rather touching cliché that is commonly cited, apparently as a formula of acceptance, 
is that the Muslims “speak the best Tibetan,” as if this linguistic excellence were sat-
isfactory compensation for a religious deficiency.)53
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The formulation of the Khache as Tibetan because they “speak the best Tibetan” 
remains strong today, even among the Tibetan exile community. In 2014, while 
visiting Los Angeles, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama mildly rebuked a largely 
Tibetan audience for not teaching their children to speak Tibetan, noting, 
“When I recently visited [exiled] Tibetan Muslims in Srinagar, I discovered 
their young children speak excellent Tibetan with a Lhasa accent. This is not 
the result of any  instruction they receive at school, but of their parents’ and 
grandparents’ training.”54 His praise of the Khaches’ linguistic ability was not 
simply another manifestation of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s broad ecumenism 
but rather a subtle wink to the well-established maxim among Tibetans that 
Tibetan Muslims have elegant fluency. Emily Yeh similarly suggests that “given 
the great difficulty many young Tibetans in Lhasa today have speaking Tibetan 
without code-switching with Mandarin, the Barkor Khache . . . are admired for 
their ability to speak pure Tibetan.”55
FROM KASHMIRI  TO KHACHE
By the sixteenth century, the Kashmiris were an already established presence in 
the Himalayan range. From Kashmir along the Himalayan front range to Nepal, 
Bhutan, and Sikkim in the east, Kashmiri merchant communities  dominated 
 trading. A prominent presence in virtually every large Himalayan trading 
entrepôt, the Kashmiri formed the backbone of trans-Himalayan trade. George 
Bogle, in describing Himalayan trade networks, referred to the Kashmiri as being 
“like the Jews in Europe, or the Armenians in the Turkish Empire, scatter[ing] 
themselves over the eastern kingdoms of Asia, and carry[ing] on an extensive 
traffic between the distant parts of it, hav[ing] formed establishments at Lhasa and 
all the  principal towns in this country.”56
While it is tempting to believe the Kashmiri traveled by the shortest route 
between Kashmir and Lhasa, the majority of the Kashmiris almost certainly 
 traveled to Tibet from the key trading centers to the south via Kathmandu, Patna, 
and even Kolkata.57 In the minds of the trans-Himalayan peoples and cultures, 
the term “Kashmiri” had an ethnoreligious rather than geographic or political 
 association. That is to say, it is almost certain that the first Kashmiris were not 
explicitly Kashmiri from Kashmir but rather from Kashmiri communities outside 
of Kashmir and across the subcontinent.
Like many immigrant communities, it is difficult to determine the precise 
moment when the Kashmiri became Tibetan subjects. It appears most likely 
that the evolution occurred over a period of several decades in the late fifteenth 
 century, and that evolution remains discernible in the multivalent nature of the 
term. For the past several centuries, the Tibetan term “Khache” has three broad 
 connotations: it is a geographic marker, it is religious designation, or a specific term 
to denote a Tibetan Muslim. The meaning of “Khache” followed a  terminological 
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evolution that paralleled Tibet’s own chronological interactions with Kashmir and 
with Islam.58 In its earliest formulation, the Tibetan word Khache referred nar-
rowly to the Himalayan region of Kashmir or to the Kashmiri people.59 The sec-
ond stage began several decades after the first permanent Kashmiri settlement 
with the arrival of Muslim immigrants from China who were also referred to as 
Khache. With this arrival of the Chinese Muslims, the dual meaning Kashmiri 
Muslim and Khache was quickly decoupled, and the term “Khache” evolved 
to mean all Muslims. The third stage occurred when the Khache communities 
settled, intermarried, and became Tibetan Muslims. In this final evolution, the 
term “Khache” came to refer to Tibetans rather than a foreign place or foreign 
religion. Tibetans have demonstrated little or no consternation over the  multiple 
meanings of “Khache.” As is common with ambiguous terminology, Tibetans had 
an array of terms that allowed one to distinguish between residential Tibetan 
Muslims and those transient Muslims from neighboring regions.
From the seventeenth century to 1959, the primary internal division among 
Tibetan Muslims fell along a South Asian–Chinese divide. The cultural,  commercial, 
and linguistic specializations reflected each group’s distinct geographic orientation. 
Since Muslims from South, Central, and East Asia all intermingled in the main 
cities of central Tibet, it was when Tibetan Muslims were spoken of in Tibetan 
that geographic prefixes were often affixed to indicate the communities’ external 
orientation, place of residency, or ancestry (e.g., Chinese Khache [Tib. rgya kha 
che] or Ladakhi Khache [Tib. la dwags kha che]).60 As explained in further detail 
below, these suffixes typically indicated the ancestral ties or cultural orientation, 
not that they were Chinese Muslim Hui or Ladakhi Muslims.
Barkor and Wapaling Khache
Within Lhasa, the Khache community was divided into two main  communities 
along linguistic and cultural lines, those of South Asian heritage and those of Chinese 
heritage.61 This terminology eventually achieved even finer  delineation within 
Lhasa and allowed for considerable specificity, referring to the  neighborhoods 
in which they settled and built their mosques: the Barkor or the Wapaling.62 By 
adding these modifiers the two communities were immediately distinguished from 
the other Khaches (or Kashmiri). The Barkor (South Asian) Khache,  predominantly 
involved in commerce, clustered around the central Barkor market area near the 
Jokhang Temple.63 The Wapaling (Chinese) Khache lived along Lhasa’s Wapaling 
neighborhood in the southeastern corner of Lhasa, near the Lhasa River and 
closer to their fields and the areas in which they were allowed to butcher  animals.64 
Tsarong Yangchen Dolkar, in her memoirs, described the Wapaling Khache 
community as primarily made up of vegetable sellers and  butchers but having a 
good reputation as selling the best quality and widest variety.65
The striking aspect of this heterogeneity of Lhasa’s two main groups was how 
rarely it was remarked on by outsiders. Even Xue Wenbo, a Muslim Chinese 
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intellectual who arrived in Tibet in 1951, noted his initial confusion in attempting 
to differentiate between the Barkor and the Wapaling Khache:
Just after arriving in Lhasa, I saw many Muslims on the streets, but I could not 
 distinguish which were Wapaling Khache (Ch. Huizu) and which were Barkor 
 Khache (Ch. ka-shi-mi-er ren). This was especially true with women who I could 
not even differentiate from Tibetan women. After sometime, when I concentrated, 
I began to see differences in their appearance and complexion, and also that some 
aspects of their manner of dress were different.66
If outsiders found it hard to grapple with the internal differences between the 
Wapaling and Barkor Khache, most struggled to come to grips with the other 
Khache communities that also flourished in Lhasa and many other central Tibetan 
towns.
Ladakhi Khache
Of all the Tibetan Muslim communities, the Ladakhi Khache tended to be the 
most frequently conflated with the local Tibetan Muslims. Although the Ladakhi 
certainly were prominent traders and had strong ties with the central Tibetan 
 government, by the 1920s it appears that aside from the subsidized triennial 
Lapchak (Tib. lo phyag) relatively little trade traveled directly between Lhasa and 
Ladakh. Central Tibetan trade, as British India flourished, oriented itself to the 
geographically closer and more lucrative India market.67 As Janet Rizvi pointed 
out in her study of Ladakhi trade, Ladakh was “at best a staging-post between the 
Punjab and Sinkiang, and Leh an entrepôt for the exchange of goods produced and 
consumed hundreds of miles away.”68 The Ladakhi did retain an official represen-
tative in Lhasa, referred to as a consul in many Anglophone sources. In the eyes 
of the Tibetan government, those who retained their Ladakhi status were not con-
sidered Tibetan and were exempt from some taxes and obligations.69 Twentieth-
century sources suggest that the community was dwindling in size and influence 
from several dozen households in the early twentieth century to only a fraction of 
that by the early 1950s.70
Singpa Khache
The Singpa Khache (Tib. sing pa; Ch. senba) have long existed as an identifiable 
subgroup of the Barkor Khache, but their name has caused considerable  confusion 
in English, Chinese, and Tibetan.71 Often misidentified as “Sikh,” the Singpa 
Khache trace their origins to Muslim soldiers led by Zorawar Singh, who fought 
for the upstart Dogra state in the Kashmiri-Ladakhi-Jammu region. Having 
 conquered Ladakh, the Dogra ruler in 1841 dispatched Singh to gain control 
over the trans-Himalayan region by invading Nepal through western Tibet. In an 
audacious assault, Zorawar Singh led his forces across western Tibet, running up 
a string of victories and controlling a broad swath of territory from Kashmir up to 
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the Nepalese border near Mount Kailash. But with his supply lines stretched and 
his campaign being overtaken by winter storms, Zorawar Singh suddenly found 
himself on the defensive. In a stunning reversal of fortune, Tibetan forces attacked 
Zorawar Singh’s much larger force in early December 1841, routed the Dogra 
army, killed the legendary general, and captured nearly a thousand soldiers in the 
process (all without the support or even tacit approval of Chinese forces).72
Unsure at first of what to do with such a large number of prisoners, the decision 
was made by the Tibetan authorities that since “it was not convenient to execute 
[the captured soldiers], it would be better to show mercy . . . and disperse them 
to various towns across Tibet.”73 Their continued presence is confirmed some 
years later, in the 1856 Nepal Tibet Treaty, where the Nepalese demanded that 
“the Tibetans are also to give back .  .  . [t]he [Singpa] prisoners of war who had 
been captured in 1841 in the war between Bhot [Tibet] and the Dogra ruler.”74 
Exactly how many prisoners returned (or were returned) is unclear, though the 
Singpa Khache remained a prominent presence within the Khache community, by 
one estimate making up as much as 20 percent of the nearly two hundred Barkor 
Khache families living in Lhasa in the early 1950s.75
Siling Khache
While the Barkor Khache likely settled in Lhasa prior to the arrival of their 
Wapaling counterparts, the Wapaling Khache grew demographically to be roughly 
as numerous as the Barkor Khache and served as key intermediaries for the 
Chinese officials serving in Lhasa. As the Qing brought Tibet increasingly into the 
Qing sphere of influence, Han and Hui Chinese, often first serving as soldiers or 
civil officials, settled in Lhasa, with the Hui typically marrying Wapaling Khache 
or Tibetan Buddhist women who converted. The primary exceptions to this were 
the Siling Khache, who were Tibetanized Hui from Qinghai, tracing their origins 
to the Amdo city of Siling (Tib. zi ling; Ch. Xining) in Qinghai province. They also 
tended to remain identifiable within the Lhasa Muslim communities. The Siling 
Khache aligned generally with the Wapaling Khache, but there were differences 
that allowed them to retain a separate identity from the other Wapaling Khache. 
By the twentieth century the Siling were a highly differentiated and identifiable 
group within the Wapaling Khache.76
Gharib Khache
In addition to the above divisions, largely associated with a group’s origin, a 
third group called “ghārib” (paupers) appears to have existed only in Lhasa.77 The 
nineteenth-century account of Khwajah Gulam Muhammad describes a Muslim 
pauper’s guild, composed exclusively of Khache, that paralleled (or perhaps was a 
subset) of the Ragyapa (Tib. rags rgyab pa).78 The Ragyapa are a Tibetan  hereditary 
class who carried out acts considered unclean or undesirable by Tibetans, such as 
disposing of corpses and animal remains, and they also served other functions like 
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the guarding and execution of prisoners. Given the difficulty most  non-Tibetans 
had differentiating between Khache and Kashmiri, it is not surprising that few 
non-Tibetan sources suggest the presence of the Khache Ragyapa.79 For this  reason 
Khwajah Gulam Muhammad’s description from the late nineteenth  century 
is invaluable, as it details a highly organized association having its own leaders 
and police. It is significant that he suggests they were recognized by the Tibetan 
 government and even received a monthly stipend.
The fifteenth of each month, a group of twelve to twenty or twenty-five gharīb  present 
themselves at the Potala Palace, and with all their force howl and shout, and then 
 receive each month eighteen tanka, that is to say the equivalent of twenty mohors 
[gold coins]. This is a stipend that they have received since ancient times.80
More recently, Tsarong Yangchen Dolkar has recounted that one of Lhasa’s most 
famous beggers was a man call “Khache Powo” who used to beg by singing 
the lines, “happier than us is not even the gods of heaven.”81 The most recent 
indication of Ghārib Khache comes from Gaborieau, who while interviewing 
Tibetan Muslim refugees to India in 1961 confirmed the existence of such a class 
of Muslims and was told that a dozen or so of those families had fled from Tibet 
to India.82
The occupational definition of Gharīb Khache—butchers, waste collectors, and, 
in general, a surveillance force—was not unique among the Khache. While rarely 
as strongly enforced in the manner of the hereditary tasks assigned to the Gharīb 
Khache, each of the Khache groups tended to be defined, if only by reputation, 
by specific professions. The occupational orientation shaped where the various 
Khache communities congregated within Lhasa.
The numerous subgroups within the Khache community suggest that the 
Khache presence was not transient, ephemeral, or brief but that they were an inte-
gral and active element of Lhasa and Tibetan society. This historical commentary 
demonstrates that Tibetans across central Tibet were aware of the distinctions 
among the Khache and perceived them as being Tibetan. This awareness arose in 
part as a result of the Khache community’s presence in commercial, social, and 
political fields pivotal to the functioning of Tibetan society. A clear definition of 
who the Khache are is inherently tied to a clear understanding of what it means to 
be Tibetan or even what we mean when we talk of Tibet.
THE KHACHE:  SEPAR ATE BUT TIBETAN
Early twentieth-century estimates consistently identify several thousand Khache 
across all central Tibetan communities. In 1934, a Chinese Muslim, Zhu Xiu, 
 estimated that the Khache numbered roughly 800 households in a total Lhasa 
population of 6,500 lay households.83 By the 1940s, several Chinese articles on 
the Tibetan Muslim community, reported that the Hui, originally from Shaanxi, 
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Sichuan, and Yunnan, “represent two-thirds of the Muslim (Ch. Huimin) 
community, while the Indian and Tibetan Muslims (Ch. Huimin) represent 
one-third.”84 In an article written a year later, a Muslim Chinese estimated that the 
Chinese Muslims “have 120 or so households,” while the Barkor Khache, or as he 
called them the “Indian Hui” (Ch. yindu Huimin), “have 70 or so households.”85 In 
1934, the Chinese envoy to Lhasa, Huang Musong, estimated the Lhasa population 
of “Han [Chinese] and Muslim [Chinese]” (Ch. Han Hui renmin) at 300 or 400 
households. Almost certainly he was talking of the Wapaling Khache and the mixed 
Tibetan-Chinese population (Tib. ko ko).86
By the 1950s, more authoritative and precise population figures began to 
emerge. When a Beijing Chinese Muslim, Xue Wenbo, entered Lhasa with 
the People’s Liberation Army in December 1951, he concluded that “the Lhasa 
Hui (Ch. Huizu) have 150 households, with a population of several thousand 
people.”87 His approximation accords with official estimates from 1953 that state 
the Khache (Ch. kaji) had 141 households.88 This suggests that the number of 
Muslims in Lhasa by the mid-nineteenth century exceeded 3,000 individuals.89 
The population of smaller communities in Shigatse, Tsetang, and other small 
towns across central Tibet outside of Lhasa approached but did not surpass that 
of Lhasa proper (though in total these other communities likely did not surpass 
Lhasa’s entire Muslim population).90
Perhaps the only single moment in time when we are able to confirm this 
estimate of roughly 3,000 Muslims living in central Tibet with a high degree of 
precision is in 1960 during the Tibetan Muslim Incident, examined in detail in 
chapter 5.91 In that incident Chinese and Indian officials identified and allowed 
nearly 1,500 Barkor Khaches—men, women, and children—to leave China and 
enter India by virtue of their “Kashmiri” identity.92 Several dozen others were 
allowed to leave for Nepal largely because of marriage to a Nepalese (or half 
Nepalese Khatsara). The Wapaling Khache, who remained behind, numbered 
more than 1,000 .93
All later estimates are hopelessly confused with the influx of Hui from the 
Chinese interior (including the northwestern provinces of Gansu) and the 
shifts in terminology brought about by China’s ethnic classification project 
(Ch. minzu shibie). This resulted in Chinese making little differentiation between 
the Wapaling Khache and the in-migrating Muslim Chinese Hui. The matter was 
further confused by the arrival of large numbers of Muslim Chinese Hui. Due 
in part to this influx, the Wapaling Khache moved to the Small Mosque in the 
Barkor, relinquishing the Grand Mosque to the Chinese Hui.94 According to the 
1982 Chinese census for Tibet, Lhasa had 1,367 Muslim Chinese (Huizu), and 
given the strict residency limitations between 1960 and 1982, these were over-
whelmingly the Wapaling Khache who were not allowed to emigrate to India. The 
2000 census suggests that number had grown only to 1,741. This low number hints 
at the possibility that the Wapaling Khache might have registered themselves as 
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Tibetan rather than Hui in reaction to the influx of Han and Hui Chinese and the 
negative light in which such immigrants were perceived in Lhasa.95
If the presence of a substantial Tibetan Muslim community is incontrovertible, 
the ways in which that community integrated itself in mainstream Tibetan society 
also demonstrates how deeply acculturated and accepted the Khache were. It is 
instructive to draw attention to just how different they were from other foreign 
communities present in central Tibet. In the eighteenth and nineteenth  centuries, 
representatives from four foreign states were granted official status by the Tibetan 
government and posted to Lhasa: Nepal, Ladakh, Bhutan, and China. The 
Chinese Qing court appointed Ambans, or Imperial Residents, in Tibet (Ch. zhu 
zang dachen).96 The Nepalese were accorded the right by treaty to have an envoy 
(N. bhardar) stationed in Lhasa who was authorized to settle disputes involving 
Nepalese citizens.97 The Bhutanese and Ladakhis had posted representatives in 
Lhasa from at least the early eighteenth century. Despite Qing China’s  insinuations 
to the contrary, neither sent tribute missions to the Qing court.98 With the fall of 
the Qing Empire in 1911, the status of the Nepali, Ladakhi, and Bhutanese envoys 
remained unaltered. However, the representation of China’s central government 
to Lhasa remained a mixed and highly contentious issue well into the 1940s, 
 reflecting the political unrest within China proper.99
The only additional state accorded the right to post foreign envoys to Lhasa was 
Britain, which beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century and with 
a high degree of regularity dispatched delegations there. In 1936, Britain’s infor-
mal relationship took on a more permanent status in response to the Nationalist 
Chinese sending a “condolence mission” to Lhasa after the death of the Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama. Instead of returning to China, this mission not only remained in 
Lhasa and installed Lhasa’s first wireless radio transmitter, but then attempted to 
establish an official presence. Whether this office was a consulate or an office of 
the central government remained a point of contention. In response, the British 
swiftly sent their own delegation in 1936, establishing a permanent but technically 
unofficial mission under the leadership of Hugh Richardson, who became the first 
head of the British Mission in Lhasa.100
My emphasis on the presence of the foreign representatives in Tibet is to 
highlight the difference between these foreign envoys and the Khache  leadership 
which was often erroneously grouped together with these foreign emissaries. The 
presence of Khache leaders did not escape the notice of foreign observers. Often 
erroneously believing the Khache were themselves foreign (and thus providing 
an accurate model of what rights and privileges the foreign visitors might be 
also accorded) often described with great accuracy the nature and powers of the 
Khache leadership. In 1845, the French Jesuit priest Evariste Huc remarked that 
the Khache “in Lhasa  .  .  . [the Khache] have a chief who oversees their immedi-
ate needs, and whose authority is recognized by the Tibetan Government.”101 An 
early  nineteenth-century Chinese gazetteer noted that the Wapaling (Ch. chantou) 
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Khache were governed by a council composed of four people: “three community 
leaders” (Ch. datou ren) representing those Khaches from in and around Lhasa 
(Ch. qianzang) and a “single community leader” (Ch. datou ren) for those Muslims 
in and around Shigatse.102 The Barkor Khache had a single community leader 
(datou ren).103
A century later, George Sandberg explained correctly that the Khache 
“governor, who is chosen by the Tibetan Gye-po from among the [Khache] 
 residents of Lhasa, decides all disputes between his own countrymen,” but then 
he, incorrectly, attempted to suggest this is the same as “the Nepalese  governor 
[who] exercises the same powers over the Nepalese inhabitants.”104 In 1916, 
Charles Bell also noted that “the Kashmiris at Lhasa are under the jurisdiction 
of their own headmen, these being appointed by the Tibetan Government.”105 
Gaborieau, in his summary of the Khache pöpo, or community leaders (Tib. dpon 
po), summarizes the status precisely: “In effect, the kha-che ‘go-pa was not a 
consul: he was not responsible to any foreign government, but rather to the 
za’idah [Tibetan-born Khaches] who constituted the majority of [Khaches] in 
Tibet, and retained ties neither to Kashmir, nor to any other region of India.”106 
The significance of differentiating the status of the Khache headmen from the 
foreign consuls might appear minor, but it highlights an important  distinction. 
The Khache headmen functioned as administrators entirely within the  framework 
of the Tibetan bureaucracy. Instead of being seen as representatives of foreign 
missions from neighboring states, they served as representatives of community 
associations formally recognized by the Tibetan government and served at the 
behest of the Tibetan state at the lowest level of government.
Rebecca French describes, insightfully and more broadly, both the function 
and the force that such community associations wielded within Lhasa and central 
Tibet:
Perhaps the most important interstitial and interconnecting networks of individuals 
in Tibet were the associations, kyiduk dang tsokpa (skyid sdug dang tshogs pa). As 
the fourth level [of the Tibetan bureaucracy], they constituted bounded social units 
that played an essential role in solving the disputes of their members and acted on 
behalf of their members in disputes with outsiders. Associations could be based on 
ethnic, religious, occupational or social similarities or formed around mutual-aid 
and special-purpose commonalities.107
Whether out of ignorance or unacknowledged bias, European accounts repeatedly 
grouped the Khache leadership with other foreign representatives.108 Regardless, 
the administrative structure of the Lhasa municipal associations demonstrates a 
responsive and nuanced awareness of the complex subgroups within the Khache 
community and how they functioned within the central government.
Despite sharing many commonalities, often praying at the same mosque and 
frequently inter-marrying, the Khache were distinguished legally, culturally and 
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socially by the Tibetan state. The distinct division between the communities is 
most apparent in the Tibetan government’s treatment of them as separate commu-
nities, governed by discrete councils who reported to different ministries within 
the government. Each of the five Khache communities, including the Gharīb and 
Singpa, had their own separate headmen (Tib. mgo pa).”109 In the case of the Barkor 
Tibetan Muslims, their self-selected leader reported to the Finance Ministry 
(Tib. rtsis khang) since they were engaged primarily in trade and commerce.110 
The Wapaling Tibetan Muslims’ leader (Tib. wapaling ponpo) reported directly 
to the Agriculture Ministry (Tib. so nam las khungs).111 While it is often assumed 
that the Wapaling Khache were assigned to the Agriculture Ministry because they 
were agriculturalists, Könchok Samden, an official in the Tibetan government, 
ascribed this to the fact that “people who came from other places such as from 
Kham, Amdo or from central Tibet and who did not thane a specific lord, in other 
words, who were people just roaming around, they all belonged to the Agriculture 
Office so it collected the mibo [Tib. mi bogs, “head tax”] from them.  .  .  . [A]nd 
they also had a gembo [headman; Tib. rgan po] who was also appointed by the 
Agriculture Office itself.”112 Tibetan archival documents from 1938 describe 
the Barkor Khache committee as constituted of a leader, a primary assistant, 
a  secondary assistant, and two members. Sometimes, though, there was an 
 alternative description, specifying joint leadership by the Barkor and the Singpa 
pönpo plus three assistants.113
The precise powers and legal authority of the councils tended to be directed 
inward to the members of their own community. Abū Bakr Amīruddīn Tibbatī 
Nadvī’s study of Tibetan Muslims described the powers of this five-member 
 committee as “adjudicat[ing] all issues pertaining to Muslims, and the Tibetan 
government never interfered with its functions.”114 Khwajah Ghulam Muhammad 
describes the nature and powers such councils had during his visit in 1895:
The verdict, in the majority of cases, is pronounced conforming to the  injunctions 
of Islamic law. Though the sanctions for adultery and theft is neither stoning nor 
the amputation of the hand [as traditionally dictated by Islamic law], but other 
 punishments are given. If the dispute is between a Muslim and a Tibetan, the case is 
heard by a mixed tribunal [of Khache and Tibetans].115
Even when a Muslim was found to be involved in theft or in a quarrel among 
Khaches, he was invariably handed over to this committee.116
Mirroring the Barkor Khache pönpo, the Wapaling also had a selected leader 
who served as the administrative head for their community. Perhaps because their 
community was not as diverse as the Barkor Khache, the Wapaling council had a 
more streamlined multimember committee. Both committees reported, paid their 
taxes, and confirmed the election of their head to the administrative ministries 
that were responsible for them.
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The dilemma of trying to speak monolithically of “Tibetan Muslims” lies 
largely in the geographic positioning of Tibet. Almost all of the Tibetan Muslim 
 communities that thrived within Tibet originally emigrated from non-Tibetan 
lands, most often as traders. As a result, unlike the Ladakhi, the Nepalese, and 
even the Chinese, the Khache considered themselves, and were treated as, fully 
Tibetan within decades after their arrival in central Tibet. In certain circles, 
many today seek to position the Muslim Tibetans as vital indicators of Tibet’s 
 internal and external relations. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, for example, often 
cites the  centuries-long cordial relationship between Tibetan Buddhists and 
Tibetan Muslims as a model for interreligious understanding.117 Conversely, an 
 emerging number of scholars are suggesting that the friction between “Tibetans 
and Muslims,” said to have existed for centuries, is rarely historically accurate. 
More appropriate would be to note that the interethnic violence occurred in very 
specific periods of time and geographically delimited places, namely, in the eastern 
Tibetan Amdo region and during the violent warlord period.118 Yet as the world 
began to increasingly encroach on Tibet’s autonomy, it would challenge the  multiple 
identities that the outside world read into the Tibetan Muslim communities.
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How Half-Tibetans Made Tibet Whole
On October 6, 1942, a brawl between two half Tibetans—one a half Nepalese (Tib. 
kha tsa ra) and the other a half Chinese (Tib. ko ko)—broke out in the center of 
Lhasa.1 As it was later described by the British assistant political officer in Lhasa:
A half-breed Chinaman and a half-breed Nepali started a quarrel outside the 
 Cathedral [Jokhang]. The koko picked up a stone and hit the Nepali half-breed over 
the head. Four Tibetan constables now intervened. The koko flew, hotly pursued by 
the constables and sought refuge in the Chinese Mission. The constables followed, 
intending to arrest the koko, but were themselves arrested by Dr. Kong.2 
Insisting the Koko merited the representation of the Chinese government, 
Dr. Kong Qingzong refused to release him to Tibetan officials and held the 
four Tibetan policemen for nearly five months.3 It was only when the Tibetan 
 government withdrew all of the government’s assistance (including a  translator and 
essential supplies for the Chinese Mission) and demanded that Kong be cashiered 
that the Chinese home government intervened and ordered Dr. Kong to release the 
policemen.
On the surface, this might appear a simple case of an overzealous foreign 
 representative intervening to protect the rights of their citizens or China’s repre-
sentative in Tibet attempting to prevent Tibet from acting independently of the 
Chinese central government. Yet neither would be an accurate interpretation of the 
 situation. By 1942, China had, for three decades, ceased to have oversight of Tibetan 
affairs. Tibet’s laws were unequivocal on the matter. With few exceptions, those 
born in Tibet to a Tibetan mother were categorically treated as Tibetan subjects.
As far as the Chinese were concerned, however, China’s control over Tibet could 
be demonstrated historically. This reasoning, then as today, was selectively applied 
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to regions formerly controlled by China that had slipped out of China’s political 
control in the early twentieth century. Casually ignoring the  geopolitical realities, 
the Nationalist government perpetuated the notion that “China” included Tibet 
by a tenuous reading of the past. Insisting that since both Tibet and China came 
under Mongolian rule in the thirteenth century, it argued that Tibet should be 
considered Chinese from that point forward. Such explications, while  perhaps 
superficially plausible, crumble under more careful scrutiny. As the historian 
Warren W. Smith has written in his work on Tibet’s relationship to China, after 
the fall of the Mongols in the late fourteenth century China “had no real  interest 
in Tibet beyond Tibet’s role in Ming relations with the Mongols.” For the Tibetans, 
“Tibet’s continuing relations with the Mongols were much more politically 
 significant than Tibetan relations with the Ming.”4
It was only three hundred years later, with the rise of the Qing, that China’s 
more direct relationship with Tibet began under the Qing dynasty. But even then, 
its political oversight remained tenuous. As the Tibet scholar Fabienne Jagou pro-
vocatively contends, if one is speaking of Tibet as being part of China in the stricter 
sense of China having territorial control over Tibet, “it was only with the end of 
the 19th century that all three Tibetan provinces became a ‘buffer zone’ of overlap-
ping international interests and a focal point of Inner China and the maintenance 
of the Qing Empire.”5 However, the end of the nineteenth century was precisely 
the period when the Qing central government was at its weakest, undermining the 
argument that there was an unending line of direct Chinese control.
By the twentieth century, though many of Tibet’s distant neighbors schemed 
about ways to bring Tibet under their sphere of control, most treated Tibet as 
Metternich once famously described Italy, as merely a “geographical expression.”6 
No two of Tibet’s neighbors agreed on its political status, geographic delimitation, 
or international standing. Just as China insisted that Tibet remained part of China, 
the British perceived Tibet as it did many of the principalities in India, namely, 
professing the presence of native governance but appointing a British adviser to 
influence policy and deter others from doing the same. Both the Chinese and the 
British flattered themselves that Tibet remained in their sphere of influence while 
ignoring the mounting evidence of Tibet’s independence.
Jagou’s and Smith’s comments reflect the scholarly predisposition to defend 
Tibet’s independence primarily by examining its actions. Few studies have reversed 
the lens to question China’s political fragmentation during this same period. 
Between the fall of the Qing in 1911 and the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949, China proper (typically defined as China’s internal eighteen 
provinces) experienced multiple “central” governments, a nonstop succession of 
warlords, Japanese occupation, and a full-on civil war. One cannot identify any 
period from 1911 to 1950 when the Chinese central government could be described 
as exerting steady political, economic, or military control over the entirety of what 
today is understood as China. By comparison to China, Tibet appears the model 
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of political stability, establishing its de facto independence over the course of four 
decades. If one can accuse Tibet of anything, it is that, as Melvyn Goldstein has 
stated, Tibet was “poorly prepared to defend its contested status.”7
Given the considerable debate over Tibet’s political status, it is surprising that 
so little attention has been paid to its relations with its Himalayan neighbors and 
their activities in central Tibet. Tibet’s concern with regional, ethnic and occu-
pational identity stems not from a misplaced elitism or ethnocentrism, rather it 
arises out of a long history of ethnic and religious tolerance of and interaction with 
its neighbors. According to traditional Tibetan historical accounts, Tibet’s first 
ruler, King Songtsen Gampo (ca. 617–47), married both a Chinese and a Nepalese 
princess.8 The elevated stature of the two princesses in Tibet’s representation of its 
past can be measured in part by the fact that among their many accomplishments 
they are credited with bringing Buddhism to Tibet and founding two of Lhasa’s 
most sacred sites, the Jokhang and Ramoche Buddhist Temples.
Although this idealized framing of the past illustrates Tibet’s positive relations 
with its neighbors, it is with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 that the Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama and many Tibetan elites began to recognize the need to clarify pre-
cisely who they were claiming as their subjects within the emerging modern def-
initions of statehood. In this reformulation, the memory of the two princesses 
continued to play a crucial role in their representation of their past. In 1923, the 
Tibetan regent, in a letter to the Nepalese government attempting to resolve a 
tense issue, sought to strike a conciliatory note by opening the correspondence 
by invoking the marriage between the Tibetan king and the Nepalese princess as 
evidence that “ever since, the two states treated each other as the members of one 
house” and that relations between Nepal and Tibet were thus the same as “the rela-
tions between two brothers.”9
The relationship with China was presented quite differently. From a religio-
spirtual perspective, in the priest-patron relationship between the Qing and Tibet 
during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, the Dalai Lama had been 
superior to the emperor, as this was the dominant perspective in the Tibetan the-
ocracy. From a political point of view, the wobbly Chinese Republic that replaced 
the Qing had even less ability to enforce its will on Tibet.
With the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the Thirteenth Dalai 
Lama took formalized steps to demonstrate Tibet’s status as an independent 
state, including standardizing the Tibetan flag, issuing postage stamps, and 
printing Tibet’s first paper currency.10 Despite the unrelenting rhetoric emanat-
ing from China, it is difficult to identify any official Chinese presence in Tibet. 
As discussed more fully in the next chapter, many scholars (largely historians 
of China) have taken the lack of Tibetan declarations of independence during 
this time as hard and fast evidence that Tibet remained part of China. Here I 
persue a highly visible on-the-ground perspective that demonstrates how Tibet 
perceived and protected those it treated as Tibetans subject to Tibetan 
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 governance. Such a shift in perspective also allows us to better understand 
precisely how the Khache community negotiated their positioning within this 
complex Himalayan context always retaining and emphasizing their status as 
Tibetan subjects.
The adoption of a more Tibetan-centric frame of reference, one that fully 
emphasizes the importance of the Himalayan context, is crucial to appreciating 
the many steps Tibet took to act as an independent state. The traditional frame-
work in which the Tibetan government regulated foreigners, Tibetans, and half 
Tibetans—particularly in relation to their Himalayan neighbors—bears witness 
to its  perception of itself as an independent state grappling with modern concep-
tualizations of citizenship, race, and statecraft. The efforts of Tibet in support of 
its independence certainly demonstrate that descriptions of it as a “fourth world 
state” mired in “statelessness” with “non-state actors” are exaggerated.11 The 
specific cases also establish that many of the key examples used by those argu-
ing for Chinese control—particularly the role of Liu Manqing, Huang Musong, 
Kong Qingzong, and Shen Zonglian—upon closer examination show how tenu-
ous China’s presence was in Lhasa. Rather what we find is a Tibetan government 
and society confident of their sovereignty and knowing precisely who fell under 
its rule.
At the heart of almost every challenge to Tibet’s de facto independence were the 
communities that had existed as an integral part of Lhasa life for several  centuries: 
the half-Nepalese (Khatsara), the half-Chinese (Koko), and the Khache.12 The 
status of mixed-parentage offspring had concerned Tibetans and the Tibetan 
 government long before issues of nationality and citizenship began to shape global 
relations, particularly in the post–Versailles Treaty and later postcolonial periods. 
By the early twentieth century, the Tibetan government had unambiguous defini-
tions of who was and who was not Tibetan for the purposes of taxes, trade, and 
political rights.
The Khatsara and the Koko were two of most recognized and demographically 
significant groups within central Tibet. The Khatsara (Tib. Kha tsa ra; Newari, 
Khacarā; N. khaccar)13 were children of mixed Nepali-Tibetan parentage, and the 
Kokos were children of Chinese-Tibetan parentage. The origins of both terms  suggest 
an uncharitable view belied by the cordial acceptance and seamless  integration of 
these individuals into Tibetan culture. “Khatsara” originates from a Nepali word 
for “mule,” the infertile offspring of a donkey and a horse.14 Most Tibetans remain 
unaware of the derogatory roots of this term, hinting at a more sustained Nepalese 
disdain for such mixed children than an innate negative opinion of the Khatsara 
by the Tibetans. The term for half-Chinese Tibetans, Koko, is derived from “Koko 
Yak” (Tib. ko ko yak), the offspring of a yak and a dzo (Tib. mdzo), a cross between 
yaks and domestic cattle.15 The term’s derivation emphasizes the commonly accepted 
notion of cross-breeding among Tibetans as a natural occurrence rather than the 
negative implication that the terms “mongrel” or “half-breed” inherently retain.
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The populations of these mixed communities in Lhasa were estimated by the 
early twentieth century to be well over 1,000 individuals—a sizable presence in a 
city that was by most estimates no larger than 25,000 to 30,000 people in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Similar to the Khache communities, the Khatsaras 
and Kokos, while not limited to living in Lhasa, were largely concentrated in 
 central Tibet’s urban centers, thus amplifying their role in central Tibetan life.16
THE POLITICS OF MIXED PARENTAGE IN TIBET
For centuries, Lhasa attracted foreigners who, as merchants, soldiers, or laborer, 
found themselves in Tibet for extended but finite periods of time. Given the 
 transient nature of their postings to Tibet, these foreign communities were unique 
in ways that altered the manner in which they were treated, understood, and 
 distinguished by most Tibetans. Lhasa’s foreign communities varied in significant 
ways from the diasporic communities found across Asia. Unlike overseas Indian 
and Chinese communities, very few foreigners permanently settled in Lhasa.
Nepalese picnic outside of Lhasa, 1921. Picnics were a common  summertime activity of all 
groups in Lhasa. Note the diversity of the individuals in the photo, ranging from the clearly 
Newari hosts sitting at the table next to the phonograph but also the Chinese, Tibetan, and 
Khatsara individuals who were guests participating in the festivities. Copyright Pitt Rivers 
Museum, University of Oxford.
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The foreign sojourners, mostly from Nepal and China but also Kashmir, Bhutan, 
and Sikkim, tended to be overwhelmingly transient, young, and male.17 Combined 
with central Tibet’s gender imbalance due to the large number of males joining 
monasteries, many of these foreign men formed relationships, and in some cases 
established households, with Tibetan women. It was the children of these mixed 
unions who emerged as clearly identifiable cores of the foreign communities in 
the central Tibetan cities of Lhasa, Shigatse, and Gyantse and to a lesser extent in 
the eastern Tibetan cities of Dartsedo (Ch. Kangding) and Siling (Ch. Xining). 
As a result, while foreign observers, particularly in the twentieth century, viewed 
them as non-Tibetan, the Khatsara, Koko, and Khache were uniformly perceived 
as Tibetan by Tibetans.
Out of this ethnic and cultural mix, a consistently used nomenclature emerged 
for the offspring of mixed parentage: Tibetan Muslim (Khache), half-Nepalese 
(Khatsara), half-Chinese (Koko). Like the Khache, the Khatsara and the Koko 
played a prominent role in Lhasa society. Confusion arose as outsiders  consistently 
conflated the “mixed parentage” term to mean non-Tibetan. Yet with the  majority 
of these half-Tibetans being raised by Tibetan mothers, the mixed offspring 
retained strong cultural and, as we will see, legal ties to Tibet. In this way, and on 
a daily basis within Tibetan society, the Khatsara, Koko, and Khache tended to be 
treated not as outsiders but as identifiable Tibetan subgroups.
Of the three communities, only the Khatsara retained vestigial legal rights 
of citizenship as a result of their foreign mixed parentage.18 This legal status, 
sharply delineated in ways quite different from the Koko and the Khache, arose 
largely from the fact that of all Tibet’s neighbors none remained so consistently 
engaged and demographically present in Tibetan society as the Nepalese. Nepalese 
 merchants were semipermanent residents, often taking Tibetan wives, as early as 
the seventeenth century.19 The growing number of incidents over the Khatsaras’ 
rights emerged as a point of conflict by the mid-nineteenth century, leading to 
the Nepalese inserting a clause in the Treaty of Thapathali of 1856. In a treaty with 
only ten articles, three deal directly with Nepalese subjects in Tibet. Specifically, 
Nepal gained the right to post an envoy (N. bhardar or vakil) in Lhasa who was 
given legal oversight over all Nepalese residents in Tibet, including half Nepalese 
and “Nepalese Khache” (N. Nepal ka Kashmiri).20 The emphasis on granting male 
Khatsaras legal protection in Tibet reflected an acknowledgment by the Nepalese 
community that such children had virtually no legal standing back in Nepal.
At the same time, Nepalese traders relied on their half-Tibetan offspring to 
help them maintain a commercial presence in Tibet during their extended 
absences. While the Nepalese may have held children of these mixed marriages 
in  contempt, they relied enough on the Khatsaras’ role as guardians of lucrative 
Nepalese  business interests to jealously guard their legal status within Tibet. It is 
 significant that the term “Khatsara,” while highly derogatory in Nepalese, retains 
little of those pejorative overtones in Tibetan. From the nineteenth century on, 
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these conflicting perceptions of the Khatsara caused the Khatsara population to 
remain a primary cause of tension between Tibet and Nepal.
With the departure of the Chinese in 1912, the Nepalese, and consequently 
the Khatsara, became the most dominant foreign presence in Lhasa, and they 
 increasingly leveraged their privileged position to their economic benefit. Such 
economic activity resulted in the Khatsara becoming an increasingly vilified group 
by their Tibetan business rivals. After 1912, Tibetans accused the Khatsara of minor 
but persistent acts of fraud and theft. These offenses were often undertaken with 
the open protection of the Nepalese consul. The growing bias against the Khatsara 
often boiled over during the Great Prayer Festival (Tib. smon lam chen mo).
The Great Prayer Festival was one of Lhasa’s prominent celebrations. Tibetans 
from across the region flocked to the city. Monks flowed into Lhasa from the 
 surrounding monasteries. The population of the city doubled, and according to 
 tradition monks took administrative control of the city for the duration of the 
 festival. The monk officials, who were notoriously stringent in punishing any 
infraction, accused Khatsaras on numerous occasions of refusing payment on 
goods or, alternately, of demanding that goods be sold to them at extortionately low 
prices. When confronted with their crimes, Khatsaras would inevitably maintain 
their innocence and seek protection from the Nepalese consul, which only further 
inflamed the large crowds. In numerous instances the public outcry spiraled into 
violence, with rioting and the frequent destruction of Nepalese shops.21
The popular disdain of the Khatsara did not arise out of ethnic bias, religious 
prejudice, or Tibetan nationalism. Accounts from early twentieth-century Tibet 
are rife with anecdotes clearly explaining that the animosity towards Khatsara 
were based on their unfair business practices and the perception they were hiding 
behind their Nepalese foreign parentage.22 Foreign visitors often remarked on the 
tension. In 1921, Charles Bell observed in his characteristically laconic manner that 
“disputes between the Tibetan and Nepalese Governments are not uncommon, 
and sometimes reach an acute stage.”23 A few years later the political officer posted 
to Lhasa, Major F. M. Bailey, succinctly summarized the popular perceptions:
The Newars who settled in Tibet as traders married Tibetan women and all their 
halfbreed sons are Nepalese subjects. This arrangement was peacefully observed 
for many years and in case of any disputes arising between the subjects of the two 
States, the subjects report[ed] the case to their respective authorities, who decided 
the case at once to the satisfaction of both. Since sometime, some of the khachars 
[ Khatsaras] have been breaking the law, and in defiance of the laws of Tibet they 
make big cases out of trifling matters with the help of the Captain, the Agent of the 
Maharaja of  Nepal. . . . In spite of our [the British] efforts, the Nepalese officer desires 
the  khachars [Khatsaras] to win their cases although they are in fault.24
The animosity toward the Khatsaras tended to cluster around the excessive privi-
leges, perceived and real, that the Nepalese and Khatsaras garnered as a result 
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of their special status. Fearful of disrupting relations between Nepal and Tibet, 
the Tibetan authorities rarely pressed the privileges held by the Nepalese. Instead 
Tibet repeatedly sought to reclassify the Khatsara as Tibetans, to be treated like 
the Khache and Koko: as Tibetans, subject to Tibet’s laws, taxes, and regulations.25 
The Nepalese government adamantly and repeatedly rejected any overture by the 
Tibetan government to change the Khatsaras’ status.
Despite Nepal’s pressing for protection of the Khatsaras’ legal status in Tibet, 
the Khatsaras occupied a very tenuous legal position in Nepal. According to the 
Nepalese scholar Tirtha Mishra, until the mid-twentieth century Khatsaras held 
no legal claim to their fathers’ Nepalese property, even if they were the only  living 
heirs.26 The Newari’s strict caste-class system considered the Khatsaras, who were 
often practicing Buddhists, unclean. Thus, prior to 1950, they were rarely invited 
(or ritually allowed) to return to Nepal to the embrace of the larger  family.27 
In addition, Nepalese officials levied an annual tax on Khatsaras living in Tibet, 
forced them to pay a surcharge when obtaining a Nepalese passport, and charged 
them the same tariffs as foreigners. Notwithstanding Nepal’s dismissive attitude 
towards the Khatsaras and despite repeated attempts by Tibetan authorities to 
bring the Khatsaras back under their direct rule with promises to collect and 
deliver taxes to Nepal at five times the normal rate, the Nepalese government 
 preferred the status quo.28
Tensions continued to grow as the Khatsaras continued to abuse their  special 
privileges, as did Tibetan outrage that a group they considered Tibetan were 
allowed to persist in such obviously inappropriate behavior. Some Tibetans 
 suggested that the level of benefits and protection had grown to the extent that even 
non-Khatsaras were claiming themselves to be Khatsara. In one such  incident, 
which occurred during the Great Prayer Festival in the late 1920s, Chabdam 
Ugen, a Tibetan monk acting in his role as a monastic warden during the festival, 
overheard a Khatsara monk telling a confidant about a crime he had committed. 
Understanding Nepalese, the elder monk immediately arrested him, only to have 
the younger monk protest his innocence and declare his immunity as a Khatsara. 
Unable to contain his indignation, Chabdam Ugen replied, “If you are a Khatsara 
I am a na-tsara” (Tib. khyoe Khatsara yina nga natsara yin),” with “na-tsara” being 
a nonsensical made-up term implying the man was an imposter.29 Though the 
arrest is said to have caused a minor diplomatic row, Chabdam Ugen became a 
minor celebrity for his actions. The tendency of Khatsaras to abuse their immunity 
fueled growing popular indignation against the half-Nepalese community.
The growing outrage over the legal protection given the Khatsara culminated 
in the infamous “Gyalpo Affair” of 1929. Sherpa Gyalpo, sixty-five years old at the 
time of the incident, was born in Tibet and raised from the age of five in Nepal by 
his Nepalese uncle. According to court documents, Gyalpo married a Nepalese 
Sherpa woman and worked for a decade as a tenant farmer in Nepal, then took 
a series of odd jobs before finally becoming an itinerant curio dealer trading 
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items between Lhasa, Darjeeling, and Kathmandu. The strong relationships he 
forged while in this trade gave rise to rumors of sordid activities he conducted 
under cover of this ostensible trade in rare objects and jewelry. Many Tibetans 
accused him of being a Nepalese spy who used his supply of high-end (and highly 
 desirable) coral and turquoise to gain entry into many of Lhasa’s elite households.30 
As was common among many Nepalese and Khatsara men, he took a local Tibetan 
woman as a second wife to help run his affairs during his absence. His status as a 
Khatsara allowed him to avoid paying taxes on many of his goods, which fostered 
considerable resentment among Tibetan traders, a reaction only exacerbated by 
Gyalpo’s imperious behavior toward others in Lhasa’s trading circles.31
It is unclear exactly why Tibetan authorities charged Gyalpo in early 1928 with 
a “series of alleged offenses ranging from the illicit trade in cigarettes and tobacco, 
minting counterfeit Tibetan copper coins,  .  .  . and above all furnishing secret 
 information to the Nepalese Vakil in Lhasa.”32 These scattershot  accusations led 
some to speculate that the charges were fabricated and that the Tibetan  government 
simply wanted a scapegoat to soothe local discontent and to deflect blame for the 
years of ineffectual efforts to resolve the Khatsara issues. Others suggested that his 
arrest would be better characterized as a backlash against the Khatsaras’ grow-
ing immunity in the Tibetan legal system. Gyalpo’s arrogance and high-profile 
behavior made him a perfect target in the eyes of many Tibetans. The incident 
might have ended there if public resentment had simply faded and government 
officials had quietly resolved any differences. However, popular opinion within 
Lhasa clamored for a harsh sentence, and the Nepalese government refused to 
accept any blame and rejected anything less than complete exoneration of Gyalpo, 
on the basis that Tibetan courts had no jurisdiction over Nepalese citizens.33
Held in custody for more than a year, Gyalpo managed to flee to the Nepalese 
legation in September 1929. The drama of his escape, and the swift sanctuary 
 provided by the Nepalese consul, caused many to suspect collusion between the 
two governments, thus reigniting popular resentment. The Nepalese reasserted 
their claims that it was perfectly legal for a Nepalese resident, a Khatsara, to seek 
sanctuary. They refused to turn him over to the Tibetans until it was agreed that 
his case would be settled by a joint judicial proceeding.34 Tibetan  authorities 
replied that Gyalpo was simply a Tibetan trying to avoid government oversight 
and  taxation by falsely asserting to be a Khatsara. They twice summoned the 
Nepalese vakil before the Kashag, but he stubbornly refused to release Gyalpo 
until the question of his nationality was settled.
With public pressure mounting, the government acted. On August 25, two 
weeks after his escape, over a thousand Tibetan police and soldiers stormed 
the legation and forcibly removed Gyalpo. Gyalpo found himself again placed 
in detention, now with round-the-clock guards.35 Nepalese sources claim that 
 following his return to Tibetan custody, his jailers alternately caned and scalded 
him with boiling water until he died from his injuries some days later.36 Tibetan 
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sources asserted that he succumbed to pneumonia and that they were blameless 
in his death. British accounts tend to support the Nepalese claims. They indicate 
he died a slow, painful death from his injuries and that he ultimately succumbed 
to gangrene, for “pieces of flesh have begun to drop out of the affected parts.”37 
All three sources agree that until his death, Gyalpo refused to sign a statement 
attesting to his Tibetan nationality.
In most Tibetan accounts, the case of Sherpa Gyalpo is cast as a prime example 
of the excesses occurring under Tibetan governance in the 1930s, in particular, due 
to the influence of the Tibetan official, Lungshar. Representing an ultraconserva-
tive and reactionary side of Tibetan politics, Lungshar is typically presented as a 
villain who pushed Tibet to the brink of war with Nepal.38 But the Gyalpo case 
suggests considerably more was at stake.
More than a singular case of an individual attempting to falsely hide behind 
his Nepalese citizenship, the Gyalpo Affair offers insight into the complex stance 
Tibetan authorities adopted in distinguishing between those who were clearly 
 foreigners (e.g., the Nepalese, Bhutanese, Ladakhi, and Chinese) and those who 
were often confused with foreigners but considered Tibetan (e.g., the Khache 
and Koko) and the Khatasara, who tended to play both sides against the middle.39 
In fact, Sherpa Gyalpo’s ambiguous status was the exception to the norm in the 
 treatment of the Khatsara. With the strong Nepalese bias against the Khatsara 
 hindering their return to Nepal and commercial incentives enticing them to 
remain in Tibet, it was rare for the Khatsara to leave Tibet. According to local 
 perceptions, the Khatsara were considered Tibetan in all but their citizenship.
As the Nepalese scholar Prem R. Uprety has demonstrated, documents 
 uncovered in the Nepalese archives almost certainly certify Gyalpo’s status 
as a Khatsara. From the perspective of the Tibetan government, its case was 
equally ironclad, for it maintained that since the matter of his birth in Tibet was 
 undisputed, little else mattered. (It should be noted that at the time considerable 
emphasis was also placed on the signed affidavits of nine witnesses who swore that 
Gyalpo was not Nepalese, although their motives in making the sworn statements 
were deemed dubious).40
The Gyalpo Affair also illustrates the shifting measures used by governments to 
assert, authenticate, and endorse citizenship in the twentieth century, as well as the 
increasing difficulties individuals faced when seeking to verify their  citizenship 
in a world without clear national boundaries, passports, or identity papers. As 
Gyalpo’s case demonstrated, it was community confirmation, not state documents, 
that remained the central determiner of the validity of such cases.41 An established 
Nepali merchant and his Khatsara son who lived in Lhasa their entire lives were 
likely to have had little difficulty establishing their provenance. It was harder for 
someone like Gyalpo who led a peripatetic life with relatives and property both 
inside and outside of Tibet. Marital relations figured prominently in establishing 
one’s Himalayan identity, and that also complicated Gyalpo’s case: his first wife 
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being Sherpa suggested he was Nepalese, while his second wife being Tibetan led 
many to believe he was Tibetan. Though the details of Gyalpo’s case remained in 
dispute between the Nepalese and Tibetan governments, the Tibetan government 
had the more difficult task of proving he was not Khatsara in spite of the strong 
evidence of his Nepalese upbringing, his Sherpa wife, and his self-identification as 
a Khatsara.
Gyalpo’s arrest and death, far from a marginal footnote, took Nepal and Tibet to 
the brink of war. In February 1930, the Nepalese prime minister mobilized troops, 
and Tibet quickly followed suit.42 With Gyalpo’s death, however, relations between 
the two countries eased. Not wanting to see Tibet get engaged in a war with their 
protectorate state, British officials worked to deescalate the situation. On March 
7 the Thirteenth Dalai Lama wrote a formal apology acknowledging that Tibetan 
police had entered the Nepalese legation. He wrote, “Once more for the sake of 
unity, with deep regret I submit this apology to the Maharaja [of Nepal].”43 Given 
the diplomatic discord, the rumors of war, and the tales that circulated among 
Tibetan tea and beer houses about this and other cases for many years afterward, 
one can understand how outsiders new to Lhasa misinterpreted the incident as a 
series of border issues rather than an issue of nationality.
Treated primarily as a border incident in the nationalist histories of India, 
Nepal, and China, the Gyalpo case highlights the manner in which individuals 
of mixed parentage shaped the definition of Tibetan citizenship in distinct ways. 
The confusion and tensions over Sherpa Gyalpo’s nationality highlights a seldom 
acknowledged but common facet of Tibetan society. His case is important for 
gaining an understanding of the evolution of twentieth-century Tibetan notions of 
citizenship. Unfortunately, this incident only served to muddle the position of the 
Khatsara, Koko, and Khache in Tibetan society because many outside  observers 
assumed all three groups held the same rights and privileges in Tibet.44
Efforts to treat Khatsaras, Kokos, and Khaches as synonyms for Nepalese, 
Chinese, and Kashmiris effectively masked the central role these mixed communi-
ties played in Tibet, despite the fact that the latter two groups were without ques-
tion subject to Tibetan law. The resentment toward the Khatsara largely stemmed 
from the fact only male Khatsaras could claim Nepalese citizenship and thus were 
the only individuals of mixed parentage who could claim foreign status.45 Female 
Khatsaras, that is, women with a Nepalese father and Tibetan mother, were, for all 
intents and purposes, considered Tibetan (though still referred to as Khatsara). 
The fact that only male offspring could claim foreign citizenship became a cen-
tral indicator of the Khatsara status to many outside observers. The confusion 
arose when outsiders, believing that the Koko and the Khache held the same sta-
tus, incorrectly assumed that Koko and Khache men were foreign but that their 
women remained Tibetan. Some accounts took this a step further to suggest that 
the status of Khache children as Tibetan or foreign depended on the gender of the 
offspring (e.g., daughters being Buddhist and sons, Muslim).46
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At the heart of such confusion lay the unmistakable fact that all Khatsara, 
Koko, and Khache were originally offspring of marriages between Tibetans and 
non-Tibetans. As Khatsaras were, by definition, the children of Nepalese men 
and Tibetan women, many accounts sought to assert that this was equally the 
case with the Koko and Khache. One such account suggested that “all [Khache] 
Muslims marry Tibetan women.”47 At the same time, some visitors insisted that for 
 religious reasons Khaches only married other Khaches, accepting at face value the 
 common Muslim assertion that the Khache were entirely endogamous.48 This was 
likely a misconception stemming from the fact that Muslims are expected to only 
marry Muslims. All this means is that the Tibetan women who married Khache 
men were expected to convert prior to marriage; it did not prohibit Khaches from 
marrying ethnic Tibetans.49 The central point here is that among the Khatsara, 
Koko, and Khache, only Khatsara men had the right of extraterritoriality.
The demographic inference of these claims—that all Khache women only 
 married Khache men, while Khache men tended to marry Tibetan women—is 
that the community would have consistently grown in size over the centuries 
rather than remain, as it did, at approximately three thousand individuals. It is 
far more likely that the Khache engaged in exogamous marriage with Tibetans 
in greater numbers than the other two groups in order to maintain a more or 
less numerically stable Khache community over several centuries.50 Even as early 
as the eighteenth century, Bogle noted that “the Kashmiris settled in Tibet are 
mostly the offspring of Tibetans.”51 Evidence points heavily toward the conclusion 
that intermarriage between Khache and their Tibetan Buddhist neighbors caused 
little consternation among either group. Certainly, historical evidence suggests 
that Khache men and Tibetan women married frequently enough that it was not 
viewed as atypical or objectionable.52
Perhaps the most extreme such characterization is that of Ghulam Muhammad 
in early 1933. Almost certainly motivated by the attempt to curry favor with the 
British (and elicit direct British support), he maintained, “The Muslims had long 
been taking Buddhist girls in marriage. A few months ago, the Tibetan authorities 
gave orders that all such women should revert to their former religion.”53 Perhaps 
fearing that the British would soon learn no such law was enacted, he quickly 
added that the Dalai Lama had rescinded that order. Then, rather bewilderingly, 
he insisted that the “Tibetans confiscated the mosque of the Muslims,” but it was 
later restored by the Dalai Lama. His most peculiar assertion was that the “Chinese 
Muslims who reside in Lhasa are not treated this way.” Muhammad’s entire letter, 
with its numerous contradictions, is most sensibly read not as an accurate descrip-
tion of Khache marriage practices but as an effort on his part to play to the British 
interest in retaining influence in Tibet and to be offered direct oversight of the 
Barkor Khache.54 His statements suggest that anxieties over mixed marriages were 
of greater concern to foreigners trying to maintain their preformed notions of a 
pure Buddhist land than they were to Tibetans themselves.
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By the 1940s, when we have a far greater number of personal memoirs, anecdotal 
evidence suggests there were few if any barriers to intermarriage between Khache, 
Nepalese, or Chinese with Tibetans. Phünwang Wangye, a founding member of 
the Tibetan Communist Party, married a Wapaling Khache named Tsilila (Tib. 
mdzes legs lags).55 Abdul Wahid Radhu, a Ladakhi Khache who traveled to Lhasa 
in the 1940s, noted that “intermarriages were common,” and he detailed a number 
of intermarriages within his family across three generations.56 In a more systematic 
study, the Chinese scholar Chen Bo confirms this practice by citing Tibetan 
archival records from 1960 that estimate Khache intermarriage constituted roughly 
85 percent of all Khache marriages.57
Significantly, although many foreign sources tend to characterize the Khache, 
Khatsara, and Koko as foreigners, the reality was almost the exact opposite. 
Outside observers consistently played on the notion of Tibet as a homogeneous 
Buddhist society intent on preserving its purity by resisting the reality of mixed 
 parentage. Even when confronted with mixed marriages, non-Tibetans failed to 
see the  communities as anything other than foreign. While post-1950  documents 
 sometimes acknowledge the existence of “mixed Chinese” (Ch. hunxue; lit., 
“mixed-blooded”) the documents of the Nationalist Chinese period stubbornly 
clung, with patent self-interest, to the belief that the Koko and Khache remained 
Chinese (Han or Hui).58 The situation had hardly changed after 1959. The facts 
became so muddied that a Wapaling Khache interviewed in the late 1980s 
suggested that in pre-1950s’ Tibet “the Kha-che were considered as Indian  citizens, 
thus having the status of foreigners. In the case of a mixed marriage the son 
was considered as an Indian citizen and the daughter as a Tibetan.”59 Despite 
 confusion, false assertions, and a misremembered past, the Khache, throughout all 
this, remained unambiguously Tibetan and together with the Khatsara and Koko, 
occupied a distinct and acknowledged position within Tibetan society. However, 
like the Khatsara and the Khache, the Koko were also caught between foreign 
assertions and a Tibetan reality.
BEING HALF-TIBETAN AND ALL CHINESE
Even with the dramatic diplomatic consequences of the Gyalpo Affair, no group 
faced more pressure from an outside force than did the Koko. After the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911 and the expulsion of the Chinese forces in 1912, virtually no 
Chinese representative was stationed or sent to Lhasa in a formal capacity until 
after the formation of the Nationalist government in 1927. Among the first was 
a young woman of Chinese-Tibetan parentage who helped usher in a new phase 
in China’s efforts to reassert control over Tibet.60 Born in Lhasa to a Wapaling 
Khache father and a Kham Khache mother, Liu Manqing, or Yudhona (Tib. 
Dbyangs can),61 lived in Lhasa before moving with her family to the Himalayan hill 
town of Darjeeling when she was five or six years old. Despite being commonly 
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referred to as “Chinese” or “Chinese Muslim Hui,” Liu’s father was born and 
raised in Lhasa and spoke fluent Tibetan, and, although he served as a clerk in 
the Amban’s office in the early twentieth century, all indications suggest he was 
Wapaling Khache.62 After first moving to Darjeeling, India, Liu’s father, in 1918, 
relocated his family to Beijing. There he enrolled his daughter in a Chinese 
 primary school, and she quickly became fluent in Chinese.63 Coming of age in 
the heady political  activism of the May Fourth era (ca. 1917–21), she sought to 
pursue a path that allowed her to help the Tibetan people in the context of the 
new Chinese nation. In 1927, she arrived in Nanjing and was embraced by the 
politically active Kham Tibetan  community, which had been swept into a 
position of influence by the newly  established Nationalist regime. As she would 
later recount, it was this serendipitous sequence of events that led to her return 
to her birthplace: “I was in Nanjing for two years. In 1929, because the Tibetan 
and central [Chinese] governments had absolutely no lines of communication, the 
Nationalist government decided to send me to serve as an envoy to Tibet in order 
to reestablish relations.”64 The precise powers the Nationalist government granted 
her remain unclear, but late that summer, when she was twenty-three years old, 
she set off overland to Lhasa through Kham (eastern Tibet), a longer and more 
precarious route than traveling by sea and then overland via India. Upon her 
arrival in Lhasa, the Wapaling Khache community received her as one of their 
own. It was through these local connections that she succeeded in achieving 
numerous interviews with the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.65 Staying a little over three 
months, Liu returned to Nanjing as the first quasi-governmental delegate to travel 
to Lhasa and publicly write about her travels.
The Chinese media showered Liu with praise. In 1930, the China Weekly Review 
led with a story, “Miss Liu—China’s Hero,” that aptly captured the excitement 
 elicited by Liu’s visit to Lhasa. The media also broached the awkward fact that 
“one president came after another but no attention had ever been given to Tibetan 
Affairs.”66 One report stated that “it has been 20 years since a special envoy was sent 
by the Chinese government to Lhassa.”67 The discontent over the discernible gap 
between the Nationalist government’s words and their deeds with regard to Tibet 
had not gone unnoticed by the Chinese public. Aside from  quasi-governmental 
and private goodwill missions carried out by individuals like Liu Manqing, 
nearly two decades had passed with no official Chinese representative in Lhasa. 
Despite the enduring fiction that China’s territorial integrity remained much as it 
had under the Qing, the public readily could see that Tibet (much like Xinjiang, 
Mongolia, and Manchuria) had been independent from any Chinese oversight 
since 1912.68 The power of Liu Manqing’s mission to Lhasa lay in its ability to spark 
a new  optimism and interest among the Chinese public, who hoped to end the 
two-decade break between the central governments of Tibet and China.69
That Liu had traveled through the large swath of eastern Tibet claimed by both 
the Tibetan and Chinese central governments—tantalizingly outside the reach 
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of both—only accentuated the belief that perhaps the moment had arrived for 
peaceful reconciliation.70 Liu Manqing’s book-length account of her trip, Overland 
Travel to Xikang and Tibet (Ch. Kang-Zang yaozheng), captivated Chinese 
 audiences and sealed her celebrity status. Her book was so popular that it went 
through three editions and was translated into five languages. Much of the book’s 
charm for the Chinese public came from the manner in which Liu downplayed the 
implications of her parents’ mixed ethnicity, referred to herself as Han Chinese, 
and promoted China’s presence in Tibet. In this manner, her journey back to 
Tibet represented the journey that many Chinese hoped their government was 
 embarking on. In fact, it was nothing of the sort.
The primary barrier to the normalizing of Sino-Tibetan relations was China’s 
lingering inability to accept that Tibet no longer considered itself under Chinese 
authority. Throughout the first decades after the Republic of China was founded 
in 1912, no phrase captured the idealized vision of China better than “Unity of 
the Five Races” (Ch. wuzu gonghe).71 A powerful rhetorical device, it presented a 
territorially and ethnically unified China that is sometimes also translated as the 
“Republic of Five Races” or “Five Races Harmoniously Joined.” As the historian 
Gray Tuttle has remarked, “The discrepancy between translations shows that the 
concept could be understood both as a political system in which five races were 
joined in a single state structure, or as a racial ideal, in which case the ‘harmonious’ links 
took priority over any particular conception of state structure.”72 The dilemma was 
less the danger that the term was understood in only racial or ethnic terms than 
that in public discourse it could seamlessly pivot from one meaning to the other 
or mean both at once.73
The ethno-territorial logic inherent in the term suggested a Chinese nation 
with a Han Chinese core surrounded by Tibetan, Muslim, Mongolian, and 
Manchu peoples or territories. “Unity of the Five Races” was virtually  omnipresent 
in the rhetoric of the Chinese Republic, as illustrated by the original flag of the 
republic under Sun Yat-sen, which contained five different-colored stripes, and 
the  academic discussions of the archaeological discoveries of Peking man, which 
posited that they demonstrated that the “five races” all descended directly from 
a single ancient people.74 Although Chinese leaders spoke of a China that main-
tained the territorial boundaries of the Qing Empire, a considerable disconnect 
existed between the idealized rhetoric and the reality.
China’s paramount leader at the time, Chiang Kai-shek, had been propelled to 
prominence as a result of his leadership role in the Northern Expedition, which 
reunified much of southern and central China primarily through the use of mili-
tary force and the forging of political allegiances with local power brokers. He had 
defeated or co-opted many of his rivals in southern and central China, creating a 
functioning central government based in Nanjing. His support in western China 
relied on a tenuous patchwork of regional warlords who agreed to acknowledge 
the Nationalist government in exchange for near-complete autonomy. Japan’s 
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invasion of Manchuria and the creation of the Japanese-backed puppet state of 
Manchukuo in 1931 only highlighted the deeply flawed premise of a Chinese state 
that embodied the Unity of the Five Races. The Nationalist government’s principal 
concern now focused on defending its already precarious position against further 
territorial incursions while stabilizing its political grip onr those areas they did 
control.
The Tibet question for the Nationalist leadership in the 1930s was not a matter 
of how to reintegrate Tibet into the Chinese nation-state but how it would pre-
vent Tibet from openly declaring itself independent. Of even greater concern was 
the fear that any actions against Lhasa would exacerbate the situation in eastern 
Tibet and western Sichuan, further degrading the Nationalists’ already negligible 
 influence there. No high-ranking Nationalist official had dared step foot in Kham 
or Tibetan Sichuan since 1928, and the entire region was openly governed by local 
warlords who might take Tibet’s public expression of independence as a sign that 
they too could openly do away with the thin pretense of loyalty to the Nationalist 
government.75 If the central Chinese government had hoped that Liu Manqing’s 
visit would lead to Tibet formally relinquishing all claims of independence in the 
early 1930s, it failed. More to the point, the Chinese government simply did not have 
the resources, the expertise, or even any direct oversight of the territories abutting 
Tibet to pressure Tibet into an open admission of being under Chinese sovereignty.
Just when it seemed no avenue forward existed, the death of the Thirteenth Dalai 
Lama on December 17, 1933, provide just the opening the Nanjing  government 
needed. As the historian Hsiao-ting Ling noted in his description of their subse-
quent efforts, it was the death of the Dalai Lama in Tibet coupled with the fact that 
the Eighth Panchen Lama remained in China proper (a result of a political dispute 
with the Lhasa government) that the Tibetan theocracy found itself without its 
two most prominent leaders. The requisite multiyear search for the Dalai Lama’s 
reincarnation allowed the Chinese government a rare window of opportunity that 
proved too tempting to resist.
Measuring what goals the Nanjing government believed feasible at this 
 juncture is largely an exercise in conjecture. Almost certainly Chiang Kai-shek 
saw his  primary objective as the establishment of direct political control over the 
 informally allied provincial leaders of southwest China through the settlement of 
the eastern Tibet boundary. The likelihood of convincing the Tibetan leadership to 
accept formal reintegration under Chinese sovereignty, while certainly desirable 
from the Chinese standpoint, remained so improbable that few believed such an 
outcome plausible and the dangers of aggravating the situation too great. More 
pressing was finding an experienced and senior official who could undertake such 
a sensitive mission with grace and vision. The official eventually selected, General 
Huang Musong, would prove to have neither grace nor vision.76
Appointed special commissioner to Tibet in 1934, Huang, from the Nationalist 
perspective, seemed the perfect choice. A member of Chiang Kai-shek’s inner 
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circle and deputy chief of staff in Nanjing, he was a trusted insider. He also under-
stood the government’s precarious position in the ethnically diverse borderlands. 
However, the previous year when Huang had served as “pacification commissioner” 
to Xinjiang he demonstrated a harrowingly bad sense of judgment. Aggressively 
pushing a pro-Nationalist agenda, Huang so alienated the Xinjiang warlord Sheng 
Shicai that he barely escaped with his life. It was only after Chiang succumbed to 
Sheng’s extortionate demands that Huang was even allowed to return to Nanjing. 
But Huang’s ham-fisted efforts resulted in Sheng purging and executing several 
key pro-Nationalist sympathizers after his release.77
Perhaps apprehensive of a repeat of that failed intervention, prior to Huang’s 
departure to Lhasa Chiang Kai-shek explicitly instructed him to adopt a con-
ciliatory tone. Specifically, Huang was cautioned to be sensitive to any points 
relating to Tibet’s sovereignty and advised not to push for border delimitation 
in eastern Tibet unless Tibet broached it first.78 Huang chose to follow neither 
piece of advice.
In the late spring of 1934, Huang’s small platoon of eighty staff, porters, and 
translators set out from Chengdu. Instead of going via the faster, cheaper, and safer 
India route, Huang chose to travel overland through poorly mapped territory and 
areas of questionable political allegiance.79 Almost from the start, Huang reverted 
to his old habits. An advance team of Chinese officials, traveling via India, had 
arrived in Lhasa several weeks ahead of Huang and were instructed to post notices 
written in both Chinese and Tibetan throughout Lhasa advising the Tibetans to 
place their trust in “the Chinese government that can ensure the comfort and 
 happiness [of all Tibetans] forever.”80 The patronizing tenor of these notices, not to 
mention the obviously misplaced political message, incensed the Tibetans.
Arriving in Lhasa on August 28, Huang stubbornly ignored the advice prof-
fered by Tibetan officials, insisting instead on a flamboyant procession and pub-
lic  ceremony to present China’s gifts. The Tibetan officials demurred, suggesting 
Huang’s proposed memorial ceremony for the Dalai Lama was inappropriate 
given that the Tibetan people were still in mourning for him. Huang refused to 
be dissuaded and insisted on publishing “a panegyric to the late Dalai Lama” that 
included an “invitation to the Tibetan people to join the family of nations and rely 
on the Chinese Government.”81
Huang, perhaps taking the wrong message from the Tibetans’ reluctant consent 
to the ceremony began to strong-arm Tibet into formally acknowledging Chinese 
sovereignty over the country. His actions resulted in the Tibetans systematically 
stonewalling his proposals. Headstrong and not realizing how damaging his 
actions were to his larger goal, Huang blamed his lack of progress in the negotia-
tions with the Tibetan officials on their lack of ability or appreciation of the bene-
fits China could offer Tibet in his reports back to Nanjing.82 Only when the Tibetan 
authorities were pressed to reply formally to his queries did they finally deliver a 
carefully translated response to Huang. The October 17 communiqué, written in 
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spare but precise language, indicated that Tibet, a “self-governing, independent 
country” (Tib. rangda gyekab; Ch. zizhu zhiguo), was governed by a religious-
political system incompatible with that of the Chinese Republican government. 
In a veiled rebuke to Huang’s pretentious assertions about Tibet being part of the 
same family as China, the document asserted that “there was no reason for China 
to interfere in its affairs or to station civil and military officials in Lhasa.”83
Taken aback by the unequivocal tone of their reply, Huang refused to accept 
the Tibetan government’s response as the last word on the subject. Concerned, 
perhaps, with the continued presence of British officials in Lhasa, he pressed for 
assurances from the Kashag that the Tibetan government would at least agree to 
consult with and then follow China’s counsel with regard to external affairs. He 
could not have been pleased with their response, which arrived in early November. 
The Kashag’s ten-point memorandum politely but forcefully rebutted each point 
Huang had raised in support of increased Chinese presence. It reiterated that 
the Chinese government retained no legal powers within Tibet. It restricted the 
 number of formal Chinese representatives in Lhasa to one, with a retinue no 
larger than twenty-five, before going on to explicitly state that “those Chinese (Ch. 
Hanmin) who have resided in Tibet since 1912 shall continue to be governed by the 
Tibetan Government’s Agricultural Ministry.”84
Almost certainly realizing that his gambit to push Tibet to recognize Chinese 
sovereignty had backfired, it dawned on Huang, certainly more slowly than it 
should have, that he had wildly exceeded his government’s initial directives. 
A swift exit was his only option. As a last request before hurriedly crossing the 
Himalayan passes before the winter snows, Huang received permission from the 
Tibetan authorities to allow two members of his delegation, Jiang Zhiyu and Liu 
Puchen, to remain behind to set up a permanent wireless radio station.85
In most accounts, this is where the narrative of the Huang Mission ends.86 
Chinese newspapers heralded Huang’s return from Lhasa with glowing praise. 
Public reports, left uncorrected by Huang, gave the impression that his mission 
had single-handedly reversed the slow decline of Chinese influence in Tibet. Most 
accounts not only failed to mention that the Tibetan government had only allowed 
Liu Puchen to remain in Lhasa to run the wireless radio station, but suggested he 
was the new head of the Chinese Mission.87 This led the world to assume, as the 
New York Times reported, that “Tibet, after twenty-two years of estrangement, has 
pledged its support to the Nanjing Government.”88 For these successes, Huang was 
promoted to the position of head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Office.
In Lhasa, China’s position appeared far less promising. In early January 1935, 
Liu Puchen died after a short illness. As a result, sole authority in Lhasa fell to Jiang 
Zhiyu, who became the first permanently stationed Chinese official in Lhasa in 
more than two decades.89 Despite the world press proclaiming a Chinese  victory, 
Jiang had no formal title, no background in Tibetan affairs, and, other than 
 running the wireless station, no clear directives from Nanjing. To make matters 
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worse, Huang’s aggressive pressure tactics had greatly increased anti-Chinese 
resentment.90
Tibet’s decision to permit a Chinese official to remain in Tibet, if only to run 
the wireless radio, reflects inconsistencies that would typify Tibet’s international 
policy for the next decade. As Melvyn Goldstein remarks in his study of the Huang 
Mission, the “decision again reflects the paradox of Tibet’s China policy”: Tibet 
neither clearly asserted its de facto independence nor endeavored to make a 
 complete break with China.91
Perhaps seeing no other path forward, Jiang continued where Huang left off, 
by following an unabashed pro-China agenda. With no secular public schools 
 available in Lhasa and with the Nationalist government’s strong tradition of 
 promoting public education across China, Jiang focused on establishing a Chinese 
school in Lhasa. To Jiang, the proposition seemed an appropriate starting place 
and one that would not cause any displeasure among his superiors in Nanjing. One 
could argue that by shifting from hard to soft diplomacy Jiang was bound to suc-
ceed where Huang had failed. Yet Jiang’s efforts to make Lhasa conform to China’s 
perception of Tibet, rather than respecting Tibet as it was, typified the attitude of 
almost every Chinese official posted to Tibet until the late 1940s.
Jiang demonstrated his shallow understanding of Tibetan society almost 
 immediately. Perhaps by falsely concluding that the Wapaling Khaches were Hui 
Chinese Muslims, Jiang hastily targeted the Wapaling Khache half day school as 
the best place to begin his school reform. He demanded that the school be turned 
into his new Chinese school. In February 1935, Jiang instructed the Wapaling 
Khache in charge of the mosque to close it. According to Derrick Williamson, 
a British political officer visiting Lhasa at the time, Jiang then ordered it to be 
“opened ‘by the Chinese Government’ as a school for the study of Tibetan.”92 
Mistaking the Khaches’ Chinese linguistic and cultural proficiency for Chinese 
support, he must have been shocked when the Wapaling Khache immediately and 
effectively blocked his efforts.
As soon as Jiang attempted to have the mosque closed, a group of Wapaling 
Khaches, led by a senior Khache named Isi Shah, openly objected to the mosque’s 
conversion and “refused to agree that the mosque should be used as such a school.”93 
Jiang’s scheme encountered a further setback when his plan became known to the 
Tibetan National Assembly (Tib. tshogs ‘du), which swiftly ordered representatives 
from both sides to appear before them. When the appointed day arrived, only the 
Wapaling representative appeared, and the case was referred to the Kashag. But 
before the Kashag could begin its inquiry, several Chinese soldiers apprehended and 
then forcibly escorted Isi Shah to the Chinese Residency where he was interrogated 
and severely beaten. Soon thereafter, soldiers went to Isi Shah’s home, and upon their 
arrival they “broke open the house and shot Isi Shah’s son dead.”94 In less than a week, 
Jiang’s actions had, remarkably, surpassed Huang’s inept legacy by reinvigorating the 
“very strong feeling in Lhasa against the Chinese.”95
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After its formal inquiry, the Kashag ordered Jiang’s school closed and demanded 
he pay retribution to Isi Shah and his family. Unfazed, Jiang set up lessons at his 
own residence. Teaching in both Chinese and Tibetan (as well as Qur’anic Arabic) 
for several decades, the school succeeded in attracting a handful of both Muslim 
and non-Muslim Tibetan students.96 Despite being asked repeatedly by the Tibetan 
government to shut his school, Jiang took “no notice of the warning,” and the 
school remained open throughout the remainder of his tenure in Lhasa.97 When 
he finally left Lhasa in 1937, after more than three years in the Tibetan  capital, 
he was despised by the Tibetans and derogated by his superiors, who felt he had 
diminished rather than advanced China’s stature in Tibet.98
After Jiang’s departure, British officials noted that attendance at the school 
quickly diminished to only 20 or more half-Chinese children.99 It is  surprising then 
that both the Huang Mission and Jiang Zhiyu’s tenure in Lhasa are  consistently 
cited as evidence in support of China’s claims of solid influence in Tibet. After the 
fall of the Qing in 1912, there were no Chinese officials present in Tibet, and though 
the coming of Huang and Jiang signified an increase in Chinese  involvement in 
Lhasa, their presence hardly demonstrated a robust Chinese influence in that city, 
let alone more broadly in Tibet.
TIBET ’S  RHETORICAL PL ACE WITHIN CHINA’S 
NATIONALIST IMAGES
In their governmental and private correspondence, Huang Musong and Jiang 
Zhiyu rarely indicated how the Tibet they encountered differed from how it was 
represented in China. They employed the standard China-as-center terminology 
as they doggedly reinforced China’s claim to Tibet through distorted representa-
tions of the past. Huang, in his published writings about his time in Lhasa, stated 
that when the Chinese army departed in 1912, “three hundred to four hundred Han 
and Hui households remained in Lhasa.”100 At best, such assertions should be dis-
missed as half-truths, since few Chinese soldiers, let alone hundreds of households, 
chose to stay behind. The larger problem is that his statements have uncritically 
been accepted to mean that there was a considerable population of native Chinese 
who resided in Lhasa. Not a single extant source points to even half that number 
of Chinese living in central Tibet. Such claims are relevant to this discussion of the 
half-Tibetan populations because one soon realizes that Huang and Jiang presum-
ably believed and erroneously presented the highly assimilated Wapaling Khache 
and Koko as Chinese citizens.
In his writings, Huang went to great lengths to simultaneously assert China’s 
cultural superiority and its presence in Tibet. In his description of Lhasa, he 
disingenuously tried to suggest that a local proverb stated, “A skilled Tibetan 
 official was not as good as an incompetent Chinese official” (Ch. yi hao zangguan 
buru yi huai hanguan).101 In his efforts to rewrite the rather shameful behavior of 
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the Chinese army in 1912, he asserted that the Khache had protected three  hundred 
of their “Han and Hui brothers” (Ch. Han Hui bao) against the Tibetans.102 It 
became increasingly clear that in ignoring the historical and ethnic realities of 
central Tibet, Chinese officials were playing to their home audience and not offer-
ing an accurate reflection of central Tibet’s ethnic makeup. Although there were 
certainly Han and Hui Chinese in Lhasa prior to 1951, these individuals repre-
sented but a small number of the total population.103 The mischaracterization of 
the half-Tibetans by Huang and Jiang and, as we will see, by subsequent Chinese 
officials posted to Lhasa was simply a thinly veiled effort to exaggerate China’s 
presence in the country. Chinese officials began to base Chinese policy on this 
poorly constructed notion of Tibetan society, and by the mid-twentieth century 
their policy demonstrated a rejection of Tibet’s highly nuanced conception of what 
constituted Tibetan citizenship.
Chinese claims of a prominent Chinese population are unreliable for several 
reasons. Almost all Chinese accounts, in adopting the “five groups” (wuzu) tax-
onomy, divided Tibet’s population into only three groups: Tibetans, Han Chinese, 
and Hui Muslims. This simple act, one that seemed (and still seems to most 
Chinese today) completely appropriate, largely suppresses the nuanced realities of 
Tibet’s cosmopolitanism. To adopt a more legalistic tone, such statements defiantly 
ignore the Tibetan government’s repeated admonition that any Chinese citizens 
who remained in Lhasa after Chinese forces departed in 1912 had, by virtue of stay-
ing, accepted Tibetan citizenship. One could argue this was an issue of semantics 
by all parties, but the descriptions of both Huang and Jiang seem to be at odds with 
all other accounts of the period. The few firsthand accounts that remain indicate 
that all the Chinese in Lhasa realized that to remain was tantamount to becoming 
Tibetan citizens.104 More significantly, no permanent Chinese  population existed 
in Lhasa that considered itself Chinese citizens or, as in the manner of Sherpa 
Gyalpo, sought protection from the Chinese. The groups that Chinese officials 
inevitably attempted to categorize as Han and Hui Chinese—the Koko and the 
Wapaling Khache—were, by cultural, linguistic, and legal definition, Tibetan. 
What one is left with is the realization that for the Chinese officials to admit no 
native Chinese remained in Lhasa was tantamount to admitting that Tibet was no 
longer Chinese. As that was an unacceptable conclusion, they simply identified the 
closest thing to Chinese in Lhasa, the Kokos and the Khaches, as Chinese.
Such a stance played well with virtually all segments of the population in Central 
China. The Chinese press, the Nationalist leaders, and most Chinese continued to 
cling to the convenient fiction that Tibet remained a part of China and that all 
people there were Chinese. In the face of all the evidence to the contrary, such 
assertions were just that, assertions. The historian Hsiao-ting Lin’s recent analysis 
of China’s frontier policies finds him equally at a loss to explain the disconnect 
between the reality of China’s extremely tenuous presence in Tibet and the image 
of Tibet as a part of China held by the Chinese. He concludes that “regardless of 
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how brilliantly Huang’s visit to Lhasa impressed [the Chinese] people,  .  .  . [t]he 
mission can by no means be deemed a victory.”105 Lin’s harsh verdict is equally 
true with regard to the manner in which Huang and Jiang’s narratives had neatly 
created the illusion of a continuous Chinese presence in Tibet from 1912 until 1949, 
an illusion often uncritically accepted as the final word on that period.
At the heart of this misrepresentation of China’s presence in Tibet is the repeated 
portrayal of the Koko and Khache as Chinese. Unlike the Qing imperial officials 
who wrestled with adopting the correct Chinese terminology to delineate the 
divisions within the Khache community, Huang and Jiang rarely  acknowledged 
the Tibetanized nature of Muslims and repeatedly declared the Koko were Han 
Chinese. By ignoring how the Tibetan groups perceived their nationality, the 
descriptions of these two groups as Chinese lent deeper credibility to the notion 
that a Chinese community, and thus Chinese sovereignty, endured in Tibet over 
the centuries.
Particularly because of the Chinese tendency to treat Tibetan, Han, and Hui 
as impermeable categories, Huang and Jiang rarely acknowledged the notion of 
mixed parentage as the British did. Instead, the reports by Chinese officials from 
Lhasa routinely divided the population into Tibetan, Han, and Hui, conforming 
to and neatly glossing over the knotty ethno-territorial contradiction implicit in 
the Republican-era definitions of China. As a result, China was able to sidestep the 
reality that in the context of central Tibet those three groups reported by Huang 
and Jiang as Tibetan (Ch. Zang), Chinese Han, and Hui all considered  themselves 
Tibetan, not Chinese.
One gets the distinct sense that many Chinese accounts attempted to treat 
the Koko and Khache populations in Tibet in a manner quite similar to how the 
Overseas Chinese populations were treated. The adoption of the once-a-Chinese-
always-a-Chinese logic that had tied Overseas Chinese communities to their 
ancestral homeland despite centuries of intermarriage with non-Chinese reflected 
an ethnocentric petulance that when applied to Tibet was entirely wrong. Unlike 
the Overseas Chinese, few of the Khache or Koko identified themselves as Chinese. 
As Chris Vasantkumar’s research on the ethnocentric and homogenizing power of 
“Overseas Chinese” demonstrates, Chinese categories of citizenship often elided 
any ethnic contradictions within such categories. Although in English “we can 
write Han Chinese,  .  .  . it is impossible to hyphenate other nationalities with 
Chinese.”106 In other words, of the other four of the “five races” that ostensibly 
constituted China, none is easily delineated as “Chinese” in English. Conversely, 
when speaking of the Overseas Chinese communities across much of Southeast 
Asia and the Indian Ocean world, neither the passage of centuries nor the 
 generations of intermarriage with non-Chinese altered the deep-rooted cultural 
chauvinism underpinning the notion of what it meant to be Chinese. Crucially, 
it was the strict maintenance of their Chinese identity, so typical of the Overseas 
Chinese, that was missing in Tibet. Tibetans openly accepted the half-Tibetans 
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as Tibetan unless, as demonstrated by the Khatsaras, when explicitly forced to 
 relinquish such a standpoint.
The ethnic chauvinism demonstrated by Nationalist China in the 1930s and 
1940s is further compounded when it is placed within the prevailing political 
rhetoric of the period, as in the Unity of the Five Races, which was a cornerstone 
of China’s identity as an independent nation. Most Chinese, throughout the mid-
twentieth century and despite a lack of political control, never relinquished their 
idealized notion of China as territorially retaining the same borders as it had in the 
Qing dynasty. As a result, political rhetoric obscured the considerable gap between 
being a Chinese citizen and being an ethno-cultural Han Chinese. The selective 
manner in which the term “Chinese” (Ch. Zhonguo ren), could omit the non-Han 
in some instances, such as with the term “Overseas Chinese,” and yet incorporate 
them in others, such as in the concept of the Unity of the Five Races, remained 
an unquestioned pillar of Chinese identity within mainstream Chinese culture 
throughout the twentieth century. If, during this period, a Chinese were to speak 
in Chinese of a Mongolian, Manchu, Hui, or Tibetan, the language used would 
make clear that one was speaking of them as Chinese citizens.
The ethnonationalist formulations offered up by Huang and Jiang provide 
rare insight into the limitations of the Chinese concepts of ethnic and political 
Chineseness during the first decades of the twentieth century. It is not  surprising, 
though still wrong, that many of the Chinese officials appointed to Lhasa were 
unfamiliar with Tibetan culture, and because they rarely spoke Tibetan, they 
 erroneously promoted the notion of the Wapaling Khache and Koko as having 
never stopped being Chinese. In many ways, by designating the Khache and Koko 
as Hui and Han Chinese, the Chinese officials were not simply fulfilling their 
own expectations, but were attempting to make Tibet conform to the political 
discourse of the center. The fact that Lhasa preserved its cosmopolitan structure 
and that other semipermanent communities of Bhutanese, Nepalese, and Ladakhi 
retained their legal standing seemed, at least to the Chinese, to lend their claims a 
veneer of plausibility. In reality, however, China’s assertions flaunted the very clear 
 definitions of who the Tibetan state considered citizens of Tibet. As the soccer 
matches that opened the book aptly captured, even in a recreational milieu the 
division between Tibetan and non-Tibetan remained clearly self-evident to those 
living in Lhasa society.
The irony is that Chinese officials, by seeking to impose an inaccurate definition 
of “foreigners” in a Tibetan context, only highlighted how Tibet administratively 
defined itself as independent from China—a stance the Chinese officials desper-
ately wanted to stifle and not amplify. Huang Musong, for example, attempted to 
contrast the situation of the Han Chinese with that of the Nepalese by asserting, 
“The Han in Tibet are required to provide corvée labor while the Nepalese are not. 
Thus, we can see that the Tibetan Government is afraid of the Nepalese and are 
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in harmony with us.”107 Huang’s claim is peculiar on several levels. Corvée labor 
was a tax imposed on citizens of Tibet. The Nepalese, among all the communi-
ties  residing in Lhasa, were unambiguously foreign. Nepal, Britain, and Tibet all 
recognized their foreign status in Tibet. Huang’s claim suggests, if anything, that 
the Han, by virtue of providing corvée labor to the Tibetan government, are 
Tibetans fulfilling their duties as Tibetan subjects, not that they are Chinese.108
The consistent inclination to consider the Khache and Koko Chinese had 
 specific implications for the Khache communities in Lhasa. Jiang’s usage “Hui” in 
his efforts to commandeer the Grand Mosque stemmed directly from a misappre-
hension of the Wapaling Khache as Chinese. Nor was the Chinese misreading of 
Tibetan citizenship limited to those communities. In examining Tibet’s relations 
with Nepal, Chinese officials and the Chinese press presented the Gyalpo Affair 
primarily as a territorial dispute over a border between China and Nepal rather 
than a test of wills over the issue of citizenship. The disconnect between China’s 
complete absence from Tibet at that time and its assertions of sovereignty over 
Tibet are particularly striking given the utter lack of documentation for its claims. 
In one 1930 press account, an article concluded that “unless strong detachments of 
Chinese troops are immediately dispatched [to the Nepalese border], it is feared 
that southern Tibet may soon be lost to China.”109 While this may have been a con-
venient ploy for maintaining the fiction of a unified China in the face of  multiple 
external threats (foremost, from the Japanese) as credible policy, it borders on 
delusional. Already by 1930 the military reach of the Chinese central government 
could barely maintain control over much of Central China let alone having the 
resources to mount, supply, and finance sending troops to the Nepalese-Tibetan 
border. Yet such press accounts neatly capture the mind-set that Huang, Jiang, and 
subsequent Chinese officials brought to their positions. Their approach seemingly 
left them with the unsavory choice of perpetuating a reality entirely of China’s 
own making or openly conceding Tibet’s independence. With the latter option 
untenable, they were left with only the former. And by making such a choice, their 
actions and their interpretation of Tibet remained unalterably skewed.
FR ACTIONAL POLITICS:  A HALF-CHINESE IS  BET TER 
THAN NONE
On August 27, 1942, a Lhasa policeman came upon a Koko beating his wife in 
the middle of a Lhasa street. When the policeman attempted to intervene, the 
Koko responded by assaulting the policeman. He was swiftly arrested,  imprisoned, 
and the next day tried and sentenced to one hundred lashes. Learning of the 
man’s arrest and punishment, the new Chinese representative in Lhasa, Dr. Kong 
Qingzong, “intervened and demanded the release of the Koko,” insisting that he 
had the right to impose punishment on the Chinese. This occurred six weeks 
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prior to the incident that opened this chapter, and it was the first indication that 
Kong intended to impose China’s ethnonationalist categories in central Tibet in a 
 manner that far exceeded those imposed by Huang and Jiang.
Well acquainted with this strategy, Tibetan authorities rebuffed his appeal by 
once again patiently explaining that in 1912 all half-Chinese were given the choice 
to return to China as Chinese citizens under the terms of the truce with the Chinese 
military forces. Those half-Chinese who chose to remain agreed to accept Tibetan 
authority, including adhering to all Tibetan laws and paying taxes. The Lhasa 
government, confident in the question of jurisdiction and the appropriateness of 
the sentence, duly applied the one hundred lashes to the Koko. Seemingly more 
incensed by the lack of respect Kong felt due to him by the Tibetan  government 
than by the actual punishment, he attempted to create a political firestorm over the 
event. He demanded photographs of the man’s bloody back be forwarded to his 
superiors in the central government.110
Kong’s efforts to interfere in the Koko’s sentencing did not emerge solely out 
of a desire to protect the rights of a Chinese citizen. Frank Ludlow, the British 
political officer posted to Lhasa at the time, noted that Kong had made multiple 
requests the previous month to the Tibetan government and “was very hurt at 
thus being ignored.”111 Ludlow did note that up to that point Kong had cooperated 
with the Tibetan government, and in a previous incident “when a Koko (half-
Chinese) committed an offense, Dr. Kong always used to hand them over to the 
Do-de Minpon [city magistrate] for trial.”112 All this suggests a level of awareness 
that abruptly disappeared when his political ambition took a new direction.
Some weeks after Kong’s arrival, the Tibetan government took the formal step 
of establishing the Foreign Affairs Bureau. As part of this process, it demanded 
credentials from all foreigners, including the Chinese who traveled to Tibet. The 
Tibetan government’s decision stemmed from an unmistakable desire to formal-
ize its independence on the world stage. It instructed all foreign governments to 
cease addressing their concerns through the Kashag and instead communicate 
through the Foreign Affairs Bureau. An exception was made for the Nepalese (and 
Khatsara) since an office already existed to deal with their needs and demands.113 
This change, and the exception made for Nepal but not China, triggered a sudden 
change of heart and interpretation of policy by Kong. In a fit of pique, and without 
specific instructions from Central China, he insisted that his “instructions were to 
deal with the Kashag only.”114
Born in Sichuan in 1898 and educated at the University of Brussels, Belgium, 
Kong had been a professor at the National Sichuan University and National Central 
University in Nanjing. In the years leading up to his appointment to Lhasa, he had 
served as counselor to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.115 A mem-
ber of the Wu Zhongxin Mission to Lhasa in 1940, Kong attended the induction 
of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. After the ceremonies concluded, he was selected 
to remain in Lhasa and to assume the new post of China’s representative to Tibet. 
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Whether this was a foreign or domestic posting was a point of contention that 
remained unresolved, though the Chinese made their perspective clear on the 
sign over the mission’s main gate: “Tibet Office of the Tibetan Mongolian Affairs 
Commission of China.”
Kong faced a dilemma. Desperate to challenge the treatment of the  half-Chinese 
Koko, he was equally adamant that he would not acknowledge Tibet’s sovereignty 
by filing his charges, as the Tibetan government required, in the new Foreign Affairs 
Bureau. If he agreed that the Koko was a Tibetan, he would be tacitly  acknowledging 
Tibet’s independence and his own status as a foreign  representative. Yet to file a 
complaint he would need to adhere to the new protocol, tacitly  accepting that 
Tibet was not part of China. If he agreed, he would be accepting his status as a 
foreigner, an act that was at variance with the very outcome he was attempting to 
achieve.116 Unsure how to both file a complaint and not undermine his position, 
he alerted his superiors and let the matter drop. A little over a month later, when 
another incident involving a Koko came about, Kong decided to act.
On October 6, 1942, a scuffle, this time between a half-Nepalese Khatsara and 
a half-Chinese Koko, occurred.117 According to bystanders, the Koko and the 
Khatsara were engaged in a verbal dispute in front of the Jokhang Temple when, to 
borrow from the British version of the incident, the Koko “picked up a stone and 
hit the Nepali half-breed over the head.” Four Tibetan policemen witnessed the 
altercation and immediately tried to intervene. Fearing arrest, the Koko took flight 
and sought refuge at the Chinese Mission. There, Kong offered him sanctuary, 
and when the police entered the mission to arrest the Koko, they instead found 
“ themselves arrested by Dr. Kong.”118
Desperate not to let an opportunity slip through his fingers again, Kong 
 hurried, not to the Foreign Affairs Bureau, but to the Norbulingka Palace to seek 
an  audience with the regent. It was already very late, and he arrived to find the gate 
shut. Breaking with propriety, he pounded loudly on the doors and demanded 
to be allowed to meet with the regent. He was informed that the regent would 
not meet with him and told to return in the morning.119 The following day the 
National Assembly convened and immediately censured Dr. Kong for his actions. 
Incensed over his interference in the street fight between two Tibetans, as well as 
his arrest of the four Tibetan policemen in deliberate defiance of Tibetan rule of 
law, the government demanded that the Nationalist government in Chongqing 
recall him and replace him with a more suitable candidate. More pointedly, and 
quite likely with more effect, the Tibetan government withdrew their liaison 
officer, ceased delivery of firewood to the Chinese Mission, and halted all 
 government  provisions for them. Without these services, Dr. Kong was stripped 
of all Tibetan assistance, an act that effectively denied him any formal standing 
while not  formally  expelling him.
Resentful of his treatment, Kong stubbornly held the policemen for five 
months. Initially the Chinese home government had accepted his interpretation 
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of the events as yet another tactic by the Tibetans to force China to accept Tibetan 
independence. But the recognition that Kong had instigated the incident became 
increasingly difficult to ignore. In the end, and desperate not to let Tibetan-Chinese 
relations slide into endless bickering, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Dr. Kong to imme-
diately release the four policemen he still detained within the Chinese Mission.120 
Although Dr. Kong and his staff would remain in Lhasa until 1944, largely due to 
the exigencies of the war against Japan, he and almost all his staff were formally 
notified that they would be recalled to Chongqing and replaced.121
As the actions above suggest, Dr. Kong was not an endearing individual. 
Secretive, impulsive, and overbearing, he frequently insisted that the Tibetan 
government had no right to treat him as a foreign representative. He repeatedly 
asserted that Tibet was part of China and that he, a Chinese official, should have 
the right to address the Kashag directly. Within Lhasa, his assertions gained little 
traction. It vexed him that the Tibetan leadership had rejected China’s many offers 
for Tibet to return to China’s protection. His vision of Tibet was unambiguously 
one where Tibet remained firmly rooted within the Chinese sphere of influence, 
as it had been under the Qing Empire. In offering counsel to Nanjing, Dr. Kong 
appealed to his superiors to accept the notion that “Chinese affairs should be dealt 
with in the same way as they were in the days of the Manchu emperors.” In essence 
he was advocating that Tibet return to a protectorate status and promoting himself 
to the status of an Amban, the imperial official appointed to Tibet during the Qing 
dynasty.122 The Nanjing government, slightly more circumspect in their efforts to 
reassert control over Tibet, repeatedly rebuffed his requests. Within Lhasa, his 
imperious attitude caused his prestige to fall to a new low. He became a social 
pariah, rarely invited into, visited by, or allowed to participate in elite Tibetan 
social circles.
As World War II wound to an end, the influential Wellington Koo, serving as 
ambassador to the United Kingdom at the time, urged Chiang Kai-shek to address 
the deteriorating relationship between Lhasa and China by appointing a more level-
headed official.123 The appointment of Shen Zonglian, a graduate of Qinghua and 
Harvard Universities and a powerful Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, appeared 
to be the perfect antidote to Kong’s calamitous tenure. Shen’s well-oiled network of 
acquaintances and allies allowed him to dictate his own terms of engagement. He 
hand-picked a team of officials to accompany him to Lhasa, including individuals 
with specialties in sociology, engineering, and geology—several of whom could 
speak Tibetan.124
Shen and his team’s arrival in Lhasa on August 8, 1944, ushered in a new 
 direction in both Chinese policy and on-the-ground diplomacy. Shen adopted a 
conciliatory and friendly tone in his general interactions with Tibetan officials, 
including hosting popular dinner parties. The Tibetan government immedi-
ately responded in kind, relaxing their harsh treatment of the Chinese officials 
and resuming delivery of supplies to the Chinese Mission, which had been cut 
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off since Kong’s unfortunate 1942 incident. With access to discretionary funds far 
 exceeding those available to Kong, Shen’s appointment marked the beginning of 
what one historian termed an escalating “cash diplomacy” between China and 
Britain, including increasing China’s annual donations to the Tibetan monasteries 
surrounding Lhasa by nearly 20 percent.125
A prominent concern with educational reforms is one area where one can see 
continuity between Shen and his predecessors. Although the Chinese school had 
remained in operation since Jiang established it in the late 1930s, Shen sought to 
make it a showpiece of his office’s initiatives. Within weeks teachers’ salaries were 
increased, students were provided with free khaki uniforms, and Shen personally 
instructed that cash gifts be distributed to the poorer students’ parents.126 The sup-
port of the Wapaling Khache during Shen’s tenure is unmistakable.
Topics taught at his school consisted of the normal curriculum of any Chinese 
school, including the Chinese language and arithmetic, in addition to, not 
 surprisingly, Tibetan. It was, however, inclusion of a course on the Qur’an, among 
several additional optional courses, that signaled the considerable influence and 
 presence of the Khache. Officially the Chinese school was referred to in docu-
ments as the Lhasa National Elementary School (Ch. guoli xiaoxue). However, it 
was perceived by most in Lhasa and central Tibet—and even Tibetan Muslims 
interviewed decades later—as the Wapaling Khache mosque school.127 British esti-
mates suggest enrollment of nearly a hundred students of whom nearly half were 
Khaches, with only ten listed as Chinese.128 The remainder was made up of Tibetans 
and Khatsaras.129 Perhaps indicative of the socioeconomic backgrounds of the stu-
dents, none of the children of Tibetan officials attended the school (although sev-
eral were tutored privately in Chinese).
Far from mounting a simple cash-infused charm offensive, Shen assiduously 
adhered to Chiang Kai-shek’s explicit threefold directive: “not interfering with 
Tibetan internal affairs,” ensuring that Tibet “not lose any part of her territory to 
other powers,” and respecting Tibetan jurisdiction over “Chinese half castes and 
other Chinese nationals in Lhasa.”130 Such directives, while deviating from Sun 
 Yat-sen’s Unity of the Five Races of the early Republican period, also digressed 
 considerably from the position Chiang Kai-shek had laid out in China’s Destiny 
only two years earlier, in 1943. Shen’s actions did, however, reflect a broader 
Nationalist postwar effort to pursue a policy of borderland autonomy. Most likely 
stemming from Shen’s success in Tibet, Chiang went as far as to articulate, in 
a major policy speech, the promise that “if the Tibetans should at this time express 
a wish for self-government, our government would, in conformity with our  sincere 
traditions, accord it a very high degree of autonomy.”131
Yet even as Shen greatly ameliorated Sino-Tibetan tensions in Lhasa, Tibetan 
attitudes towards the Chinese generally remained negative. The lingering distaste 
for the Chinese presence and for their political messages was most obvious when 
Shen organized several hundred Chinese, half-Chinese, and Wapaling Khaches 
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in August 1945 to celebrate China’s victory over Japan. Bearing Chinese flags and 
a large photograph of Chiang Kai-shek and accompanied by a Chinese band, the 
procession marched around the Barkor. Mistaking the march for a display of pro-
Chinese nationalism, Tibetans lined the route “booing, hooting and hissing.”132 
Even with Tibetan policemen accompanying the procession, many in the crowd 
threw stones and at one point damaged decorative lanterns carried in the parade. 
Several months later, in early 1946, Shen returned to China, bringing to an end 
the era of Nationalist efforts in Lhasa. His tenure signaled the high-water mark of 
Chinese influence in Tibet in the first half of the twentieth century, a mark that 
would be dramatically overtaken with the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army 
five years later.
Khatsaras, Kokos, and Khaches featured prominently in Tibet’s confrontations with 
its neighbors during the 1912–50 period. While most of the incidents discussed 
above are well documented, the role of half-Tibetan communities is frequently 
obscured, overlooked, or glossed over in favor of narratives that highlight the 
non-Tibetan perspectives of their neighbors or outsiders. In part, this is because 
historical interpretations of the period overwhelmingly emphasize the ques-
tion of Tibet’s independence. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Tibet displayed a 
 reluctance to openly declare itself independent or to be drawn into discussions on 
the  matter with either British or Chinese officials. British and Chinese representa-
tives repeatedly approached Tibetan officials to seek clarification. Tibet repeatedly 
demurred.
As late as 1945, Shen Zonglian, a Chinese representative who had engendered 
considerable goodwill in Lhasa, appealed for advice from all levels of his Tibetan 
contacts as to how to get a definitive response about Tibet’s status. Even as he 
“heard that most of the Tibetans are very keen on ‘Tibet’s independence,’ ”133 few 
would discuss it with him. During casual conversations with high Tibetan offi-
cials, “they either evade[d] the question or decline[d] to give any answer.”134 The 
British Foreign Office concluded in 1950 that all evidence demonstrated that Tibet 
was not part of China but rather “had a clear international identity of her own.”135
If Tibet displayed some hesitancy in declaring itself independent on the 
 international stage, internally it openly defended itself against all external attempts 
to declare that half-Tibetans were not Tibetan. Tibet’s defense of the Khatsaras, 
Kokos, and Khaches as Tibetan citizens demonstrates how these three  communities 
lay solidly within Tibet’s traditional definition of itself. The significance of Tibet’s 
proactive stance on citizenship has seldom been explored because of the  ambiguity 
surrounding its status as an independent state, yet the clarity with which Tibet 
 delineated and defended the status of these groups suggests a confidence not 
 previously recognized. When one accepts the premise that these groups were 
unequivocally Tibetan, as Tibetans typically did, the incidents involving Khatsaras, 
Kokos, and Khaches discussed above take on a new significance.
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In this broader context, it appears that in practice Tibetans—and other 
 subcategories such as Khatsaras, Kokos, and Khaches—had little difficulty 
 traveling between Tibet and India. Indeed, it was harder for Chinese to travel to 
Tibet than it was for Tibetans to travel to India. By the 1940s, particularly after the 
war, increasing numbers of Tibetans, including Tibetan Muslims, were traveling 
to the hill town schools of Darjeeling and Kalimpong in India and elsewhere to 
continue their education. Although monitored, most such travel occurred without 
any formal border control. At the same time, Tibetans also traveled to the interior 
parts of China with equally limited oversight. Finally, Tibetan Muslims traveled 
freely to the Middle East on hajj via both China and India and typically did so by 
taking the fastest route, via Bombay.136 In each case, there appears to have been a 
willingness, a customary acceptance, and a desire to maintain the status quo of 
freedom of travel, such that travel rarely precipitated diplomatic protocols such 
as the carrying of passports, let alone documents proving one’s residence or 
citizenship.137 The expectation that such documents were unwarranted would 
later, after the arrival of Chinese governance, prove to be an unexpected shock.
The breadth of Tibet’s (and similarly British India’s) acceptance of the many 
Muslim groups entering India is apparent in the well-documented maneuvers by 
the Tibetan government to extricate the Fourteenth Dalai Lama from the grip of the 
Muslim Chinese warlord Ma Bufang. In a complicated negotiation,  culminating 
in a payment of large bribes to Ma Bufang from the Chinese Nationalist and 
Tibetan governments, the Dalai Lama was released to a group of rich Siling 
(Ch. Xining) Tibetan Muslim merchants who intended to travel via Lhasa to India 
and on to Mecca to carry out their hajj.138 Acting as guarantors in the transaction, 
the Tibetan Muslims would first advance Ma Bufang the promised payment, with 
the Lhasa government repaying the merchants upon the young reincarnation’s 
arrival in Lhasa. Several months later, the Muslim traders, with several Chinese 
escorts, arrived and were duly paid in Indian rupees at an advantageous rate before 
continuing to India and then Mecca. Their onward travel to India was  sanctioned, 
and it was even expressly indicated that they were traveling “without valid 
 passports.”139 The Tibetan government, acknowledging their crucial role in 
 escorting the new Dalai Lama out of harm’s way, diligently facilitated the Qinghai 
Khaches’ travels in their communications with the British officials. For all parties, 
the prosaic nature of Tibetan Muslim merchants made them the most  dependable 
option for Ma Bufang, the Chinese Nationalists, and the Tibetan and British 
governments.
These merchants were part of a rarely remarked on branch of the large  number 
of Muslims from Tibet and Central Asia who traveled via Indian ports on the hajj. 
Between 1930 and 1938, the annual number of Muslim pilgrims traveling via India 
who were classified as Tibetan, Nepalese, or Turkestani averaged nearly a  thousand 
individuals per year—a number confirmed by official hajj figures of pilgrims 
 arriving by sea.140 Issues of mixed parentage, cross-border identity, and Himalayan 
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interstate relations played key roles in how Tibet defined itself, a  definition very 
often inconsistent with the interpretation applied by China but accepted by most 
other nations the Tibetans passed through. It was Tibet’s cosmopolitan populace 
that lay at the intersection of the various notions of citizenship, notions that 
were quickly hardening with the Chinese occupation and taking on new and 
 untraditional meanings. Typical of most Himalayan states, Tibet remained far less 
concerned with what it considered an abstract demarcation of formal territorial 
boundaries and more concerned with retaining and delimiting the peoples who 
populated its urban centers. The consistency with which Tibet maintained that 
focus for nearly four decades suggests that Tibet was forcefully and successfully 
able to assert its independence primarily through its definition of Tibetan citizenship, 
in all its complexity.
Even as such crossing of international borders remained commonplace, the 
concern over the individual’s precise status began to slowly change in the  postwar 
years. The ability to delineate and categorize individuals according to their  country 
of residence, which had been put aside during World War II, arose again, more 
prominently, after the war. Hugh Richardson, who had remained in Lhasa after 
Indian independence in 1947, to serve as the Indian consul-general,  somewhat 
presciently noted in an annual report that “except for Government servants, 
there are few Indian subjects in Lhasa, etc., and those others who can technically 
claim that status are Ladakhi Muslims at present somewhat undecided about their 
allegiances.”141 Concerns about nationality were superseded by the arrival of the 
People’s Liberation Army in Lhasa in October 1950. With the army’s appearance, 
the question of what being Tibetan meant began, abruptly and forcibly, to bend to 





In late 1951, over eight thousand Chinese soldiers arrived in Lhasa, marking a new 
era for the capital.1 During this time, Lhasa, like many cities in the early phases 
of occupation by a new political force, was a city of contradictions, political 
 machinations, and cultural clashes. Following Mao Zedong’s explicit instructions, 
the Chinese government adopted a gradualist approach. As Goldstein describes 
it, the Chinese officials in Lhasa “set out to develop cooperative and cordial 
 relationships with the elite and to convince them that these officials had come to 
Tibet to help them modernize and develop, not to oppress and exploit them, as 
previous Chinese regimes had done.”2
Although post-1951 Tibet is often presented either as a case of state-sponsored 
Chinese “liberation” or as a case of Tibetan oppression and resistance, recent 
scholarship has begun to avoid such polarized interpretations.3 Nowhere is this 
revisionist perspective on Tibet’s past more visible than in the years immediately 
following the arrival of Chinese forces.4 New evidence and oral histories from this 
period suggest that Tibetan autonomy in many spheres of life persisted well into 
the mid-1950s. Lhasa’s social calendar—Tibetan Buddhist rituals, daily prayers, 
and constant flow of pilgrims—proceeded largely unabated. The Kashag, the 
Tibetan governing council, and Tibetan monasteries persevered institutionally. 
The Dalai Lama carried on in his central role in the institutional and cultural life 
of the city while serving as the primary mediator between the realities of Chinese 
control and the limitations of Tibetan authority. Republican-era Chinese silver 
dollars  continued to serve as the legal tender in central Tibet, making Tibet the 
only administrative region in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) not to have 
“People’s money” (Ch. renminbi) as its primary currency.5 In many ways, life 
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improved. Spared the monetary transition to Chinese currency, Chinese officials 
and soldiers generally received wages in and paid for goods with silver dollars, 
adding a new stream of revenue for central Tibet.6 Yet even as these recent 
 perspectives have become more widely accepted, Tibet’s experiences typically are 
seen in isolation from China’s post-liberation and more broadly Asia’s postcolonial 
history.7
The lingering tendency to isolate narratives of Tibet’s past from mainstream 
accounts of Asia’s past is peculiar, since many of the seminal forces that shaped 
Tibet, particularly in the 1950s, emerged out of the same complex postcolonial 
historical trends that swept across Asia after World War II. Unlike the experiences 
of Europe and the United States, where victory over Nazi Germany in May 1945 
marked the beginning of the Cold War era, in Asia the defeat of Japan ushered 
in an extended period of decolonization and political change. There was China’s 
civil war between Nationalist and Communist forces, culminating in a sweeping 
Communist victory in 1949; India’s independence from Great Britain,  precipitating 
the traumatic partition of India and Pakistan in 1947; and the creation of nearly 
a dozen new nations in Southeast Asia, ushering in a period of intense patriotic 
nationalism. In each of these instances, the citizens of these newly formed nations 
grappled anew with what it meant to be Chinese, Indian, Malaysian, Indonesian, 
or Thai. Similarly, overseas populations of peoples who had permanently settled 
outside their ancestral homelands found their identities challenged in new and 
often fraught ways. While becoming manifest in different ways, 1950s Tibet’s 
responses to the newly delineated territorial, religious, and national identities had 
much in common with the broader Asian experience.
NEW CHINA,  NEW TIBET,  AND A NEW ER A  
FOR THE KHACHE
A quick succession of events unfolded in the spring of 1951 that would establish 
Tibet’s political trajectory for the next decade and beyond. The Indian, British, 
and U.S. governments in the early months of 1951, after years of vague promises of 
support, signaled that they would not be willing to defend Tibet against a Chinese 
invasion or even provide a safe haven for the Dalai Lama’s government. Tibetan 
government officials, seeing little or no alternative, met with officials from the 
Chinese government on May 23, 1951, and signed the 17-Point Agreement for the 
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The agreement affirmed Chinese sovereignty over 
Tibet, although it stated it would “not alter the existing political system in Tibet.” 
Ending months of speculation about his plans, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa 
from the Indian border town of Kalimpong, arriving in the Tibetan capital on 
August 17, 1951. Finally, on September 9, the People’s Daily reported that with “the 
warm Tibetan sun” shining down on the spectacle, “Tibetan crowds flowed into 
the main avenues, sitting on the walls surrounding the city’s many densely wooded 
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lin-ka (parks) dressed in their best Tibetan attire” to greet with  requisite  enthusiasm 
the several-thousand-strong vanguard of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
The People’s Republic of China, like the Nationalists before them, insisted that 
Tibet was historically an integral and unalienable part of China, but they often 
emphasized Tibet’s Asian and Himalayan positioning. In a People’s Daily article 
published on September 7, 1949, just weeks prior to the formal founding of the 
PRC, the government laid out what would become one of several core rationales 
for China’s liberation of Tibet: “That British-American Imperialist efforts to 
invade Tibet is unmistakable. .  .  . British Imperialists through the Indian Nehru 
 government, gained control of the protectorates (Ch. tubang) of Sikkim and 
Bhutan positioned between Tibet and India as a means by which to threaten the 
Tibetan regional authorities into taking one more step towards to submitting to 
Western governments.”8 The inclusion of Sikkim and Bhutan in its justification for 
liberating Tibet highlights China’s sensitivity to Tibet’s Himalayan standing while 
disingenuously sidestepping the Chinese government’s own tenuous position on 
the Tibetan plateau.
It was not simply that the PRC refused to acknowledge that the Tibetan 
 government had functioned entirely independently of the Chinese government 
since 1912. It was also the fact that, even as China consolidated its rule over 
Tibet, the traditional ties the Dalai Lama’s government had with Nepal, Bhutan, 
and Sikkim remained in place. More startling is the equally telling fact that the 
Himalayan states, all with prior ties to Qing China, had resolutely refused to 
 officially recognize the new Chinese Communist government.
The PRC’s swift occupation of Tibet caused speculation across the Himalayan 
region over China’s ultimate intentions. This concern included how China might 
alter the status, rights, and position of Nepalese, Bhutanese, and Kashmiri, as well 
as the Khatsara, Koko, and Khache. For the Tibetan Muslims, the 1950s marked 
an era of opportunity as well as unaccustomed scrutiny by both Tibetans and 
Chinese. The Khache quickly sought to indicate their loyalty, with one Wapaling 
Khache explaining to a Chinese official, “We Hui-Hui support (Ch. qingxiang) 
the motherland. We often were at the receiving end of the [Tibetan] government’s 
pro-English group’s wrath. At this old age, what do I have to be afraid of? Before 
I would not dare do many things, now that we have freedom and equality, what 
am I to be afraid of?”9 Although the political discourse certainly changed with 
the establishment of the PRC, Chinese characterization of Lhasa in the public 
media remained remarkably similar to that presented by the Nationalist officials 
during the previous decade. In newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts, all 
Muslims were monolithically labeled “Hui.” The repeated articulation of Muslims 
as Hui, Tibetans as Zang, and Chinese as Han was a formula used to demon-
strate the government’s support of ethnic diversity but also to emphasize Tibet’s 
similarity to China. Deliberately fastidious in their efforts to appear ethnically 
neutral, Chinese officials pursued ethnic parity at all levels of the government 
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(even  though the Han and Hui represented a tiny proportion of Tibet’s popu-
lation). To take one example, the Patriotic Cultural Youth League membership 
in 1955 was reportedly composed of 100 Tibetans, 100 Chinese, 80 Wapaling 
Khaches, and 20 Barkor Khaches.10
Portraying the Khache in this manner proved useful to the Chinese in  multiple 
ways. The Chinese could avoid the appearance of exclusively promoting the 
interests of the Han if their policies and public works also included the Hui. 
The Chinese Communists, however, differed from the Nationalists in one criti-
cal way. In unofficial writings by early Chinese officials sent into Lhasa, following 
the  initial vanguard, one encounters both an understanding of and a concern 
with the divisions within and among the various Muslim communities— particularly 
the differences between the Barkor and Wapaling Khache communities. The 
 recognition of the Barkor Khache as aligned with India proved to be an early 
 concern for many Chinese officials. It was also of concern that the Barkor Khache 
remained more strongly allied with the Tibetan government than did their 
Wapaling Khache neighbors. Yet both groups remained monolithically Hui in the 
writings of the period.
Similar to the Nationalists’ dispatching of the Lhasa-born Liu Manqing in 1927 
to serve as an early envoy for the government, Beijing identified and included 
 cadres whose knowledge of Muslim affairs would shape China’s early efforts to 
realign Tibetan attitudes with those of Central China. Foremost among these 
 figures was the Beijing native Xue Wenbo. As the historian Wlodzimierz Cieciura 
has neatly presented, Xue was a Hui scholar active in Republican intellectual circles 
during the 1930s who had “advocated pan-Muslim nationalism, defining Huizu as 
encompassing all the Muslims in the world, not only in China.”11 A pro-Muslim 
activist with a global perspective, Xue had been hand-picked to serve on a five-
member Nationalist Chinese Muslim delegation to the Near East in the 1930s.12 
With a strong record of assisting the Communist government in Qinghai and 
Gansu, Xue possessed the skills and political background to make him a natural 
fit to join the Tibet Working Research Team attached to the PLA forces departing 
for Lhasa in 1951.13 His presence in Lhasa, beginning in early December, denotes a 
sophisticated awareness by the Chinese central government of Lhasa society.
In his memoirs Xue indicates his mandate was vague but stemmed from the 
leadership’s concern that the two Khache communities remained divided in some 
ways. Realizing the essential role they played in Lhasa, Xue “was ordered by [his] 
superiors to unify them into a single group.”14 The Barkor Khaches’ stature in Lhasa 
was not lost on Xue. Their standing as traders “was second only to the Nepalese, 
and only after them do the Han and Hui appear.”15 It was Chinese officials, including 
Xue, who demonstrated how difficult it was for outsiders to comprehend the subtle 
differences within the Lhasa Muslim community.
Even though he had traveled throughout the Muslim world and had a deep 
personal and intellectual familiarity with divisions among the Chinese Hui, 
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Xue indicated upon his arrival that he had difficulty not only differentiating the 
Barkor from the Wapaling Khache but also distinguishing both groups from the 
Tibetans. Eventually he came to be able to tell the Barkor and Wapaling apart by 
their  sartorial preferences, noting that “Barkor (Ch. Ke-shi-mi-er) prefer wearing 
a red and black hat that is taller and longer while the Wapaling (Ch. Hui) prefer 
a smaller and flatter black and white hat.”16 In spite of his awareness of internal 
 differences, journal entries from his time in Lhasa tend to characterize the Khache 
on the whole as more ideologically aligned with China than with the Tibetans. 
Differing in tone from the People’s Daily account above, Xue’s journal recounts 
that “when the People’s Liberation Army arrived in Lhasa, the Lhasa Tibetans, 
as a result of the pro-British propaganda, were not terribly welcoming (Ch. 
qinre), but the long-oppressed Hui already believed themselves to be closer to the 
motherland, and were willing to come out and support us in our efforts.”17 Like 
many Chinese tasked to work in Tibet in the early years of the PRC, Xue tackled 
his duties with considerable enthusiasm and blamed the differences within the 
Muslim community on the lack of progressive influences in the traditional Tibetan 
society. Xue focused on recruiting the Khache as essential interlocutors and sup-
porters of government-desired reforms in Lhasa, a task that gained considerably 
more urgency in the face of inflation and the unanticipated shortfall of supplies 
that occurred with the arrival of the Chinese in the Tibetan capital.
Descriptions of Lhasa in the 1950s often highlight the rapid inflation that 
occurred immediately after the arrival of the Chinese.18 Less often emphasized is 
that the worst of this inflation was a short-lived result of the influx of Chinese 
soldiers and officials without a commensurate level of supplies being sent with 
them, creating a scarcity of goods.19 During the first six months, the price of grain 
quadrupled. However, Goldstein’s detailed study of the 1951–55 period argues that 
the extreme shortages and inflation were mostly transitory. Tibetan and Chinese 
officials resolved the acute grain shortage, caused by improper accounting and 
communications, within a year. The larger food-supply issues were partially dealt 
with by planting and harvesting barley and vegetables from reclaimed swampland 
outside of Lhasa. By and large, the worst of the food shortages had been rectified 
by the summer of 1952.20
As inflation became a fact of life during the early months of Chinese rule, 
the dramatic influx of silver dollars made a deep impression on many Tibetans. 
The noted Tibetan historian Dawa Norbu recalled a saying popular in Lhasa 
at the time, “The Chinese Communist Party is like a kind parent / To whom we 
owe a great debt of gratitude / They give us silver dollars like showers of rain” (Tib. 
rgya gung khran drin chen pha ma red dngul da yangs char pa babs babs red).21 
The Chinese government paid for all goods in silver dollars, and the soldiers 
and  government officials who were posted to Lhasa drew their salaries in silver 
dollars. As most of the Chinese had their daily needs met by eating and living in 
 government quarters, they had considerable disposable income to spend on items 
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not available in China proper, and at a much cheaper price.22 As a result of the 
17-Point Agreement signed in 1951, traders were still permitted to import goods 
from India that were scarce, extremely expensive, or even banned in other parts 
of China. In addition, luxury goods remained tax-free (or were taxed at a greatly 
reduced rate) as compared with other inland Chinese cities.23 These conflicting 
forces—inflation and monetary policy—simultaneously created both a scarcity of 
basic foodstuffs and a market for luxury goods inconceivable in China.
In the first months following his arrival in late 1951, Xue Wenbo remarked on 
the difference between the goods available in Lhasa and the markets in Qinghai. 
In his memoirs he noted that during his six-month stay in Lhasa, “life was quite 
good. We had access to American powdered milk and ornately wrapped candies, 
and I was even able to buy an Omega brand watch.”24 Several years later, in 1956, 
the Xinhua News Agency photographer Chen Zonglie recalled his surprise, soon 
after being posted to Lhasa, at being escorted to the Barkor and seeing the stalls 
“fully stocked with goods that one almost never saw in interior China such as 
brand-name Swiss watches, French perfume, Italian accordions, German cameras, 
American Kodak film, . . . Indian silk, spices, condensed milk and desserts, as well 
as Nepalese Buddhist figurines and ceremonial instruments, etc.”25
With the large number of Chinese officials and soldiers in Tibet, demand swiftly 
outstripped supply. In interviews years later, Tibetan Muslim caravaneers boasted 
of selling off their complete inventory within days of arriving in Lhasa. Realizing 
the remunerative potential, the Barkor Tibetan Muslim traders quickly abandoned 
the importation of textiles, cigarettes, and kerosene and branched out into high-
value, low-bulk luxury items such as European pens, watches, and even batteries. 
The scale and scope of goods being imported from India into Tibet, even as the 
availability of dry goods and the wool trade shrank, caused profits to soar for most 
traders. A British Embassy official traveling in northwestern and central China 
shared a train compartment with a Chinese Air Force major who was returning 
from an assignment in Lhasa:
He was wearing a new Rolex watch and explained that he had bought it in Lhasa 
where watches and pens are tax-free. He had therefore paid only ¥130 instead of ¥480 
in Beijing. In Lhasa there are apparently large numbers of Omega, Rolex, Longines 
and even American watches together with a plentiful supply of Parker ‘51 pens, all 
imported from India. Members of the Chinese forces are allowed to buy one watch 
and one pen each.26
Even as late as 1958, an Indian trade agent, K. C. Johorey, who was posted at the 
Indian-Tibetan border town of Yatung (Tib. Dromo; Ch. Yadong), reported that 
there remained “a heavy demand for radios, cameras and watches as the Chinese 
were buying these in the hundreds and thousands.”27
The plethora of luxury goods was in stark contrast to the dearth of daily 
 necessities. It was during this period that the Chinese government, having few 
Himalayan Asia    71
local options, had to ship in needed supplies such as medicines, construction 
materials, and even rice from outside Tibet. This allowed the Khaches, as well 
as Tibetan and Nepalese traders, to make unprecedented profits.28 These profits 
meant many more Barkor Khaches could, and did, bear the expense of sending 
their children to study in the Indian hill stations of Kalimpong and Darjeeling, or 
even Delhi. It was against this backdrop of a significantly altered political situa-
tion, as well as acute shortages of food, fuel, and housing, that the Barkor Khaches 
found their economic circumstances in the 1950s far exceeding what they had 
experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.
With profits rising and business good in 1956, as many as forty-one Tibetan 
Muslims were able to afford the high cost associated with going on pilgrimage 
to Mecca—more than double the number who went ten years earlier.29 These 
Khaches did not travel with the official Chinese Islamic Association delegation 
(and thus do not appear in national statistics). They traveled by their own means 
via India, demonstrating a rarely remarked autonomy from the PRC’s control 
over all religious associations and international travel.30 China had attempted to 
send a group of Chinese Muslims on the hajj via Pakistan as early as 1952, only 
to be denied entry by Saudi Arabia with whom the People’s Republic of China 
did not have diplomatic relations. Indian officials in Lhasa reported concern 
in 1956 among the Wapaling Khache over whether Saudi Arabia would accept 
Chinese passports, for it created “considerable anxiety as to whether they would 
be granted entry.” They were told, however, by Chinese officials that “by the 
kindness of Chairman Mao, the Muslims had been able to proceed to Mekka.”31 
More likely, the Tibetan Muslims simply joined Indian Muslims traveling from 
Bombay. Relatively large numbers of Khaches took the hajj during the 1950s. As 
Yusuf Naik indicated, many Barkor Khaches went several times, his father, for 
example, in 1953 and 1958.32
The ongoing contact with India and the Middle East, prevalent among the 
Barkor Khache, raised concerns among Chinese officials regarding that commu-
nity’s loyaltyy. Xue Wenbo was delighted that both the Barkor and the Wapaling 
Khache participated in the first May Day celebrations in Lhasa, excitedly 
describing them “carrying the national flag, enthusiastically shouting slogans.” 
The Khaches’ patriotism, however, remained an open question for many of the 
newly arrived Chinese authorities.33
If the Barkor Khaches were prospering economically through their trade and 
other commercial ventures, the Wapaling Khaches profited as linguistic, cultural, 
and political brokers between the Chinese and Tibetans. From the perspective 
of the Chinese, the Wapaling Khaches were crucial interlocutors. This affinity 
between these two groups did not always sit with well with the Tibetans. Some 
Tibetans even suggested that the Wapaling Khaches viewed the liberation of 
Tibet as a personal windfall, well deserved for their having suffered under the 
pro-British Tibetan government.
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The Wapaling Khaches’ rapport with Chinese officials stemmed from years of 
cultural and linguistic linkages, yet, as discussed in chapter 3, there exists little 
evidence that such connections caused the Wapaling Khaches to perceive them-
selves as “Chinese” or even “Hui.” Rather, the local Wapaling Khaches, even in 
1952, tended to describe themselves as common Tibetans (Ch. Xizang de bai xing).34 
However, the pro-Chinese stance of the Wapaling Khaches gradually came to 
annoy many local Tibetans. This vexation most likely stemmed from the seem-
ing favoritism shown them by the Chinese.35 A former Tibetan government offi-
cial, Tubten Khétsun, with a bitterness undiminished by the intervening decades, 
recalled that the Wapaling Khaches “immediately after the invasion welcomed and 
cooperated with [the Chinese Communists] like a baby embracing its mother” 
(Tib. btsan ‘dzul byas ma thag a ma yin shag dang nu ma ‘thung shag).36 It was 
certainly not just the Wapaling Khaches who benefited from the arrival of the 
Chinese. As Dawa Norbu has noted, it was during the 1950s that “for about seven 
years the Chinese invaders literally [gave] away dayin (silver dollars). Every man has 
his price, and I do not think that there was any Tibetan heroic enough to refuse.”37 
But the perception of the Wapaling Khache both benefiting from the Chinese and 
assisting them is likely accurate.
With a dearth of Tibetan-Chinese translators available in Lhasa, the 
Wapaling Khaches emerged as critical intermediaries for Chinese officials and 
soldiers. They were in high demand as a result of the political and economic 
forces in play, and these forces most likely proved too enticing to resist.38 Like 
the Barkor Khache who profited from the new trade in luxury goods being 
purchased by the newly arrived Chinese officials and soldiers, the Wapaling 
Khache appear to have  displayed  little disquiet over any moral, political, or 
ethnic dilemmas that were presented by aligning themselves with the new 
Chinese presence in Lhasa.
The Wapaling Khaches’ linguistic abilities also led the Chinese Communist 
 officials to replicate early Nationalist policy by introducing state-approved 
 curricula and engaging the Wapaling Khaches as natural partners in that venture. 
In 1952, two elementary schools were established, one was Tibetan and the other 
was Chinese. In the Chinese school, Wapaling Khaches held key positions and 
ran the school with the Wapaling ahong (a Chinese term for “imam”) serving as 
the principal. A previous Wapaling Khache Council leader, Wang Chunshen, was 
appointed assistant principal. As had occurred in the 1930s and 1940s when the 
mosque became the Chinese school, the classes held on the grounds of the Grand 
Mosque offered instruction in Chinese, Tibetan, and Arabic.39 While it may seem 
that an Islamic presence in Lhasa’s first public schools under Communist rule 
would be an issue, in the near term, like the earlier efforts by the Nationalists, the 
Chinese officials had few options for instructors fluent in Tibetan and Chinese or 
for appropriate alternative school sites.
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The more immediate problem appeared to be how to classify the Khache. Chinese 
officials and cadres admitted they were undeniably Tibetan, as  demonstrated by 
their dress, language, and social traits, but they consistently referred to the Khache 
as Hui. The Communist government saw being Muslim as sufficient to designate 
them as Hui. The Chinese approached the question through the lens of whether 
or not Tibetans were Chinese citizens, reasoning that if both the Wapaling and the 
Barkor Khache had been treated as Tibetan and Tibet was now part of China, then 
the Khache were Chinese citizens.40
The primacy of Tibet as Chinese, while adequate to resolve questions of 
 citizenship, was less effective in dealing with the question of understanding the 
Khache ethnically as either Hui or Tibetan. The default interpretation of  treating 
them as Hui hints at the larger problem the Chinese had with individuals of mixed 
parentage and heritage or marriages between Tibetans and foreign  nationals, as 
existed with the Nepalese and Ladakhi. Such questions were not simply  academic, 
given that for several years the Tibeto-Nepalese Treaty of 1856 granting the 
Khatsara Nepalese citizenship had not been officially abrogated.41 As groups like 
the Ladakhi, Nepalese, Indians, and other Himalayan peoples continued to traverse 
the Tibetan borders, as they had prior to Chinese control, the difference between 
Tibet’s continued relationship with its neighbors, on the one hand, and the Dalai 
Lama’s acknowledgment of Chinese rule, on the other, became an increasingly 
awkward issue for the Chinese in both predictable and unpredictable ways.
LOST CITIZENS OF THE HIMAL AYAS
What is often forgotten in much of Chinese scholarship on Tibet is that regardless 
of whether one accepts China’s claim that Tibet has been part of China since the 
Yuan dynasty is the fact that Tibet remained far more embedded in Himalayan 
and Central Asian politics than the politics of central China. Tibet’s de facto 
 independence after the fall of the Qing in 1911 only amplified Tibet’s Himalayan 
ties, allowing Tibet to reestablish itself as a political, religious, and commercial 
center among its Himalayan neighbors.
Although Nepal occasionally sent missions to the Qing court and Qing 
documents described the relations of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim with China 
as tributary states (Ch. jingong), each of these states had far closer ties with 
Tibet than with China.42 Complicating the picture is the fact that these same 
Himalayan states, in addition to Kashmir and other lesser Himalayan states, 
had all experienced varying degrees of British control, making them essentially 
British protectorates. At one extreme, in Sikkim, the British gained “direct and 
exclusive control over internal administration and foreign relations.”43 At the 
other extreme, in Nepal, Nepalese officials retained internal autonomy during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, although Britain often dictated the 
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country’s foreign policy.44 Bhutan evolved from a quasi-protectorate in the late 
nineteenth century to being forced to cede much of its external affairs to Britain 
by the early twentieth century.
Regardless of this British influence, it was throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century that all three Himalayan states continued to dispatch per-
manent and semipermanent representatives to Lhasa. Annual tribute payments 
were exchanged between Tibet and its neighbors, demonstrating the continuing 
relationship between them. The resilience of these relationships, in light of the 
tumultuous events in Asia during the 1930s and 1940s, is impressive. Although 
it is true that by the postwar 1940s, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim were paid little 
heed by India and China, for Tibet they remained key nodes of external contact. 
Only with the People’s Republic of China’s decision to invade and declare Tibet 
part of  sovereign China in 1951 did the position of the Himalayan states slowly 
 demonstrate their relevance.
The 1950s were a time of careful Sino-Indian diplomacy, a diplomacy  emerging 
out of these nations’ shared struggle for independence and liberation from an 
imperialist past. As the Cold War heated up, both China and India sought to 
 cooperate in the pursuit of a new Asian era, unfettered by the former colonial or 
new Cold War powers. Nehru had deftly negotiated India’s independence from 
British rule and became the first prime minister of independent India in 1947. 
Similarly, Mao cast the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 as one of 
China having finally “stood up” after a century of humiliation.
Although both Nehru and Mao certainly aspired to become dominant Asian 
leaders and wield the informal prestige that would spring from such a role, both 
intuitively grasped the strategic benefits of jointly forging postcolonial  solidarity in 
Asia. On numerous occasions following Indian independence, Nehru  advocated 
on China’s behalf, including consistent support of the PRC’s claim to China’s seat 
in the United Nations. China’s invasion of Tibet did not alter his stance. Staunchly 
pro-Tibet, Nehru hewed to a distinctly pragmatic line, realizing that China’s 
 leaders seemed intent on reclaiming Tibet and that most of the other world powers 
were determined not to get involved. Nehru remarked, “I think it may be taken for 
granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole 
of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop 
it. It is equally unlikely that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do so.”45
After the arrival of Chinese troops in Tibet, and even after it was clear Nehru 
would not intervene, Tibet’s neighbors did not immediately relinquish their 
 extraterritorial ties with Tibet. Bhutan, for example, continued to post a  permanent 
representative to Lhasa through 1960, even as it refused formal diplomatic ties 
with Beijing.46 China’s permissiveness towards Tibet’s relations with its neighbors 
neatly correlates with the central government’s initial commitment to Tibetan 
autonomy. Similarly, China, initially at least, allowed the Tibeto-Nepalese Treaty 
of 1856 to remain in force. This included allowing Tibet, with China’s acquiescence, 
Himalayan Asia    75
to continue making its annual 1856 treaty payments of 10,000 rupees to Nepal.47 
The government’s early forbearance stemmed largely from its categorization of 
the Tibetan government’s actions as ceremonial rather than political in nature. 
However, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, as well as the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan 
government, quickly demonstrated that they saw them as more tangible.
A year after Tibet and China signed the 17-Point Agreement, China could not 
have been happy to see Indian press reports of a letter from the Dalai Lama to the 
Nepalese representative in Lhasa (N. vikil) stating, “[I have] every hope that there 
will be no hindrance to continuing the age-old relations between my Government 
and yours. I pray to God that our relations may become stronger than ever.”48 A 
year later, in 1953, China finally informed the Lhasa government that it should 
cease the annual tribute payments to Nepal as stipulated in the 1856 treaty. But that 
seems not to have put the matter to rest, as two years later Nepalese prime minister 
M. P. Koirala asserted that “Nepal would approach the Dalai Lama and not Beijing, 
for Nepal even now acknowledged the Dalai Lama as the sovereign of Tibet.”49 
As the political scientist Leo Rose correctly pointed out, Nepal’s stance “by impli-
cation, at least, seem[s] to question China’s claim to sovereignty in Tibet.”50
It is odd that despite China telling the Tibetan government to cease its  relations 
with Nepal, neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese government notified Nepal of 
the intention to abrogate the treaty, which left Nepalese officials simply  waiting 
for the tribute mission to arrive in 1954. This expectation is somewhat more 
 understandable given that China and Nepal had yet to establish formal  diplomatic 
ties. Nepal’s surprise at this measure is palpable when the Nepalese prime  minister 
 somewhat plaintively conceded in 1954 that the “tribute-bearing emissary of the Dalai 
Lama does not seem to have left Lhasa.”51 The following month when the Nepalese 
representative in Lhasa was again instructed by his government to query the Dalai 
Lama about the matter, he was told “to refer all questions about Nepalese-Tibetan 
relations to the Chinese Government.”52 China’s swift, decisive, yet unexplained 
actions alerted the Himalayan states to the intentions of the Chinese Communists 
in ways that troubled many across the Asian subcontinent.
Headlines such as “Reds Next Move Near India’s Border” were common 
in newspapers, in government debates, and on street corners across the region 
in the early 1950s. Such concerns, when read in the context of global Cold War 
anxiety, appear unremarkable. Given that China seldom mentioned any of the 
Himalayan states, let alone made provocative statements about them, the number 
of entirely fabricated reports that circulated in the Indian and Western press was 
extraordinary.53
Many newspaper articles, politicians’ speeches, and diplomatic reports  citing 
a wide variety of sources (including Mao’s own writings) began to assert that 
Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, like Tibet, had been part of China and would soon 
be reclaimed in a similar manner.54 A prominent promoter of such notions was 
George Patterson, a Scottish medical missionary who had lived in the Kham 
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region of eastern Tibet for several years in the late 1940s. Forced to flee the region 
in 1949, he took up residence in the hill towns of Kalimpong and Darjeeling, 
 earning a living writing stories describing China’s ill treatment of Tibetans. In his 
first book, God’s Fools, he claimed that China’s occupation of Tibet was part of a 
larger plan to “liberate” all of Asia, asserting that “within one year Tibet would be 
liberated, within three years Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan would be liberated and in 
five years India would be liberated.”55 Preying on Cold War anxiety, he promoted 
the phrase “Tibet’s Five Fingers” to describe the designs China had on Kashmir, 
Nepal, Sikkim, and the North East Frontier Agency of Assam as natural targets 
stemming from their invasion of Tibet.
Certainly as Mao Zedong has gone on record as saying that Nepal must return to 
China as part of her former territories annexed by the imperialists and he has also 
said that Nepal and China must work together to liberate their “oppressed brothers 
in India.” But in China’s long-term plan it is Sikkim, the middle finger, the NEFA, the 
thumb, which will play the key pressure parts in China’s larger ambitions in these 
areas.56
There was one small problem with Patterson’s assertions. They were entirely 
 fabricated. No Chinese documents, and in particular none of Mao’s writings, ever 
made any claim for territorial expansion into the Himalayan states. There was 
 certainly nothing approaching the very clear claims the Chinese Communists had 
indicated for Tibet.57
DR .  SINGH AND REDEFINING HIMAL AYAN ASIA
The active imagination of Patterson and others regarding China’s interest in the 
Himalayan front range, however, should not suggest that the events in Nepal, 
Bhutan, and Sikkim were not of interest or did not affect Tibet and China more 
broadly. The extraordinary experiences of Dr. K. I. (Kunwar Inderjit) Singh reflect 
how little attention is given to the Himalayan context in which these events 
occurred.58 Singh was a Nepalese politician who in the course of five years would 
be called a revolutionary, a populist, a communist, and a rebel, and yet he was a 
man who also gained the title of prime minister of Nepal for four months in 1957. 
His experience demonstrates the risk of viewing this period purely through a Cold 
War lens, a lens that focuses solely on nationalist or ideological themes to the 
exclusion of the still-present traditional interstate ties.
Raised in western Nepal, Singh led a peripatetic life that included growing up 
in rural western Nepal, fighting for (and being dishonorably discharged from) 
the Indian National Army (INA), fleeing Burma on the eve of the Japanese inva-
sion just prior to his becoming a practitioner of homeopathy back in Nepal. An 
early member of the Nepali Congress Party in western Nepal, Singh promoted 
a reformist agenda that pushed rural relief to the forefront of Nepal’s political 
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consciousness. Singh’s grassroots organizational skills and his ability to speak in 
blunt and coarse language that resonated with Nepal’s broad underclass rocketed 
him to political prominence. The same qualities quickly attracted the attention of 
the government, which, threatened by his success, accused him of banditry and 
other crimes against the regime.
In the course of six months in late 1951, Singh was arrested, imprisoned, and 
escaped; he was ultimately rearrested and transferred to Kathmandu, where 
in January 1952 he awaited trial. A result of the ruling Rana family’s oligarchic 
excesses, Nepal in this period was already experiencing a constitutional crisis. 
Singh was a popular leader, and his presence in the capital prompted sympathetic 
members of the paramilitary police to carry out a coup d’état.
Late on January 21, Singh’s supporters released and immediately declared Singh 
the leader of a new parallel government. In a poorly coordinated set of maneu-
vers, the rebels raced to seize key governmental offices, to gain control over the 
nation’s communications centers, and to round up top ministers, all in a bid to 
spur the reform-minded King Tribhuwan to call for an all-party representative 
 government.59 Instead, the state army, tipped off in advance, whisked the  leading 
government officials to safe havens, quickly recaptured many of the key state 
buildings, and effectively forestalled the prospect of negotiations with the king. 
Less than twelve hours after it had begun, the coup had failed.
Realizing their fate, Singh and a small group of his closest associates, in the 
dead of winter, fled Kathmandu and headed north towards Tibet.60 Exactly why 
Singh chose to flee to Tibet remains an enigma. His base of support lay in  western 
Nepal near the southern Indian border. Politically, he had never allied himself 
with any communist movements or demonstrated strong interest in Chinese 
Communism. The decision to flee to Tibet must have been relatively spontaneous. 
Given the almost certain ruthless reception he would face upon capture, Tibet’s 
proximity (roughly a hundred miles from Kathmandu) and misplaced optimism 
that the Chinese would support any anti-establishment movement likely seemed 
a better option.61
The sheer audacity of the escape combined with Singh’s larger-than-life person-
ality fueled wide-ranging rumors that soon filled the front pages of newspapers 
across the Himalayan front range to Delhi and beyond. By February, the Nepalese 
government, clinging to power and seeking to use the threat of extremist and 
radical political parties to gain public support for their government, insinuated 
that “the Chinese Communists with the help of the rebel leader Dr. K. I. Singh 
would take advantage of this [lack of peace] and enlarge their field of activity.”62 
Weeks turned into months with no clear intelligence about what had happened to 
Singh, and the rumors grew. In March, reports speculated that Singh, with roughly 
“50 followers, fully armed, and a large amount of cash looted from the Nepalese 
treasury,” had used the funds to make “substantial payment to local Tibetan offi-
cials for protection and safe passage to Lhasa.”63
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By April 1952, the stories began to take a slightly different tack. Some asserted 
that Singh had been invited to Beijing, his men had enlisted in the People’s 
Liberation Army, and all were involved in a plan for Singh “to take a  leading 
part in the ‘liberation’ of Nepal.64 Shortly thereafter, it was suggested that 
Singh and his followers had been captured near Shigatse, with the Nepalese 
trade agent stationed there assisting in “negotiations between the Tibetan and 
Nepal Governments.”65 By July, a newspaper article highlighting disturbances in 
 western Nepal  speculated that the leader must be “a follower of K. I. Singh,” since 
the “trouble-makers” were “either Communist-led groups or the rightist Rana 
elements or a combination of both.”66 Nor were these rumors simply  gossip 
 published by the papers to sell more copy. When Nepalese general Bijaya 
briefed British officials in May, he informed them that there was “no doubt that 
K. I. Singh had turned completely Communist  .  .  . [and] that he was gathering 
some of his followers and [there was] a risk that he might stage an armed  uprising 
in Nepal.”67 With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the accusations 
claiming Singh and his men had joined the Chinese army or had participated 
in plans to “liberate” Nepal or that Singh had become “completely Communist” 
were entirely untrue. In some ways, the true story of Singh’s time in China is 
equally interesting if not quite as politically expedient for those attempting to use 
his flight to Tibet for their own political ends.
In an odd twist of fate, on January 21, 1952, at the very moment that Singh 
and his men, desperate to escape pursuing Nepalese troops, were racing north 
to Tibet after their failed coup, Peter Aufschnaiter, grateful to have escaped from 
Communist-controlled Tibet into Nepal, was headed south along the same road. 
Aufschnaiter, the sardonic friend of Heinrich Harrer, whose book Seven Years 
in Tibet would make them both household names later that year, had fled Lhasa 
ahead of the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army. In Aufschnaiter’s telling, 
“K. I. Singh had escaped northwards along the road I was traveling down. His 
group crossed the river at Shabru, throwing the middle section of the bridge into 
the water to hinder pursuers, and then crossed over the [Rasua Garhi] Pass from 
Chilime to Chang in Tibet continuing to Kyirong.”68 Forgoing the main road for 
the less patrolled mountain paths, Singh eluded efforts by Nepalese troops to block 
his progress at Rasua Garhi pass (elev. 16,500 ft.).69 His band of brothers fared 
badly. Without proper clothing or supplies, several of the nearly forty men who 
began the journey died in the crossing. On January 31, 1952, Singh and his remain-
ing followers emerged in Tibet frostbitten and famished.70 Singh later indicated 
that they did not reach Shigatse until March 20, 1952, where they remained for four 
months, before moving on to Lhasa in June.71
From all accounts, the Chinese were as surprised as the rest of the world about 
Singh’s arrival in Tibet. It should be remembered that the first Chinese officials 
and soldiers of any significant number had just arrived in Lhasa months earlier, 
in September 1951, followed by the main forces in December. The first months 
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of their occupation had not gone smoothly, as they grappled with rampant infla-
tion, dwindling food supplies, and with having only a tenuous political grip on 
the country, outside of Lhasa and Shigatse. Although desperate to improve their 
image, the Chinese seemed at a loss as to what to do about Singh and his men, 
particularly as the Nepalese government, still treating the Tibetan government as 
an autonomous entity, communicated only with Tibetan officials in their effort to 
locate and repatriate Singh.72 Given that the Nepalese and Chinese governments 
would not establish diplomatic ties for another four years (1956), the Nepalese 
actions were not completely irrational. Desperate to get control of the situation, 
Chinese officials went to great pains to have Singh and his men apprehended, 
even procuring a photo of Singh and providing it to the local Tibetan government. 
Given the political ambiguities of this situation, it is intriguing that the Chinese 
did not simply order Singh and his men back to Nepal. They chose instead to order 
the local Tibetan officials to hand him over to them so that he could be transferred 
“on to China.”73
That Singh did not arrive in Lhasa until midsummer, five months after his 
arrival in Tibet, is indicative of the limits of Chinese control in those early months. 
As late as June, the Nepalese representative in Lhasa continued to effectively  canvas 
“senior [Tibetan] officials to secure the handing over of K. I. Singh to Nepal.”74 
Only in early August, half a year after fleeing Kathmandu, did Singh and his nearly 
forty followers leave Lhasa for the southwestern China city of Chengdu, which 
 traditionally served as the administrative hub for Tibetan-related activities.75 
While Singh and his men were likely to have welcomed the Chinese intervention 
on their behalf, the questions of jurisdiction still being sorted out between the 
Tibetans and the recently arrived Chinese suggest the limited reach of the Chinese 
authority, or as one British official speculated, it could have simply represented 
“the procrastination of Tibetan officials.”76
Singh appeared delighted to be in China. According to Chinese accounts, he 
repeatedly compared his journey from Kathmandu to China as his own personal 
“Long March,” asking on his arrival to be taken to Beijing to meet with Mao Zedong. 
This request would be politely deflected and never fulfilled during his nearly four-
year sojourn in China. After arriving in Chengdu, he and his men were provided 
with housing, language instruction, and the occasional outing. It was not until the 
following May 1953 that Chinese officials invited Singh to Beijing; the forty men 
who had come with him remained in Chengdu.77 In Beijing he led the life of an 
honored visiting guest, living in a government guest house and meeting with a 
string of minor foreign office and friendship association officials.78 From his treat-
ment, it is clear that the Chinese perceived Singh more as a political fugitive for 
whom they had generously provided asylum than as a revolutionary leader whose 
presence could serve a domestic or international purpose.
The Chinese rarely, if ever, publicized his arrival or used him in politically 
 motivated ways. No articles appeared touting his support of China, nor was his 
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presence used to demonstrate the weakness of “lackeys of western imperialism.” 
There also does not seem to be any evidence that they contemplated at any point 
benefiting from his presence in fomenting Communist activity in Nepal.79 Several 
years later, in one of his rare public comments about his time in China, Singh  simply 
stated, “The Communist countries have their own rules to regulate the movement 
of foreign visitors and political refugees. I was governed by those rules.”80 Even 
after Singh returned to Nepal to become prime minister for a brief period in 1957, 
the Chinese state media never alluded to his time in China, even though numer-
ous reports of his term as prime minister appeared in Chinese newspapers.81 While 
Singh’s motives for his actions remained opaque, it seems likely the Chinese were 
primarily intent on keeping him from further destabilizing Nepal and, potentially, 
Tibet.
China’s strategy to control the international framing of Singh’s visit appears 
to have had some merit. Although all evidence suggests that China had given 
 diplomatic relations with Nepal little consideration prior to 1952, China could 
hardly ignore Nepal’s repeated efforts to maintain the terms of the 1856 Nepal-
Tibet Treaty in which Tibet was considered an independent government. Nepal’s 
expectation of annual tributes and the prime minister’s reference in 1954 to the 
Dalai Lama as “the sovereign of Tibet” suggested that Nepal had no intention of 
accepting China’s presence in Tibet.82 Nor was China entirely sure of India’s stance 
in the matter. Nepal had long been under the mantle of India. Nehru repeatedly 
asserted that the “Himalayas are the guardians and sentinels of India and Nepal 
and their white-capped peaks welcome friends and are a warning to those of 
 hostile intents,” going on to conclude that he considered “the fate of India and 
Nepal linked closely together.”83
In early 1954, several disparate elements of China’s broader plan began to move 
toward a delicate alignment with India, Nepal, and Tibet. Only months after Singh 
crossed into Tibet, India and China finally concluded a Sino-Indian  agreement, 
which was signed on April 29, 1954. The agreement included elements that  satisfied 
both China and India. Foremost of these was that India explicitly recognized 
China’s sovereignty in Tibet and forfeited all former privileges that it held in Tibet. 
Despite considerable domestic opposition, Nehru had reason to be pleased with the 
outcome. The agreement’s preamble included, for the first time, his Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel), a blueprint he believed would usher in 
a period of peace and stability in Asia. The principles the  agreement envisaged 
were (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and  sovereignty, 
(2) mutual nonaggression, (3) mutual noninterference in each other’s internal 
affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.84 Speaking 
before the Indian Parliament and clearly defensive over claims he had been soft 
on China, he said, “In my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since 
we became independent. . . . I think it is right for our country, for Asia, and for 
the world.”85
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In the weeks after the agreement, India and China both, independently, sought 
to resolve the respective ambiguities in their relationship with Nepal. In Beijing, 
Singh was summoned for a forty-minute meeting with Zhou, who proceeded to tell 
Singh that while China supported the Nepalese People’s Revolution (Ch. Nipoer 
Renmin Gemin), Singh should understand that “China would never send even one 
soldier [to Nepal].”86 It would seem that now, with the Sino-Indian Agreement 
signed, Singh’s usefulness was coming to an end. Soon after Zhou met with Singh, 
Nehru summoned the Nepalese foreign minister to meet with him in New Delhi. 
In their meeting, and in equally explicit language, Nehru explained that the “old 
Treaty between Nepal and Tibet had no force or relevance today” and that “in 
effect Nepal should recognize the change in Tibet and not seek to exercise any 
of its previous rights.”87 Nepal’s efforts to perpetuate its advantageous status with 
Tibet had come to an end, and neither China nor India was about to let Nepal’s 
wishes get in the way of their larger plans.
Singh’s significance in the larger picture became apparent several months later, 
in October 1954, when Nehru broached Singh’s presence in China during his first 
state visit to Beijing:
There is a very small thing [I would like to raise]. . . . One man named K. I. Singh  
had created some trouble in Nepal some time ago, fled to Tibet. He was then 
 reported to be in China. Later on, news came that he was being openly entertained. 
When  persons who are traitors to their countries are thus openly feted then people 
 naturally get apprehensive.88
After assuring Nehru that China had no intention of asking Singh to engage “in any 
activity for overthrow of [the] Nepal Government,” Zhou and Nehru continued to 
discuss China’s need for diplomatic relations with Nepal. Zhou willingly conceded 
India’s “special position in Nepal” and agreed that diplomatic representation for 
Nepal “could probably be dealt with by the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi, who was 
also accredited to Kathmandu.”89
As the discussion came to a close, Zhou Enlai raised the possibility of China 
being included in the Asian-African Conference championed by Nehru, which 
would later be known as the Bandung Conference. This was a moment that Nehru 
had been waiting for, for he emerged from the meeting with Zhou believing 
 himself vindicated for engaging rather than resisting China’s presence in Tibet. 
With Zhou’s expressed interest in attending the Bandung Conference, Nehru had 
his faith in his Principles of Peaceful Coexistence confirmed.
Heavily criticized by his detractors at home for pursuing a policy of  appeasement 
towards China, Nehru’s efforts were seen by many of India’s Asian neighbors as a 
masterful maneuver to break out of the dualistic Cold War geopolitics. Aware of 
the dangers presented by China’s occupation of Tibet, Nehru clearly believed that 
the Sino-Indian Agreement and his successful state visit to Beijing validated his 
decision not to contest China’s control of Tibet. It appeared to justify his policy, 
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dating to 1950, when he first asserted “that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor 
indeed any other Power, is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that 
country. What they are interested in is embarrassing China. Our interest, on the 
other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail.”90
This stark evaluation of the options available to India in this instance reflected 
an unabashed pragmatism, even as Nehru remained optimistic about avoiding 
the high stakes politics of the era. Much of his political philosophy is referred 
to obliquely, using a terminological shorthand that is rarely fully defined—“third 
way,” “non-aligned movement,” or Panchsheel. His philosophy did, however, cap-
ture the ethos of the period among the newly independent Asian and African 
nations. In the end, twenty-nine nations, including Nepal, India, and China, came 
together in Bandung, Indonesia, to lay the groundwork for a future free from their 
former colonial rulers and to explore ways to avoid the emerging divisions being 
imposed by the Cold War.
A tentative postcolonial expression of Afro-Asian unity, the Bandung 
Conference sought to forge a Third World alliance independent of the First World 
powers and to create a neutral space between Communist and non-Communist 
nations. Indonesian president Sukarno captured the boundless optimism of the 
conference in his opening speech when he set out the task of the twenty-nine 
African and Asian participant nations as nothing less than to “demonstrate to the 
minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the  majority, 
are for peace, not for war.”91 Yet the mere fact that Nehru had convinced the 
 attendant nations to allow the PRC to attend, which was still unrecognized by 
the United Nations, was a major step in demonstrating India’s commitment to 
facilitate China’s role in Asia. The conference fostered an Asia-centered  discussion 
of issues facing the newly established nations—not one governed by colonial 
powers with permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. Nehru hoped that 
the involvement of China with Asian initiatives would distance China from the 
Soviet Union while nurturing the possibility that India and China would emerge 
as the centers of Asian authority, free of external oversight. For its part, China 
believed that attending the conference would advance its efforts to manage 
relations among non-Western countries, to develop Islamic connections, and to 
promote the rights of Overseas Chinese even if they had not been citizens of 
China for generations.92
A central dilemma for both India and China was that these communities 
of Indians and Chinese, many of whom had lived outside their homelands for 
generations, were perceived by their host countries as retaining enduring if 
 ambiguous ties to their homelands. In many countries across Asia, the Indian 
and Chinese populations were seen as “a source of internal conflict and threat.”93 
The sense of threat was particularly present in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, 
where the Chinese made up a significant portion of the population, and Indonesia, 
where Overseas Chinese controlled considerable commercial and financial assets. 
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While all parties agreed that the implicit dual nationality of these communities 
posed a problem, the obvious solutions required multilateral agreements across 
Asia. Extremely sensitive to the accusation of fostering neo-imperialism, China 
and India sought to acknowledge their ethnocultural ties to these  communities 
while advocating that they accept citizenship in their country of residence. 
Achieving such a solution would not only provide Asia’s many newly founded 
states with a much-needed ethnic stability, but, as India and China recognized, if 
left unresolved such discontent would be redirected back at them and potentially 
prevent either or both from taking a much desired leadership role in Asia.
Nor was it simply demographic influence in elections or financial leverage that 
these newly formed nations most feared. In the case of Overseas Chinese, the 
 question remained highly politicized. On the one hand, the Beijing government 
was concerned that many Overseas Chinese, particularly in India and Burma, 
might still be politically aligned with the Nationalist Chinese government which 
was still a prominent threat even if largely contained to the island of Taiwan. On the 
other hand, many countries in Southeast Asia worried that their Overseas Chinese 
populations might be susceptible to the Communist propaganda of  mainland 
China and thus could serve as a fifth column within new nations. When this issue 
again emerged in talks in Beijing in 1954, Zhou Enlai stated quite  categorically 
that China believes “there should be no dual nationality. An individual is either 
Chinese or a national of the country where he resides. It is a question left to us by 
history. But we would like to make it clear that it should be decided voluntarily and 
on the basis of parentage. If you remain Chinese then you cannot participate in the 
activities of the country where you reside.”94
With this question of citizenship still unanswered and with a deep desire to 
offer tangible evidence of a triumph fostered by the “Bandung spirit,” China 
and Indonesia sought to bring resolution to the question of the citizenship of 
Indonesia’s large Overseas Chinese population. In 1955 roughly 1.1 million Chinese 
still held dual nationality.95 Since Indonesia’s independence, and China’s  liberation, 
a central concern for both nations was the citizenship status of Overseas Chinese, 
 essentially persons of Chinese descent, who at the end of Dutch rule in 1946 had 
passively acquired Indonesian nationality while still being considered  ethnically 
alien by the Indonesians. Such a choice was not a patently obvious one at that time 
for most Overseas Chinese in Indonesia, given the strong anti-Chinese  sentiments 
in many parts of the country. As the historian Philip Kuhn pointed out, “For an 
ethnic Chinese to renounce Chinese nationality and choose Indonesian offered 
scant protection.”96 Agreeing that the dilemma needed resolution, China and 
Indonesia met and emerged from the meeting with a bilateral accord on dual 
 citizenship: those individuals who held dual citizenship would be allowed two 
years to choose citizenship in one or the other. In the context of the Bandung 
Conference, this protocol captured the resolve to address the undesirable and 
lingering vestige of colonialism in a peaceful and collective manner. Many took 
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the agreement as proof that these newly formed nations could broker their own 
 agreements without the assistance of the former colonial and new Cold War 
 powers. It also appeared to herald a broader resolution of the persistent concerns 
held by many Southeast Asian nations over the ambiguous status of Indian and 
Chinese communities outside of India and China.
The Bandung Conference also offered an interesting denouement for Singh. 
On the eve of the conference, the Nepalese king, Tribhuvan, died and his young 
son, Mahendra, ascended the throne. Hardly a reformist, King Mahendra, like 
many young Nepalese, still sought to guide Nepal away from India’s overwhelm-
ing influence. He instructed his envoy to openly endorse the Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, and he fully embraced the goals of the conference. Sensing the 
 appropriate moment had arrived, Zhou Enlai approached the Nepalese  delegate 
and conveyed that “Dr. K. I. Singh and his followers were anxious to return 
to Nepal, if the Nepalese Government assured them that they would not be 
 prosecuted or otherwise victimized.”97 Despite the shift in political mood since 
his hasty departure, Singh had remained a popular figure in Nepal’s political land-
scape. After the message was relayed to the king and Singh’s return agreed to, the 
Nepalese government asked only for assurances that Singh and his men pledge to 
forsake any form of violence.
By September 1955, Singh and his followers arrived at the Tibet-Nepal  border. 
Singh was escorted back into Nepal and ultimately pardoned by the king. He 
received a hero’s welcome, as described at the beginning of this chapter. Even the 
international press took note. Time magazine labeled him the “Robin Hood of 
the Himalayas.”98 The question of Singh’s political agenda and aspirations remained 
unknown, though many assumed that Singh would be sympathetic to Chinese 
values. After several weeks of reflection, Singh astonished the mainstream  political 
establishment by announcing a political philosophy built on a pro-India and 
 pro-monarchy platform underpinned by a vociferous denial of any Communist 
ties. Nehru remained unimpressed. After meeting Singh some weeks later in New 
Delhi, he described him, with his characteristic sharp wit, as “not a communist, 
just a freebooter.”99
With Singh’s declaration of his pro-India beliefs, Nepal had become less anxious 
over China’s territorial interests in Nepal. The following year, on September 20, 
1956, Nepal and China signed the eight-year Agreement to Maintain the Friendly 
Relations between China and Nepal. The treaty not only officially abrogated the 
Nepal treaty of 1856 but also abolished all the privileges that Nepal and its  citizens 
had previously enjoyed in Tibet.100 The swiftness of this change is difficult to fully 
appreciate. On one level, the treaty simply brought the Nepal-China  relationship 
to a modern diplomatic standard by replacing Nepal’s representative with a consul. 
Yet there were other seemingly anodyne clauses in the treaty, such as the stipu-
lation that all those “who travel across the border between the Tibet Region of 
China and Nepal, shall hold passports,” that marked a rather sharp deviation from 
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the traditional ways in which Nepal, Tibet, and the other Himalayan states had 
interacted.101 Given the centrality of the concepts of citizenship, ethnicity, and 
nation at the Bandung Conference, it is striking how little attention was paid in 
the agreement to the complexities of Tibet’s Himalayan relations and multiethnic 
population. In many ways the post-Bandung period generally, and the year 1956 
specifically, signaled a high-water mark in China’s attitude towards Tibet.
Dr. K. I. Singh’s triumphant welcome in Kathmandu, Nepal, on October 5, 1955, after having 
spent more than three years in the People’s  Republic of China. Copyright  Bettmann / Getty 
Images.
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The Bandung Conference, Nehru’s Five Principles, and K. I. Singh’s escape to 
China all reflect a shared activism rooted in dissatisfaction with the political limi-
tations of post-independence Asia. As Singh’s experience epitomizes, his quixotic 
choice to seek refuge in China ultimately led back to his championing the tra-
ditional pillars of Nepalese politics: supporting the Nepalese monarchy and the 
Indian alliance. Similarly, the treaties signed between China, India, and Nepal 
were greeted with considerable enthusiasm precisely because they sought to usher 
in a new Asian order, one that transcended both Cold War divisions and the long-
established status quo between Himalayan states and their neighbors. Yet in the 
rush to move forward, many elements of the past were forgotten. The Bandung 
Conference sought to facilitate, in different ways, an inter-Asian communication 
that would allow such changes to occur. The confident optimism of the early 1950s 
quickly succumbed to stiff conservatism, particularly with regard to the concepts 
of indigeneity and citizenship. The seemingly simple solutions defining citizenship 
through the philosophy advanced at Bandung or by treaties at the state-to-state 
level became difficult to enact on the ground given the highly situational and often 
ambiguous definitions of identity. No ideological optimism was able to paper over 
those challenges. The lingering Himalayan relations combined with the harden-
ing notions of state boundaries and identity caused considerable consternation 
for the residents of central Tibet. The Himalayan manner in which the Khache, 
Khatsara, and Koko had thrived increasingly faded, leaving few options in the new 
postcolonial era.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END:  1956–1958
Much of China’s early success in Tibet had been built on China’s willingness to 
preserve, or in some cases simply to not prohibit, much of Tibetan culture, soci-
ety, and, in some instances, government. In its depiction as a “forbidden king-
dom,” pristine and morally pure, pre-1951 Tibet has been cast as the epitome of 
an idealized version of premodern society. The few Western visitors in the 1940s 
often described screening movies to delighted Tibetan crowds as if seeing a film 
for the first time, suggesting that Tibet had remained untouched by such common 
“modern” experiences. There is, in fact, considerable evidence that the Tibetan 
elite were avid early adopters of motion pictures, and Tibetans in general were 
ardent consumers. Among the earliest of these enthusiasts was Tibetan com-
mander-in-chief Tsarong Dasang Dadul who in 1936, after serving a sumptuous 
forty-course dinner to the British head of mission, Charles Bell, proceeded to give 
Bell a screening of an “8-millimeter cinema film which he had taken himself ” on 
his “small electrically driven projector.”102 Similarly, the Dalai Lama, from an early 
age, had been fascinated with movies ever since he discovered two hand-crank 
projectors belonging to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. The German visitor Heinrich 
Harrer and the English officer Frank Ludlow, serving the British Mission in Lhasa, 
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encouraged the popularity of film in private and public screenings.103 Although 
such examples suggest that movies were a private affair of the elite, in fact, a 
Barkor Khache, Abdul Aziz, opened the first commercial cinema hall in Lhasa 
in the early 1930s, screening well-known Indian movies to  considerable popular 
acclaim (and profit).104
By the arrival of the Chinese in 1951, Lhasa residents had enjoyed the delights 
provided by cinema for several decades. The number, topic, and style of  foreign 
films permitted in Central China in the 1950s, though perceived as a key 
avenue for the new regime to educate and indoctrinate its populace, was highly 
 regulated. They tended to be limited to Chinese films or those from China’s 
closest allies such as the Soviet Union. Chinese officials in Tibet decided quite 
early on to make exceptions there in an effort to woo favor among Tibetan 
residents for whom Indian films remained immensely popular. Within weeks of 
the Chinese arrival in Lhasa, Abdul Aziz’s two younger brothers, Muhammad 
Asghar and Sirajuddin (commonly called the Tsakhur brothers), were, with little 
fuss, granted the  necessary permits to show films at their private cinema.105 Over 
the next few years, the Chinese authorities attempted to combine propaganda 
with entertainment, allowing the brothers to show Hindi films and even films 
borrowed from the Indian consulate, with the simple demand that all  material 
be previewed for objectionable content by Chinese officials. As late as 1955, 
Chinese authorities still demanded that all Indian films be prescreened by them, 
though they had seemingly never censored or banned a single Indian film (leading 
many Tibetans to speculate the Chinese simply wanted a free screening of the 
Indian films).106
In 1956, a subtle shift began to occur. Although the cinema remained as  popular 
as ever and was still being allowed to show Chinese and Indian films, in late 1955, 
the Chinese central authorities procured three Indian films (Do Bigha Zamin, 
Awara, and Toofan), dubbed them into Chinese, and offered screenings to “select 
audiences.” Clearly, the screenings were an effort by the Chinese authorities to tap 
into the undeniable success and popularity of Indian films. There appears to have 
also been some resentment among the Chinese over the fact that Tibetans found 
Chinese films lacking. According to an Indian consular report, many Tibetans 
had remarked “about the higher technical standards and aesthetic qualities of 
[Indian] films as compared with Chinese films, which are mostly of a  propagandist 
nature.”107 Perhaps Chinese officials began to tire of these unfavorable  comparisons, 
one being that, according to the Indian consul, despite several years of exposure to 
Chinese movies, it was those from India that remained “extremely popular among 
the Tibetans.”108
Business continued to be profitable and the political situation amenable enough 
for the Tsakhur brothers to decide to construct Lhasa’s first public cinema hall on 
June 8, 1958. The Happy Light Movie Theater (Tib. bde skyid od snang) opened to 
great fanfare with a showing of Jhanak Jhank Payal Baje and included the screening 
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of several newsreels of the Dalai Lama’s visit to China in 1954. The audience that 
night included important Tibetan officials, “a few Chinese officials,” and the Indian 
consul general and his staff.109 This grand opening, however, marked not the start 
of an era of superior cinematic experience but the beginning of increased Chinese 
censorship.
Soon after the grand opening, the Chinese informed the management that 
moving forward they would only be allowed to screen ten Indian movies per 
year. “The remaining pictures,” they were advised, “should be either Chinese or 
Russian.”110 By the end of 1958, Chinese officials reduced that number to “only six 
Indian pictures a year instead of ten, and they would have to get the films through 
them and not direct from India as being done by them at present.” As the Indian 
consul general at the time remarked, “The Chinese notice that the India pictures 
are very popular and they draw full houses, while their own [Chinese] pictures fail 
to attract Tibetans.”111
Finally, in January 1959, the managing director of the theater was informed 
he would not be allowed to show any Indian films in the future but only Chinese 
and Russian films provided to them by the Ministry of Culture (Ch. wenhua 
bu).112 The Tsakhur brothers grew increasingly concerned. Not only were they 
down to one Indian film every two months, they could only select Indian films 
from those made officially available by the Chinese government, with no access 
to the more popular ones available in India. To make matters worse, they were 
required to pay the Chinese government 40 percent of all ticket sales, as a 
rental fee, even though Chinese and Russian pictures attracted only fifty to sixty 
persons per showing and Indian movies “attract[ed] full houses.”113 Although 
Indian consulate officials indicated their distress and were “completely at loss to 
understand as to why the Chinese have passed this order,” the signs of change 
were all around them.
The Chinese treatment of the Tsakhur brothers could be seen in many other 
areas of Lhasa life. Beginning in 1956, Chinese officials began to stress the need for 
Tibetan traders to “concentrate on internal trade and to gradually lessen depen-
dence on foreign trade.”114 At the same time, Chinese officials promised “financial 
assistance” to local Khache traders if they would begin to challenge Nepali trad-
ers.115 Several months later, Abdul Aziz, the original owner of the Lhasa cinema, 
sensing the shifting balance of trade, began withdrawing assets from Tibet and 
transferring them to India. The Indian consul, in his monthly update on Tibet 
to the home office in New Dehli, remarked that such a step indicated something 
larger afoot, since “usually these Muslim traders have a shrewd idea of the shape of 
things to come and their precautions give us some clue to the possibility of greater 
control over trade in the near future.”116
The following year, the Indian trade agent apprised his superiors of the fact that 
the “Chinese were trying their very best to push their [Chinese] consumer goods 
into the Tibetan markets by requiring Indian traders to pay exorbitant rents for 
Himalayan Asia    89
shops and storehouses,” while the Chinese were allowed to “merely requisition 
such houses and godowns [warehouses] at a very nominal rent.”117 At the same 
time, the Chinese government began to wean the Tibetan region from Tibetan 
currency by attempting to set the official conversion rate at an artificially high 
exchange rate, over and above its market-determined value. Their clumsy attempt 
to favor their Chinese silver dollars as a half-step to ultimately introduce Chinese 
paper currency floundered in the face of near-uniform displeasure from the 
Tibetan populace. As Goldstein described the failed effort, “The opposition was 
led by the abbots of the Big Three Monasteries, who were the money lenders in 
Tibet, and who did not want the Tibetan government to lose the ability to print 
and regulate Tibetan currency. Tibet therefore, continued to print and use its own 
money until the uprising of 1959.”118 Though the Chinese efforts were temporarily 
thwarted, they demonstrated China’s increasing desire to reintegrate Tibet into 
China in very real ways.119
In 1956, as the government in Tibet began to impose the regulations initiated 
by the treaties with India and Nepal, passports began to be required to leave or 
enter Tibet’s border with India and Nepal. Previously such a requirement had 
rarely been imposed. As a reaction to the crackdown, the Indian consulate in 
Lhasa saw a year-on-year 400 percent increase in visa requests between 1955 
and 1956.120 That same year the consul registered five Ladakhi Khaches and two 
Nepalese as Indian citizens. The Nepalese consul general started issuing passports 
in November 1958.121
Individuals whose identity did not fit neatly into the national categories Nepal, 
China, or India began to express their concern.122 The first were the Khatsara and 
the Tibetan wives of Nepalese citizens who were not consulted or even identified 
in the 1956 Sino-Nepalese Treaty (a notable oversight since significant consid-
eration was given to them in the previous treaty with Tibet). Not surprisingly, 
such changes were not popular with the three hundred to four hundred Nepalese 
nationals who remained in Lhasa despite the economic downturn. Originally told 
they would be “given the choice to decide their future [citizenship],” by 1959, the 
Chinese government insisted that such individuals would first “be issued pass-
ports from the Chinese [government].” This was a significant shift: it meant they 
would need to accept Chinese citizenship before being allowed to leave Tibet in 
order to be granted Nepalese citizenship.123
For smaller communities, like the Ladakhi Muslims in Lhasa, the new regula-
tions put them in a challenging position. Many Ladakhi Muslims had registered 
as Indian citizens at the consulate, but nonetheless they deliberately attempted 
not to advertise their foreign status in order to be allowed to trade as Tibetans. 
Since the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 did not designate Lhasa and Shigatse as 
trade marts for Indians, it was illegal for them to carry on their livelihood as non-
Tibetans.124 The point often lost regarding the momentous events of 1959 is how 
few foreign nationals living in Lhasa pursued passports since they did not intend 
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to return to their home countries. Aside from the Khaches, Nepalese, Ladakhis, 
Khatsaras, and Indians who did travel back and forth with considerable consis-
tency and ease between 1957 and 1958, few thought to procure a passport even as 
a safety precaution. In addition, given the swift downturn in foreign trade and the 
diminished number of foreign traders active in the trade that remained, the num-
ber of individuals needing passports remained quite limited.125
As discussed in chapter 3, the Tibetan designations of ethnicity, identity, and 
mixed parentage were seldom employed or well understood by the Chinese, mak-
ing it difficult for the affected individuals to know the proper actions to take for their 
specific status. The transition from the traditional context, where such definitions 
were rarely disputed or challenged, as in the case of Sherpa Gyalpo, to one where 
such categories were now being demanded by the government was challenging. 
That this transition occurred with the swiftness it did, essentially between 1957 and 
1959, and without any mechanisms to identify those groups who did not fit neatly 
into the newly established national categories—or those who preferred to retain 
their pre-1951 Tibetan categories as long as they could under the regional Tibetan 
government—resulted in very few individuals conforming to the categories now 
imposed by the central government.
The fact is that this very question—the ambiguity that lay at the intersection 
of ethnicity, nation, and regional identity—was what prompted China’s participa-
tion in the Bandung Conference. That this troublesome ambiguity facilitated its 
single most prominent diplomatic outcome, in the form of the agreement with 
Indonesia about the Overseas Chinese, suggests that such issues were not com-
pletely absent from the concerns of the central Chinese leadership. Yet China 
appears to have been working with two standards. There was one for defining 
and classifying Chinese outside of China, primarily with an eye to entice them to 
declare themselves as Chinese. There was another for defining ethnically different 
Chinese inside of China, primarily with an eye to prevent them from declaring 
themselves as anything other than Chinese. For the Overseas Chinese, ethnic-
ity trumped any assertion of nationality as defined by place of birth, since China 
wanted as many Overseas Chinese as possible to have the option of selecting 
China as their nationality. Domestically, Chinese officials were especially sensitive 
to assertions that Tibet and Tibetans were not part of China (or were not Chinese). 
Given this heightened concern over Tibet being portrayed as not Chinese, the 
Chinese authorities sought to invert that logic by suggesting that, except in clear-
cut situations in which individuals could prove their foreign identity (usually by 
birth), they would be treated as Chinese. To put this in a slightly different way, the 
Chinese government, although using similar logic in both situations, insisted that 
Chinese with dual citizenship abroad should be allowed to select their citizenship 
while those with similar cases in Tibet should not. In Indonesia, it did not matter 
to the Chinese government if the Overseas Chinese had arrived centuries earlier or 
just last week; all Overseas Chinese should be given the opportunity to select their 
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nationality based on their Chinese ethnicity. In Tibet, if you had foreign ancestry 
but had lived in Tibet, you were considered Chinese. Only if you had just arrived 
from a foreign country would you possibly be considered alien.
As demonstrated by the Chinese officials’ increasing concern with the number 
and origin of Indian films being shown in Tibet and with their intent to exert con-
trol of them, the outward facade of normality that had been assiduously adhered to 
after their arrival in 1951 began by 1958 to crack. Internally, other indicators began 
to alert the residents of central Tibet to new political winds. Increasing numbers of 
Kham Tibetans from eastern Tibet began appearing in Lhasa, fleeing the increas-
ingly harsh political reforms occurring outside of the administrative borders of the 
Tibet Autonomous Region. As the broader situation became clear, many in Lhasa, 
including the Dalai Lama, reevaluated Tibet’s relationship with China’s central 
government. It became clear that Tibet’s limited autonomy was at an end.
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The Tibetan Muslim Incident of 1960
In January 1959, Mao Zedong remarked ominously that “ in the Tibetan area over 
the next several years, the enemy side and our side will compete for the [support of 
the] masses and test the ability of the armed forces. . . . [I]t is inevitable that a great 
showdown will occur.”1 After eight years of pursuing a policy of  accommodation 
within Tibet, the Chinese were growing weary of what they perceived as Tibetan 
resistance to Chinese rule.2 Predictably, as the Chinese tightened their controls, the 
number of Tibetan “pro-independence” and “self-determination”  demonstrations 
rose dramatically.3
S. L. Chhibber, who arrived in 1956 as Indian consul general, was one of only 
a few foreign officials who had long-standing familiarity with Lhasa.4 Since 1936, 
the British Mission in Lhasa had resided in a traditional Lhasa-style compound 
on the outskirts of the city known as the Dekyi Lingka (Garden of Happiness). In 
the years that Chhibber had been in Lhasa, he witnessed firsthand the slow rise in 
tensions between the Tibetans and the Chinese. He was also accustomed to the 
short periods of agitation exhibited by one side or the other followed by a tense 
reconciliation.
In January 1959, something different was in the air. Chhibber grew con-
cerned enough that he began to offer detailed reports to his superiors in Delhi 
on the unmistakable vigilance and readiness being displayed by the Chinese in 
what seemed to him to be preparations for a clash. All around the city, stone 
 watchtowers were suddenly constructed at intersections and other strategic points 
as the Chinese became “feverishly busy in strengthening their defense.”5 These 
fortifications were erected on the top of the buildings where Chinese worked or 
lived. A sense of urgency permeated their actions, and when progress was deemed 
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too slow, Chinese officials “requisitioned the services of their [Chinese] civilians, 
like barbers, hotel keepers, tailors, etc. to help them in making these [defenses].”6 
Rumors began to circulate of the Chinese stocking emergency rations and  digging 
wells inside their courtyards. In tandem with these defensive preparations, the 
Chinese officials also began to exert pressure on the Kashag to expel the Khampas 
who had been flowing in from eastern Tibet and who were perceived to be 
 undermining the city’s stability. The general inaction of the Kashag on the matter 
made an already tense situation worse.
Speculation surrounding impending Chinese troop reinforcements and the 
increased swirl of rumors suggesting Chinese plans to seize the Dalai Lama 
 exacerbated the already unsettled mood in Lhasa. On March 10, 1959, amidst 
 swirling accusations and denials between the Tibetan and Chinese  authorities, 
large demonstrations by Tibetans became commonplace. Both Chinese and 
Tibetans seemed to be at the end of their patience. Tibetan groups, including 
government officials, monks, and heads of monasteries, as well as an assembly of 
several thousand women, began to organize themselves. A deputized committee 
approached the Nepalese and Indian consuls in Lhasa seeking their support, advice, 
and protection. In each instance the foreign officials indicated, apologetically, that 
despite their obvious distress they could not interfere in the domestic affairs of 
China.7 In response, Tibetans began to dress conspicuously in only Tibetan attire. 
Tibetan volunteers took up positions around strategic points. Tibetan employees 
of Chinese schools (and the Tibetans who attended them) were pressured to not 
attend work or school. Finally, the Dalai Lama and his closest advisers, unable to 
discern Chinese intentions and fearful of public consternation over the possibility 
of his being abducted, fled Lhasa on March 17, 1959, crossing the Himalayas and 
arriving in India two weeks later.8
On March 19, as news of the Dalai Lama’s departure became known, Tibetans 
and Chinese, already tense, angry, and suspicious of one another, began a fierce 
fight for control of the city.9 The fighting that occurred in the 1959 March Uprising 
has been portrayed primarily in Anglo-European literature as Tibetan resistance 
and Chinese suppression. And seen broadly, such a description is not inaccurate. 
Yet as the historian Tsering Shakya has described, the reality was much more 
complicated. That complexity was due in part to the considerable anger Tibetans 
directed against the “Tibetan ruling élite who, they believed, had betrayed their 
leader [the Dalai Lama].”10 This anger, in the twenty-four hours after news of the 
Dalai Lama’s departure became public, was not particularly rational, nor was it 
predominantly directed against the Chinese. Rather in these first hours the pent-
up outrage tended to occur as unpremeditated attacks on pro-Chinese Tibetan 
elites at traditional Tibetan centers.
The first individual to be attacked was Sampho (Tib. Sampho Tsewang 
Rinzin), and it would appear his assault came about not as political targeting 
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but an unfortunate decision to wear Chinese rather than Tibetan-style clothing. 
He was a member of the original Tibetan delegation who had agreed in 1951 to the 
increasingly unpopular 17-Point Agreement that led to Chinese control of Tibet. 
At the time of his 1959 attack, Sampho held concurrent posts as Tibetan Army 
commander-in-chief and as the PLA Tibet Military Command  vice-commander. 
As he approached the Norbulingka Summer Palace in Lhasa, dressed in a PLA 
uniform and riding in a military jeep driven by a Chinese driver, a large crowd 
surrounding the Summer Palace assumed he had pro-Chinese sympathies and 
began throwing stones. As he exited the jeep, a rock hit Sampho on the head. 
Injured and fearful of further violence, he fled to the nearby Indian Mission 
Hospital for treatment.11
The next pro-Chinese Tibetan to be attacked was a prominent member of the 
Chamdo Liberation Committee, Khunchung Sonam Gyamtso. He had entered 
the Norbulingka wearing traditional Tibetan clothing but later left in trousers, a 
white shirt, and with a white surgical mask covering his face—attire commonly 
worn by the Chinese.12 In Tsering Shakya’s telling, “this simple act seems to have 
enraged the public, who attacked him and beat him to death.”13 According to 
another account, he was “shot dead and his body taken round the streets of Lhasa 
in the most humiliating manner.”14 The day ended, however, without overt military 
actions from either side.
The following day, March 20, began very differently. Tibetan rebels took up 
 defensive positions at various points across the city, with the violence now 
 deliberately targeting Chinese military forces and government buildings. At 
10 a.m., in response to this provocation, the Chinese PLA was given the order “to 
take  punitive action against the traitorous clique who had committed monstrous 
crimes.”15 Clashes erupted across the city. Particularly bloody clashes occurred west 
of Lhasa around the Norbulingka Summer Palace and the Potala Palace, as Tibetan 
centers of  resistance struggled to defend these important Lhasa landmarks and 
repel the organized Chinese military assault. Given the overwhelming firepower 
of the well-trained Chinese troops, the opposition had little chance of success. 
During the fighting, the Indian consulate, situated between Norbulingka and the 
center of Lhasa, was caught in the crossfire, with bullets striking the building, kill-
ing a Tibetan staff member.16 As the fighting spread into areas in and around the 
Barkor, the second story of the Nepalese consulate was also hit and damaged.17 The 
Chinese government gave no figures of Chinese or Tibetans killed, but it estimated 
that “more than 4,000 rebel troops were taken prisoner.”18
Almost as quickly as the fighting had begun, it drew to a close. Within twenty-
four hours the Chinese flag flew over the Potala, dead Chinese soldiers and Tibetans 
littered the streets, and virtually all the Tibetan resistance had melted away. As a 
result, many Lhasans decided to follow the Dalai Lama over the Himalayas to India.
Rarely remarked is the fact that during the clashes on March 20, in addition 
to the “anti-collaborationist” violence at the Norbulingka and Potala, Tibetan 
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groups attacked the Wapaling Khache community at the southeastern edge of 
Lhasa. This was unlike the attacks on individual Tibetans, for the violence directed 
at the Wapaling Khaches resulted in the destruction of their personal property, 
their homes, and their place of worship. By the end of the day, the centuries-old 
Grand Mosque and several dozen Wapaling Khache residences were burned to the 
ground. Wapaling Khache homes and shops along the market street were looted 
and ransacked. Despite the widespread attacks, not a single Chinese soldier was 
dispatched to protect the Wapaling Khaches or their property. Fearing for their 
lives, many Wapaling Khaches sought out the Chinese soldiers and took shelter in 
the PLA encampment outside the city.19
It is tempting to characterize the attacks on the Wapaling Muslims as a case of 
a minority population being caught in the crossfire of a violent insurgency, but 
that does not seem to be the case. The Wapaling Khaches had over the previous 
decade, in the eyes of many Tibetans, clearly become identified as colluding with 
the Chinese and thus became early targets of Tibetan violence.20 Tibetans made no 
secret of their open displeasure with the Wapaling Khaches’ pro-Chinese stance. 
Some Tibetans suggested that not only did they offer aid to the PLA and Chinese 
officials, but when approached by Tibetans to help in the uprising, they were said 
to have staunchly refused. Nor did the violence against their community alter 
this attitude. According to the historian Tubten Khétsun, “During the subsequent 
violent suppression, many Muslim youths took up arms and accompanied the 
Chinese soldiers as translators, oppressing and terrorizing the Tibetans.”21
With the departure of the Dalai Lama, with broad-based Tibetan resistance 
spent, and with the Chinese government abandoning all pretense of policies 
of accommodation, the period of the Wapaling Khache remaining politically 
ambivalent while benefiting from the Chinese came to an end. Deciding if one 
was Chinese or Tibetan became, for the Khache, a decision with far-reaching 
consequences. From this point forward, there would be no middle ground, and 
from the perspective of the Chinese government, there was only one choice: to 
embrace their Chinese identity or be labeled as a traitor.
Immediately following the 1959 March Uprising, the Beijing central  government 
feared that its suppression of the uprising would be used to fuel accusations of the 
state being antireligious. They quickly sought to portray themselves as protectors 
of religion and denounced the Tibetan rebel attacks on the Wapaling Khaches as 
evidence of religious intolerance. Early state media reports of the Uprising 
 portrayed the Wapaling Khaches as valiant defenders of the Chinese state against 
the  treasonous and desperate measures of Tibetan rebels. Between the end of March 
and early May 1959, the People’s Daily conspicuously featured the Wapaling Khache 
in a half-dozen front-page articles detailing the Uprising. The earliest article, on 
March 31, characterized them as local supporters of China’s military response to 
the uprising. Wang Peisheng, a Lhasa-born Wapaling Khache and a prominent 
pro-Chinese Khache, was quoted as asserting, “The overwhelming majority of 
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Lhasa’s Hui are patriotic, and we, the entire Hui people, will  steadfastly follow the 
Communist Party.”22 Two days later, on April 2, a front-page article appeared with 
the headline, “The People of Tibet Enthusiastically Uphold Suppression of Rebels,” 
in which two senior Wapaling imams decried “the rebels’ monstrous crimes of 
looting and burning Lhasa.” The article noted that the rebels’ “crimes reached up to 
the heavens and brought calamity to both the country and the people.”23
Two weeks later, in mid-April, a front-page article denounced the Tibetan 
 rebels, profiling over two hundred Wapaling Khaches and highlighting the harm 
done to them. In the article one Wapaling Khache, Ma Mingliang, berated the 
Tibetan rebels, insisting, not inaccurately, that the Khaches had been targeted 
“only because they were opposed to the rebellion and refused to participate in the 
pro-uprising rallies.”24 In late April, two more People’s Daily articles appeared. By 
this point, the thrust of the articles shifted from the trauma endured by “normal 
Tibetans” at the hands of Tibetan rebels to the rebels’ purported heartless behavior 
towards the Khache. The articles, far from defending the Khache, primarily were 
interested in undermining the commonly held view of Tibetans as peace-loving 
Buddhists.
By twisting the manner in which the rebel violence had affected the Tibetan 
Muslims who had lived in Tibet for generations, the state press sought to sub-
vert the commonly held notion that Tibetans generally, and the rebels specifically, 
were innately harmonious and nonviolent. The first article was titled “Inhuman! 
Deplorable! Tibetan Rebels Heinously Murder by Ripping Out Hearts!” In an 
accompanying photo, Muslims are shown holding Friday prayers in the  burned-out 
shell of the Grand Mosque. The headline of the second article, “Tibetan Rebel’s 
‘Protect Religion Army,’ ” deliberately underscored the irony of the rebel’s moniker 
by demonstrating their antireligious actions against Muslims. The  article is juxta-
posed to a photo of a Wapaling Khache standing forlornly in the  remnants of his 
burned-out home.25 Employed in this manner, the Wapaling Khache remained 
powerful instruments of the Chinese central government’s claim that the Tibetan 
rebels were a minority intent on reversing the positive achievements of the People’s 
Republic since its arrival in Lhasa.
In the weeks and months after the uprising, many Tibetan leaders were arrested, 
imprisoned, and often publicly criticized for their crimes during mandatory public 
rallies. All citizens of Lhasa were expected to show their support of the Chinese 
by insulting, spitting on, and, in some cases, beating the former leaders. Often 
individuals selected to lead such demonstrations were those who had personal 
grudges against the ones who were imprisoned. In one case, Chinese  authorities 
selected Ghulam Muhammad, a well-known Wapaling Khache, to publicly  criticize 
a Tibetan accused of crimes against the state.26
By early May, the prominent reporting of the Wapaling in Chinese state media 
suddenly ended. This dramatic change reflected the broader shift in Chinese 
 central government’s strategy, which shifted the focus away from the Tibetan 
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rebels’ antirevolutionary actions towards one establishing India’s central role in 
organizing the uprising.27 On May 6, the day after the last article in which Tibetan 
Muslims were prominently featured, this new anti-India offensive began with 
the People’s Daily banner headline reading, “The Revolution in Tibet and the 
Philosophy of Nehru.”28 The long, 18,000-character editorial filled the entire first 
two pages of the paper. While saying little about Nehru’s philosophy, the article 
articulately, and with choice use of Nehru’s own words, attacked the Indian leader’s 
views on Tibet’s autonomy. Taking particular issue with how some Indians char-
acterized “Tibetan autonomy,” the editorial scathingly rebutted commonly held 
Indian perceptions of Tibet as a protectorate or buffer state of China:
Some politicians in India regard China’s “suzerainty” over Tibet like that  inherited 
from the British tradition of the past: suggesting China’s so-called “suzerainty” over 
Tibet is like India’s “suzerainty” over Bhutan and Sikkim.  .  .  . It is true that Tibet 
is not a province but an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China. An  
autonomous region has more constitutional and legal rights than provinces. The prov-
ince has more authority under the Constitution and the law. But Tibet is  definitely 
not a protectorate—neither a protectorate of China nor a protectorate of India, nor a 
joint Chinese-Indian protectorate, nor is it a so-called buffer state between India and 
China. The People’s Republic of China enjoys full sovereignty over Tibet, just like it 
does over Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia [autonomous regions]. These 
facts are not even in the slightest degree in question, and no foreign country or the 
United Nations are allowed to interfere in any name or form.29
Alternating between deeply polemical language and scathing sarcasm, the  editorial 
advised Nehru to pay more attention to his own country’s problems and leave 
those of Tibet to China.
One also finds a subtle degree of introspective self-criticism. It went as far as to 
suggest that the Chinese government had waited too long, coddling the misguided 
efforts of Tibet’s errant traditional elite. Only now, by listening to the will of Tibet’s 
lower classes, was the Chinese leadership going to alter Tibet for the better:
In Tibet, we displayed especially great patience in order to win the cooperation of 
Tibetan upper strata elements. For eight long years since the liberation of Tibet we 
maintained intact the former Tibet Local Government, its complete system, its army 
and even its currency and persuaded the people of Tibet not to carry out for the time 
being the reforms they urgently demand.30
While China’s dissatisfaction with India emerged from many quarters, there is little 
doubt that by late May, the Khaches’ claim of Indian citizenship had  unexpectedly 
become a potential liability for the Chinese government.
Observant Chinese, now quite attuned to such rapid shifts in the political winds, 
would have realized that the Khache’s absence from the state media was a clear 
sign their political stock had plummeted. However, it would have been  difficult 
for any but those intimately familiar with Tibet to understand the  continued role 
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the Khache played in the Chinese government’s growing unease over the  situation. 
Part of the difficulty lies in the People’s Daily’s choice to refer to the Khache, 
 generically and uniformly, as Hui (Muslim Chinese). As in the years leading up to 
the 1959 March Uprising, no mention or distinction was ever publicly made of the 
diversity within the Lhasa Muslim community.31 Never, for example, did the media 
reports divulge that while Tibetans did raze the Wapaling Khache mosque, they 
neither desecrated the Barkor Small Mosque nor damaged a single Barkor Khache 
home. Not surprisingly, Chinese government coverage avoided  mentioning the 
Wapaling Khaches’ role as translators for Chinese soldiers and officials or that 
Tibetans accused them of “behav[ing] with unlimited arrogance.” 32
In the state newspapers, the Khaches’ swift descent from fame to obscurity was 
a result of deliberate expediency, not unintended ignorance. In the hours after the 
uprising, and as quickly as the government acted to promote the victimization 
of the Wapaling Khache, they also moved to suppress what they considered to 
be the Barkor Khache threat to the city’s tenuous calm. On March 21, the very day 
they secured control of Lhasa after the uprising, the Chinese detained and arrested 
Hamidulla (Rapse) Masle, senior leader (Tib. kha che dpon po) of the traditional 
Khache council.33 This action was followed by two other arrests, and the entire 
council was in prison by the end of the year. Within the week, Chinese officials 
informed the Barkor Khache that all “previous laws and documents [regarding 
their Indian citizenship] were to be deemed as cancelled, and no claim was to be 
accepted unless it was backed by fresh documentary proof.”34
On April 1, Chinese officials went to the Barkor Khache residences and busi-
nesses inquiring about their “race and nationality” while demanding at the same 
time that they declare themselves Chinese. Those who refused were taken for 
extended interrogation sessions that resulted in several Barkor Khaches being 
forcibly coerced into declaring themselves Chinese citizens.35 Throughout this 
period, the Barkor Khache were forbidden from gathering in groups of more than 
three people.36 Even as they disputed their citizenship, officials demanded they 
participate in various indoctrination and propaganda meetings, under the threat 
of being taken into custody.37
TO BE TIBETAN IS  NOT TO BE CHINESE
The Indian consulate was one of only three foreign missions in Lhasa, along 
with the Nepalese consul general and the Bhutan Mission. It was in 1947, with 
India’s independence, that the consulate was transferred from British to Indian 
control, and a succession of Indian consuls had occupied the post over the next 
decade. Since his posting to Lhasa in 1956, Chhibber had made it a point to 
become familiar with the Khache community, and their decision to approach 
him was not unexpected.38 In the face of these aggressive tactics, as Ramadan 
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came to an end in early April, the Barkor Khache leaders “approached the 
Indian Consulate for aid, whereby they hoped to bring about the migration of 
the whole [community to India].”39 Having traveled back and forth to India for 
decades if not centuries, the Barkor Khache were familiar with Indian culture, 
customs, and government. Many Khaches sent their children to school in India, 
and a small but substantial minority had moved to Kalimpong, Darjeeling, and 
elsewhere there.
Presciently, Chhibber had addressed the question of the Tibetan Muslims’ 
nationality on April 27, 1958. Nearly a year before the Dalai Lama left Tibet, the 
Indian consul general in Lhasa and his Chinese counterpart, the director of the 
Foreign Affairs Bureau in Tibet, had discussed the issue.40 That autumn, Chhibber 
again informed his superiors in Delhi that the “Muslims in Lhasa, especially those 
who have origin in Kashmir, are worried about their future. Some of them have 
approached us for registration as Indian citizens.”41 The 1959 March Uprising had 
both raised the stakes and dramatically altered the context of this issue.
Taking up the issue again in a note to the Chinese dated May 1959, Chhibber 
contended that his own investigation into the matter had led him to conclude that 
“the Kashmiri Muslims and other Indians living in Lhasa and Shigatse should 
be treated as Indian nationals.”42 Two months later, when the Chinese finally 
offered a response, it was equally concise and unequivocal: “These assertions are 
opposed to the historical facts and I cannot agree with them.”43 Not deterred by 
China’s position, the Barkor Khache approached the Foreign Affairs Bureau to 
ask how to legally declare themselves Indian citizens and were told they needed 
to present Indian passports. Then, according to Chhibber’s account, about “four 
to five hundred Muslims of Kashmir origin, who had never approached us ear-
lier” came to him asking to register as Indian citizens.44 After asking for and 
receiving his government’s approval, he distributed forms to register them as 
Indian citizens. Just as the Barkor Khache prepared to submit the forms, the 
Chinese officials seized all their documents and declared them null and void. The 
Barkor Khache were then informed that any further efforts to prove their for-
eign citizenship would be considered illegal.45 The local Chinese authorities then 
posted guards outside the consulate to prevent further communication between 
the Khache and the consul general. Throughout July and August 1959, groups of 
Barkor Khache that approached the Indian consulate were repeatedly “turned 
away by force.”46
Adding a new wrinkle to the Chinese state’s insistence that Tibet had been an 
integral part of China since the Yuan dynasty, Chinese officials maintained that all 
the  residents of Tibet were Chinese citizens regardless of origin. While the Barkor 
Khaches were the obvious target of this policy, several hundred Ladakhi Buddhists 
who had never required passports or papers to cross the border into India were 
now detained and told they needed to produce documentary evidence of their 
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country of origin. In a testy response to Chhibber, the director of the Foreign 
Affairs Bureau in Tibet lectured the Indian government:
As everybody knows, among the  inhabitants in Tibet of our country, there are a 
number of people of Islamic faith. Besides the Hui from such provinces as Yu[n]nan 
and Sichuan these are some whom we call Kachis [Khache]. Although their fore-
fathers were from Kashmir, yet as early as the 17th century, during the time of the 
Dalai Lama, their forefathers had already  chosen the Chinese nationality and had 
thus become a component part of the Tibetan  people of China.47
These historical assertions did little to clarify why the Chinese government had not 
instituted such steps earlier or how such a view accommodated the realities of Tibetan 
autonomy under the Nationalists in the first half of the century. Nor does it explain 
how, according to the memoirs of the Chinese diplomat Yang Gongsu, the Khache had 
for many years been raising the question of their “Indian ancestry” (Ch. yindu ji). In 
his account, the Khache had first approached the Kashag in 1956, who in turn referred 
them to the Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau. The Foreign Affairs Bureau rejected their 
request because it was “in violation of China’s foreign policy,” and also because the 
“Kashag had in the past consistently treated them as Tibetan.”48
These specific inconsistencies added to the more general impression that the 
Chinese government had suddenly, in 1959, adopted a blanket policy forcing all 
individuals, with or without proof of foreign citizenship, to accept Chinese citizen-
ship. The Chinese officials in the post-Uprising period seemed to be  primarily inter-
ested in establishing a policy that would uphold their contention that all residents of 
Tibet were Chinese. They preferred this to sorting through the complicated pastiche 
of citizenship claims they faced, fearing that such a process would result in Tibetans 
claiming non-Chinese citizenship and make an already awkward situation worse.
The problem with the Chinese government’s efforts to impose a  one-size-fits-all 
solution on Tibet was that even in obvious cases of foreign citizenship, China’s 
own national interpretations of citizenship laws were being ignored. In one 
instance, eight Nepalese, whose government had a recognized diplomatic  mission 
and a representative in Lhasa, were arrested and held without charge. When 
the Nepalese consul general demanded their release, the Chinese replied that 
“there was no special law for foreigners and that their cases would be taken up 
under the law of the land.”49 Even those Nepalese who were not arrested, such as 
Nepali  traders, were given the choice of returning to Nepal or remaining in Tibet, 
recognizing that if they remained their movements would be restricted to Lhasa, 
severely hindering their livelihood as traders.
By August, the constantly fluctuating situation for Lhasa’s Khache, Nepalese, 
and mixed-nationality populations reflected China’s new autocratic stance toward 
Tibet. China’s new posture and policy were unambiguous. Tibet was a part of China, 
and no concessions were to be sanctioned. The consequences were  immediate and 
pervasive. Chhibber disconsolately summarized this in his monthly report at the 
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end of summer 1959, “With the overwhelming number of Chinese troops and 
 cadres the local opposition has completely been overcome. The younger genera-
tion in particular have been taking active part in the pro-Chinese programs and 
activities.”50 Chinese authorities began to tighten control over every aspect of life 
in the city. All residents of Lhasa were rounded up and over the course of three 
days fingerprinted, cataloged, and issued identity cards.51
During this period, disinformation was rampant. Chinese officials and  residents 
began circulating a rumor that the Dalai Lama was being detained against his will 
in India, and this led to a group of nearly five hundred Tibetan women  storming 
the Indian consulate, “refusing to leave the premises unless some proof of the Dalai 
Lama’s free movement was shown to them.”52 In June, the Chinese government cir-
culated the news that Chinese currency would become the only legal tender; foreign 
and Tibetan currency would no longer be accepted.53 Two months later, officials 
formally instituted the currency regulations but would convert Tibetan currency at 
only 20 percent of its face value.54 With little or no advance warning, the foreign and 
Tibetan traders, who had been commercially prosperous until March, were faced 
with financial ruin, as most of their assets were in Indian rupees or silver dollars. 
When the news of China’s actions reached India, silver prices shot up as bullion 
traders panicked over the prospect of a curtailed supply of silver from Tibet.55
By August, China and India appeared to be at loggerheads over the Barkor 
Khache. In mid-August, India’s ambassador delivered a diplomatic note to the 
Foreign Ministry in Beijing. In the note he accused local Lhasa officials of arresting 
a Barkor Khache on August 6 who had refused to attend a neighborhood meeting 
intended for local residents. In response to the Barkor Khache’s arrest, “two to three 
hundred of his compatriots went in protest to the Foreign [Affairs] Bureau.” Later, 
when fifty to sixty Barkor Khaches “endeavored to come to the Indian Consulate,” 
they were “prevented by the Chinese guards at the point of weapons.”56 While 
Chhibber assiduously maintained very careful relations with all Tibetans, the 
Chinese expressed unhappiness with the Indian consul general’s behavior. Having 
already served for nearly three years, longer than any of his  predecessors, the Indian 
government made the judicious decision to move Chhibber to a new post.
While not exactly unanticipated, Chhibber’s departure was warmly  welcomed 
by the Chinese. If the Chinese believed that his replacement would be less 
 troublesome, they were to be disappointed. The appointment of P. N. Kaul, a career 
diplomat hastily transferred in from Romania, marked an astute shift in tactics 
by India in Tibet. With his arrival, the Barkor Khaches’ status became a central 
 concern of the Indian government.
INDIA AND THE “KASHMIRI  MUSLIMS”
If the question of whether the Barkor Khache were Tibetan, and thus Chinese, 
dominated the discourse in Lhasa, in India the question initially centered on 
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the dilemma of whether they should be considered Kashmiri and thus Indian 
 citizens. Indian diplomats, politicians, and reporters tended to use a  hodgepodge 
of  terminology to refer to them. Consul General Chhibber, in his May 1959 
 communication to his Chinese counterpart in the Tibetan Foreign Bureau, refers 
to them as “Indian Muslims from Kashmir,” or “Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir 
origin,” or “Kashmiri Muslims.”57 The Indian press, and even the New York Times, 
repeatedly referred to the Barkor Khaches simply as “Indian  nationals” or as “Indian 
traders,” emphasizing their rights as Indians. From the Chinese  perspective, 
all Muslims in Tibet, whether they were Barkor Khache, Wapaling Khache, or 
Muslims from Beijing living in Tibet, were all Hui and without  exception were 
considered Chinese citizens.
Initially, the Barkor Khache mustered historical evidence to put their case in the 
best light possible, even if the proofs they chose to use were selective, fragmentary, 
or deliberately taken out of context. At first, in seeking to prove that they were for-
eign, not simply of foreign ancestry, they often purposely conflated their position 
with that of the Ladakhi community by playing into the ongoing confusion over 
Khache/Kashmiri terminology. Given their clear-cut pre-1951 status as Tibetan, 
the Barkor Khache appeared to be unsure of the best path forward to prove their 
Indian ancestry. In the face of the persistent Chinese assertion that to be Tibetan is 
to be Chinese, they sought to play to the common (albeit false) notion that in the 
eyes of the Tibetan government they had been like the Ladakhi in order to prove 
their claims. The “evidence” they provided was a mixture of half-truths and white 
lies that played to the Chinese ignorance of Tibetan society, including that they 
were “tax exempt,” that they were self-ruled by the Khache council, and, citing 
a Tibetan dictionary, that they were defined as “Kashmiri.”58 The Chinese never 
directly refuted the Barkor Khaches’ argument but simply indicated that none of 
this definitively proved they were not Tibetan and thus were Chinese.
In the months immediately after the Uprising, Indian officials were equally 
at a loss as to how to prove that the Khache were Kashmiri and thus Indian. In 
the Indian parliament, Nehru’s response to queries about Indian citizens arrested 
by Chinese forces at first suggested it was just a matter of clarification: “We have 
approached the Chinese authorities to permit Muslims from Kashmir as well as 
Ladakhi Lamas to contact our Consulate in Lhasa and to allow them to return to 
India if they so wish.” When immediately pressed for more details, Nehru could 
only state:
Two types of Indians went there [Tibet]; the one were the [Buddhist] Lamas and they 
went for study there; the other were Ladakhi Muslims who sued to go for trade. Ac-
cording to our old practice nobody need get the papers and most of them did not. So, 
we had no record. . . . The Chinese authorities have raised the point that these people 
are no longer Indian citizens if ever they were because many of the Kashmiris—La-
dakhi Muslims—have been there for a long time. That is a matter on which we are 
conferring with them.59
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Yet, when immediately pressed again, Nehru elucidated with even greater clarity:
There is no question of mistaken identity. It is a question of a person establishing 
his nationality, not identity. Nationality is normally established by papers, passports 
etc. Now, they have no papers and passports except such oral or other evidence 
they might give. Immediately it becomes a little less definite although it might be 
established. It depends upon the authorities taking a strict view or a flexible view 
about it. They [Khache] have said quite definitely that they are Indian nationals 
from Kashmir.60
Clearly, Nehru, by September 1959, had already concluded that the Barkor Khache 
met the criteria to be considered Indian citizens.
Despite Nehru’s newfound confidence, it was only months earlier that Indian 
and Chinese officials appeared far less sanguine about their positions vis-à-
vis the Khache. In May 1959, a group of Tibetan Muslims on hajj found them-
selves stranded in Bombay and without international travel documents. Having 
left Lhasa prior to the political tensions, the pilgrims, as customary for  several 
decades, had been allowed to cross the Indian border with the simple notation 
that they were pilgrims traveling to Mecca via Bombay.61 For many years Bombay 
had functioned as the primary exit port for Muslims traveling to Jeddah by boat 
on their hajj to Mecca. The presence of Tibetan Muslims would not have attracted 
attention in the past, but as this group attempted to board the boat, Indian agents 
discovered their lack of international travel papers and they were stopped. A pro-
gressively stringent enforcement of hajj travelers’ identity had begun under the 
British in the 1930s, making their plight a not uncommon occurrence. What made 
this story newsworthy was the fact that when the Tibetan Muslims approached the 
Chinese consulate in Bombay, the Chinese refused to issue them passports or to 
claim them as Chinese citizens.
Alerted to their plight when he saw a picture of them in a newspaper, Nehru 
personally raised the matter with his foreign secretary, Subimal Dutt, asking 
him to intervene on their behalf. Several days later, Morarji Desai, the Indian 
finance minister, was dispatched to meet with them at the hajj Pilgrims Welfare 
Committee office in Bombay and facilitated their departure.62 Nehru’s grow-
ing interest in the Khache issue almost certainly stemmed from the immense 
 domestic and  international acclaim he had received because of his treatment of 
the Dalai Lama. In early July, he would write again to Dutt regarding China’s 
increasingly  belligerent behavior towards India’s consulate officials and the con-
tinuing  anti-India abuse in the Chinese media: “I have been wondering if we 
have done all we could in these matters. The impression created in my mind 
is that the Chinese authorities in Tibet are behaving very badly and are trying 
to squeeze out our people.”63 As Nehru began to orchestrate a state response to 
resolve the Khache issue in Tibet, other Tibetan Muslims in India also began to 
mobilize their resources.
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A small Tibetan Muslim community had existed in Kalimpong since at least the 
1930s and had retained strong connections to the Barkor Khache in Lhasa. As the 
situation deteriorated in Lhasa, they were the first group that the Lhasa Khache 
attempted to contact for assistance. Their first letter, written in Urdu to escape 
Chinese detection and smuggled out by Tibetan traders, arrived in late April. This 
letter outlined the basis for their claim to be Indian citizens, almost as if to signal 
their strategy with a single voice to those Khache in India:
It is vitally important for us to let you know that the Chinese Government, after the 
recent trouble in Lhasa, has threateningly asked us about our ancestry. In reply we 
have declared ourselves with cogent evidence as Kashmiris and subjects of INDIA. 
The Chinese Government is trying its best to subjugate us and make us Chinese 
Nationals. With great perseverance and sacrifice we reported the matter to the 
Chinese Government as well as to the Indian Counsel in DEKILINGA. The Indian 
Counsel at Dikilinga is also striving hard for us by representing to the Chinese 
Government that we are INDIAN NATIONALS, and you might have heard it on 
the Radio.64
The overall tone of the letter is one of extreme urgency. It repeatedly emphasized 
their dire circumstances in Lhasa and ardently demanded the assistance of those 
Khaches living in Kalimpong. The authors of the letter cast their appeal in  multiple 
registers, including their obligation as Muslims: “It is a question of the entire 
generation whether it will cling to its faith or turn infidel. . . . Muslims and specifi-
cally our own kith and kin must not sit idly by enjoying comfort and remaining 
indifferent.”65 The letter concludes by addressing the two Khaches in Kalimpong 
by name and calling their request a “test from Allah.” A second letter from them 
was received several months later and said plaintively, clearly at their wits’ end, “we 
were hopeful after our last letter that you would surely do something for us. But 
we sadly noted that nothing was done.”66 In spite of their concern, many among 
the Khache in Kalimpong had taken up their cause, none more than Fazullah 
Chisti. Chisti, a prominent citizen of Kalimpong had in the past aided Khaches in 
securing needed Indian transit permits and passage on the annual hajj boats from 
Bombay. Immediately after receiving the first letter, Chisti had approached Indian 
officials with memoranda and face-to-face meetings.67
By late August 1959, several factors converged to facilitate the Kalimpong 
efforts to raise awareness of their fellow Khaches’ plight in Lhasa. Chisti led a four-
member delegation from Kalimpong to New Delhi to “meet Mr. Nehru and other 
members of the Cabinet and  .  .  . apprise them of the difficulties being faced by 
Indian traders in Tibet.”68 As noted above, his timing coincided fortuitously with 
the Indian government’s renewed efforts to discover a process by which to resolve 
the issue. Indian public opinion also became more interested as a result of a flurry 
of front-page articles in early to mid-August that pushed for a resolution to the 
Khaches’ situation.69
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From spring to late summer of 1959, the parameters of the dispute over the 
Barkor Khache remained for all parties involved—Indian, Chinese, and the 
Khache—largely a reiteration of previous assertions about (1) the historical 
 status of the Khache under the Tibetan government prior to 1950, (2) the issuing 
agency of the Khaches’ passport or visa to travel to Mecca on the hajj, and, often, 
(3) the assertion that the term “Khache” meant Kashmiri and thus, ipso facto, the 
Khache should be adjudged to be Indian citizens.70 In late August, however, two 
seemingly unconnected events—a skirmish at the Sino-Indian border outpost of 
Longju and an anti-Chinese trade ban in Indonesia—preceding the ratification of 
the Dual Nationality Treaty between Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China 
 dramatically altered the context and rationale with which both China and India 
would interpret and portray the Lhasa Khache.
BANDUNG’S REVENGE
The Bandung Conference had achieved considerable goodwill across Asia in 1955. 
All participant countries were deeply committed to a wide range of issues;  however, 
only China and Indonesia had emerged at the end of the meeting with a bilateral 
Tibetan Muslims at the Haj Pilgrims Welfare Committee office in Bombay, India, pleading with 
Morarji Desai, Indian finance minister, May 28, 1959. Copyright AP Photo.
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accord on dual citizenship. The agreement sought to clarify for both nations the 
citizenship status of Overseas Chinese who had, at the end of Dutch rule in 1946, 
passively acquired Indonesian citizenship while still being  considered ethnically 
alien. This protocol captured the goal of the Bandung Conference to resolve the 
undesirable and lingering vestiges of colonialism. It also appeared to proclaim a 
broader resolution of the persisting concerns many Southeast Asian nations held 
regarding the ambiguous status of Indian and Chinese communities outside of 
India and China. While both nations agreed on the desired outcomes, they very 
quickly discovered they did not see eye to eye on the means by which they sought 
to achieve that goal.
The unbounded hopefulness that characterized Indonesian president Sukarno’s 
welcoming speech in Bandung in 1955 expressed his desire to “demonstrate to the 
minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority, are 
for peace, not for war.” Four years later, this optimism appeared naive.71 Particularly 
in the Indonesian context, the lingering anti-Chinese sentiments combined with 
Sukarno’s strong anti-Communist tendencies caused Indonesia to fear that China’s 
actual intention was to spread Communism among Indonesia’s Overseas Chinese 
population.
In the years following the Bandung Conference, the social priorities and  political 
convictions had undergone substantial evolutions in both China and Indonesia. 
As a result, the ratification process for the bilateral accord on dual  citizenship 
exposed the difficulty of transforming lofty sentiments into  meaningful actions. 
In the summer of 1959, a complex combination of religious, ethnic, and  political 
tensions culminated in the Indonesian government placing a ban on all alien-
owned (overwhelmingly Chinese) rural retail stores.72 In response, the Chinese 
government dispatched embassy employees to impede the ban’s implementation 
by seeking to intimidate Indonesia into reversing its decisions. At an impasse, both 
nations dug in their heels.
Sensing little movement by the Indonesian government and believing they were 
winning over international public opinion, China dispatched merchant  flotillas to 
repatriate the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia, culminating in more than 100,000 
Chinese returning to China by early 1960. With both sides believing they had won 
domestically, Chinese and Indonesian officials finally agreed on terms and, in 
1960, ratified a mutually amenable treaty.73 Yet China’s broad and assertive actions 
on behalf of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia were now proclaimed in headline 
news around the world and began to intermingle in perplexing and unexpected 
ways for the Khache in Lhasa.
India, by late September 1959, realized that China’s handling of its overseas 
population in Indonesia had created an opening for them in the standoff over the 
Khache in Tibet.74 In the preceding decade, China had deftly managed to  organize 
its domestic ethnic diversity into a state-approved set of fifty-six ethnicities 
(Ch. minzu shibie) that neatly existed under an overarching framework of Chinese 
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citizenship.75 But even as the classification had resolved the thorny issue of internal 
ethnic differences, China’s traditional definition of “Overseas Chinese” remained 
unaltered. As so forcefully demonstrated in Indonesia, this rubric applied only to 
ethnically Han Chinese. As most Chinese understood the term, Overseas Chinese 
were those Han Chinese who had lived outside their ancestral homeland for gen-
erations but remained Chinese.76 As China openly and aggressively demonstrated 
in their standoff with Indonesia, no amount of time, distance, or even intermarriage 
with non-Chinese diminished China’s ability to declare Overseas Chinese citizens 
of the People’s Republic of China.
The stark differences in China’s definition of citizenship in Indonesia from that 
in Tibet demonstrated to Nehru that Mao’s strategy, far from following the Bandung 
Spirit as a way to lead Asia away from the ideological quarrels of the Cold War, 
remained at its base an ideological cover to be used selectively to serve China’s best 
interests. As the Indian government began to see the inherent contradictions in the 
PRC’s policies, Nehru hastily seized upon the  contradiction between China’s once-
a-Chinese-always-a-Chinese reasoning inherent in their definition of Overseas 
Chinese and the refusal to allow the Khache to assert  themselves as citizens of 
India. India now confronted the Chinese government with the fact that having 
already admitted that the Khache were once Indian, China must allow the Khache, 
as “overseas Indians,” an opportunity to declare themselves Indian citizens.
The first appearance of this diplomatic end run was in Nehru’s answers to 
 questions in the Indian Parliament’s Upper House (Rajya Sabha) about the 
status of the Barkor Khache in August 1959 when he succinctly explained: “There 
is an argument going on between the Chinese government and ourselves as to 
whether they are to be considered Indian nationals or not. I do not want to take 
up in answer to the question the story of this argument. We think they are Indian 
nationals; they claim to be Indian Nationals; they want to be Indian Nationals.”77 
A little over a month later, on September 24, 1959, the Indian government deliv-
ered a 2,500-word note to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi that fully expli-
cated their position on the matter. Marking a major shift in Indian tactics as well 
as tone, the Tibetan Muslim issue was presented not as hinging on whether the 
Khache had been classified as Tibetan subjects but as the need to equally apply a 
single  policy by two liberated Asian partners. More specifically, India began to use 
China’s demands for its Overseas Chinese population in Indonesia as a criterion 
by which the Khache in Tibet should be evaluated:
As is well known, a large number of persons of Chinese origin have been resident 
for decades, if not generations in the various countries of South-East Asia without 
having actually accepted the nationality of the countries in which they reside. In the 
Agreement which has been concluded by the People’s Republic of China with the  
Republic of Indonesia, to take only one example, persons of Chinese origin have 
been given the option to choose between Chinese nationality or the nationality of  
Indonesia. The Government of India seeks no greater concession in respect of  persons 
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of Indian origin in the Tibet region of China than the application to them of a  
principle which the People’s Republic of China have accepted in respect of persons of 
Chinese origin resident outside China.78
Realizing that China’s primary justification for not recognizing the Khache as Indian 
had been their historical claim of Chinese control over Tibet, the Indian  government’s 
note neatly exposed the intellectual lacuna between China’s  territorial-based 
definition of being Tibetan and thus Chinese and the  extraterritorial logic deployed 
to assert Chinese citizenship in Indonesia. The note also explicitly pointed out that 
the Chinese government’s earlier claim that “the Kashmiri Muslims were subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Tibetan courts, that the selection of their leader was con-
firmed by the Dalai Lama, that they recognized the Fifth Dalai Lama, and further, 
that they sometimes fought alongside Tibetan forces” was not in itself enough to 
“constitute conclusive evidence regarding their Chinese/Tibetan nationality.”79 In 
this elegant maneuver, India forced China to acknowledge in the Khache case that 
ethnic heritage trumped sovereignty. With this tactic, India had limited China’s 
options to two basic choices: (1) either reverse themselves and surrender the ideo-
logical high ground to India but relinquish the rights of Chinese in Indonesia or 
(2) to insist that national boundaries alone defined Chinese citizenship and  concede 
that the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia could not be considered Chinese.
China initially refused to concede either point. Instead, it adopted a two-
pronged response to stymie India’s change of tactics. Internationally, China denied 
that any double standard existed, insisting that “the Chinese Government cannot 
agree to the fact that the Government of India should lodge a so-called strong 
protest against this matter which is purely within the scope of China’s internal 
affairs.”80 Feigning complete innocence, the Chinese maintained that “it is a fact 
known to all, that foreign nationals in the Tibetan region or any other part of 
China who desire to return to their country are always given permission” when 
they apply to the relevant departments.81 Most telling, though, was China’s 
 meticulous avoidance of being drawn into India’s comparison between the Khache 
in Tibet and the Chinese in Indonesia. Treating this statement as their final word, 
and despite repeated and insistent requests from India for dialogue, the Chinese 
refused all of India’s attempts to draw them into any further discussion of the 
topic. Nearly seven months passed before China would again deign to respond to 
India’s repeated questions regarding the Khache.
Internally, however, the Chinese adopted a rather more strident tone and course 
of action. At the same time that formal communications were being exchanged 
between the two central governments, inside China officials from both countries 
were taunting each other, using slights, snubs, and only slightly veiled insults. In 
particular, the Chinese singled out the Indian consul general, Chhibber, for his 
role in aiding the Khache. Having served nearly four years in Lhasa, his transfer 
to Sikkim was highly anticipated by the Chinese authorities stationed in Lhasa. 
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In early September, as the day of his departure approached, Chinese  officials 
 collectively declined to attend a farewell ceremony in his honor. To make their 
insult explicit and before his actual departure, Chinese officials came out in full 
force to attend a welcome party for his replacement, P. N. Kaul.82 The Chinese 
government also ramped up its unambiguously explicit internal attacks against 
India. Both in the media and as topics for study in political meetings, Indians were 
repeatedly described as “expansionists” and “interventionists,” with the Indian 
consul and his staff in Lhasa labeled “agents of Imperialists.”83
If the situation became unpleasant for the Barkor Khache in the first months 
after the 1959 Uprising, by the end of the summer it became even more so. There 
was a marked increase in the intensity of an all-out campaign begun with renewed 
vigor by local Chinese officials to convince the Khache to give up their claims to 
Indian citizenship. This coercion resumed in earnest on October 21, 1959, when 
all Khaches were summoned by China’s local Lhasa authorities and told they 
should attend the daily meetings required of all Lhasa residents. They were also 
“warned that failing compliance they would be subjected to punishment.”84 Over 
the next four days, Khache men and women were repeatedly held, individually 
 interrogated, and “harassed and pressed” to accept Chinese nationality. When 
none agreed, one Khache family was placed under house arrest.85
As 1959 came to an end, the Barkor Khache adopted far more exacting and pre-
cise measures in their efforts to prove their Indian nationality. They cited instances 
where the Chinese themselves had acknowledged their foreign status, and they 
noted how they had educated their children in separate schools (madrasa) from 
those of the Tibetans prior to 1951. Initially such arguments seemed, at least in 
Lhasa and Tibet, to gain traction. Quickly, though, the Chinese again altered their 
tactics and attempted to compel the Khache to abandon their claims, regardless of 
precedent, and to accept Chinese citizenship.86 The Chinese insisted on documen-
tation, not only of Indian ancestry, but of Indian residency or citizenship. This was 
a requirement that just months earlier the Chinese had not enforced for traders 
crossing the border and had pointedly resisted in the case of the Overseas Chinese 
in Indonesia.
As a result, the Khache also changed tactics. Instead of working to provide 
 evidence of their Indian origin, they endeavored to avoid taking any steps, admin-
istratively, politically, or socially, that the Chinese could construe as accepting 
their status as Chinese.87 The Khache avoided all meetings that were expressly for 
Chinese citizens (e.g., not work related or required for other foreign citizens such 
as the Nepalese) and all large events of a political nature. As Indian consul general 
Kaul noted, the Khache became cautious when filling out forms that required them 
to include their ethnicity (Ch. minzu) or documents that were “obviously meant for 
the Tibetan nationals so as to have a census of them and enable them to prove their 
bona fides as citizens in every-day transactions.”88
110    CHAPTER 5
A new dynamic emerged that made an already unpleasant state of affairs even 
worse. Realizing that being considered Tibetan would be tantamount to  accepting 
Chinese citizenship, Barkor Khache could no longer allow themselves to be treated 
as equals by their Tibetan neighbors, who were often their relatives. To this end, the 
Khache increasingly looked to how the Chinese government oversaw the Nepalese 
living in Lhasa. They insisted on being treated as noncitizens and rejected any 
administrative designation that grouped them with the local population. As the 
Chinese slowly began to impose more restrictive administrative control in Lhasa, 
the Khache could only resist passively and accept harsh sacrifices in order to 
continue their fight to make their claim to be Indian citizens. In 1959 when the 
government had begun to control foodstuffs in the capital by issuing ration cards, 
the Barkor Khache as a group refused to accept the cards because theirs were to 
be issued by the office for local residents, unlike the Nepalese, whose ration cards 
were issued by the Lhasa Foreigners Administration Department. Initially, the 
community dipped into its communal funds to supplement their supplies, but by 
December, goods on the open market gradually became unavailable, which caused 
the community considerable privation.89
The free-flowing Lhasa that had been so prominent in the early 1950s was now 
completely absent. In August 1959, Chinese paper currency became the only legal 
tender. Even though the purchasing value of Tibetan currency was a  fraction 
of its face value, as fixed by the Chinese government, Tibetans continued to 
circulate it among themselves, and they still calculated prices with it. The Chinese 
responded by “flooding the market with their paper currency and withdraw[ing] 
the  silver dollars.” This action halted one of the last ways in which the Khache 
could  procure goods and food.90 The Chinese opened their own stores and pro-
hibited all Chinese officials and soldiers and their families from purchasing 
foodstuffs from non-state-owned shops and shops selling foreign commodities. 
Such regulations were strictly enforced. If any Chinese soldier or official made a 
purchase from a nonapproved source and were “noticed by Chinese watch-dogs 
[they] were made to return their purchases and asked to buy those things from 
the Government shop.”91
Nor were the Khaches alone in feeling the new restrictions. Over 1,500 Nepalese 
and Khatsaras and their Tibetan spouses remained in central Tibet.92 The few 
dozen Nepalese traders remaining in Lhasa who were able to import luxury goods 
continued to thrive, and “Chinese soldiers and cadres flock[ed] to a few Nepalese 
shops for purchase of watches, cameras and similar luxury [goods].”93 However, 
for the majority of the Nepalese traders who made their living selling essential 
goods, life was difficult given that the Chinese had banned the public sale of com-
modities. Even the sale of yak dung cakes and firewood was prohibited. Even those 
“pavement hawkers” who plied their goods on the streets of Lhasa were forced off 
those streets by a variety of tactics. As a result, Nepalese traders were increasingly 
closing their shops and returning to Nepal.
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Returning to Nepal, however, turned out to be more difficult than it had been 
only a year earlier. The few Nepalese traders who attempted to return to Nepal 
found their way blocked by the Chinese, who refused to give them exit visas. 
Worried they were only making a bad situation worse, some Nepalese tried a more 
positive approach. Instead of filing protests through their government representa-
tives, they sought to work with, instead of against, the Chinese. At the invitation 
of the local Chinese authorities, a growing number of Nepalese participated in the 
various cultural events and public rallies. Roundly praised by the Chinese officials 
at the time, the Nepalese were sorely disappointed when their participation had 
little or no effect on their status. The discriminatory pro-Chinese exchange rates, 
the preferential policies for Chinese traders, and the restrictive trade tariffs all 
remained immutably in place.
Nor were the Chinese authorities more generous in their dealings with 
Nepalese officials posted to Tibet. When the Nepalese trade agent posted to 
Gyantse attempted to travel to Shigatse in June 1959, he was denied transport by 
the Chinese and forced to travel by horse-drawn cart. Also, if Nepalese traders had 
Tibetan wives, which included about twenty of the one hundred Nepali traders in 
Lhasa, the Chinese were prepared to allow their spouses to leave the country on 
an ordinary exit permit, with one condition. The exit permits would be granted 
only when the Nepalese consul general certified that “in the case of death of either 
 parent the property would devolve [to] their [Khatsara Tibetan] children.”94 At 
issue was the fact that the traders often had two families, one in Tibet and one in 
Nepal. The consul general refused to agree to the Chinese terms because Nepali 
law specified that inheritance “went to the legitimate collateral descendants 
living in Nepal rather than the direct descendants of the deceased living together 
in a family in Tibet.”95 Those Khatsaras who declared themselves Nepali and were 
granted exit permits for their return to Nepal were often shunned by their Newari 
in-laws and their “stepmother” (the Nepali trader’s Newari wife).96 Facing such 
a difficult decision, the Nepali community remained subdued, unsettled, and 
concerned about their shifting political status in Tibet.
On October 1, 1959, Lhasa, like towns across China, celebrated National Day. 
If the PRC’s tenth anniversary gave Mao confidence in the path he had forged 
as the nation’s primary architect, his meeting with Khrushchev in early October 
likely left him feeling deflated. The Soviet Union had remained uncharacteristi-
cally silent about events in Tibet and had openly sought to disassociate its India 
policy from that of China’s.97 When Khrushchev had visited China in early 1958, he 
responded to Mao’s risk-taking brinksmanship with a shared Cold War comrad-
ery. When he visited China a year later, in early October 1959, Khrushchev was in 
a distinctly different mood.
Coming off of two seminal diplomatic triumphs, the visit of British prime  minister 
Harold Macmillan to Moscow and his own visit to the United States the previous 
month, Khrushchev felt that the Soviet Union understood how to navigate the deep 
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waters of the Cold War. Compared to China’s more petulant brinksmanship with 
India and Taiwan (China shelled the Taiwanese islands without notifying the Soviet 
Union), Khrushchev’s diplomatic maneuvers seemed to be paying dividends that 
irritated the thin-skinned Mao. Deploying his characteristic bluntness in a con-
versation with Mao, Khrushchev said, “If you let me, I will tell you what a guest 
should not say—the events in Tibet are your fault.”98 To which Mao, clearly peeved, 
replied, “Nehru also says that the events in Tibet that occurred [are] our fault.”99 
Khrushchev, not willing to let the issue drop, needled Mao further by asking him, 
“If you allow [the Dalai Lama] an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru 
to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist 
Party of China, not Nehru’s fault.”100
Though both men eventually let the matter drop, Mao’s reluctance to let 
Khrushchev and the Soviets call out his actions in Tibet suggests that Mao himself 
realized that he was not entirely blameless in his handling of the events in Lhasa.
L AST STANDS /  NEW BEGINNINGS
By the spring of 1960 tensions between the Chinese and the local Lhasa Khaches 
had reached a fever pitch. At least twenty-two Barkor Khaches were  imprisoned, 
the community was under increasing pressure to relinquish their claims as Indians, 
and the stress of the past year was beginning to show.101 Chinese  authorities, 
 offering no explanation, searched eight Khache residences in the  middle of the 
night. In Lhasa, the rationed food publicly for sale  without ration cards was of 
bad quality and in extremely short supply. Staples like  mutton and butter  formerly 
available were virtually unobtainable. In spite of these  hardships, the Barkor 
Khache remained steadfast in their refusal of ration cards, even as the last of 
their stockpiled supplies were depleted. In early April, they again approached 
Chinese authorities for permission to emigrate to India. The government officials 
responded that as Chinese nationals they would not be given permission to travel 
to India “except on regular [Chinese] passports for trade or meeting relations.”102
On April 13, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs delivered a withering note 
to the Chinese embassy in India. It dealt exclusively with Chinese intransigence 
in resolving the issue of “Kashmiri Indians.” The Indian note, written in the curt 
tone of a schoolmaster scolding a recalcitrant student, did not simply refute the 
past arguments of the Chinese, but demonstrated the inconsistency of China’s 
policy with regard to the Khache. The Indians pointed out that the Chinese defi-
nition of nationality appeared to be “based on principles of jus  sanguinis; that 
is, every descendent of Chinese nationals, irrespective of residence, was consid-
ered to be of Chinese nationality.”103 Following this logic, the Indian government 
found it baffling that “the Chinese Government should endeavor to challenge 
the right to Indian citizenship of Indian origin” since it is based on a principle to 
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which the Chinese “have traditionally and specifically subscribed, and even now 
continue to subscribe.”104
Citing that international law and international opinion were on their side, 
India’s note preemptively refuted three common assertions repeatedly employed 
by the Chinese to stonewall Indian efforts to break the diplomatic deadlock. 
First, in answer to the Chinese contention that some Khaches held Chinese 
 documents, the Indians observed that even if Indian nationals have “for the sake 
of convenience and out of ignorance, taken Chinese papers, the Government 
of India believe that such assertion does not apply to the bulk of Kashmiri 
Muslims, “ and it should not deprive them of their Indian nationality.105 Second, 
the Indians asserted that even if the Khaches had been in Tibet for more than a 
generation, they have retained a separate identity and there is no evidence that 
they “expressly renounced their right to Indian citizenship.” Thus it is “unfair and 
illegal” to force such people to renounce their “assumed” Chinese nationality, given 
that there is no evidence to suggest they had ever “acquired Chinese nationality 
much less that they had surrendered it.”106 And third, the Indian government 
politely but firmly stated that “it may be expedient to recall the Treaty between 
the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia on the question 
of dual nationality.” At its core the treaty affirmed the “principle that all per-
sons who simultaneously hold the nationality of two signatory countries have 
the right to choose according to their own will which nationality they would 
wish to adopt.”107 The note concluded by stating simply that a list of “Kashmiri 
Muslims” had already been furnished and that “in the spirit of friendship” and 
“in accordance with International law and custom,” “the Chinese Government 
will facilitate the return to India of persons of Indian origin should they so desire 
and that local authorities in Tibet will be instructed to remove obstruction in the 
way of their doing so.”108
Later that same month, Zhou Enlai arrived in New Delhi for his first visit since 
1956. In advance of this summit, the Tibetan Muslims living in Kalimpong sent a 
telegram to Nehru urging that “your excellency will also take the  opportunity to talk 
about those miserable and deprived of human rights 135 families  numbering about 
600 people . . . [w]ho are still detained in Lhasa and Shigatsi [sic] by the Chinese 
government.”109 With tensions running high over border disputes between the 
two countries, neither side appeared to be in a mood to make  concessions. Nehru 
was under extreme domestic pressure not to concede anything to the Chinese. 
Although Zhou and Nehru’s discussions largely focused on finding a way to avoid 
aggravating the border disputes between the two countries, India took the oppor-
tunity to press China on the Khaches’ situation, delivering an informal diplomatic 
note again stating strongly that in accordance with the Bandung Treaty of Dual 
Nationality (1955), India maintained that “regardless of the period of their resi-
dence abroad, these persons of Indian origin are entitled to Indian  nationality.”110 
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In spite of all these overtures and oral assurances given to Prime Minister Nehru 
by Zhou Enlai during his visit, China’s home government remained silent on the 
matter.
Perhaps more disconcerting than the lack of diplomatic progress at the summit 
was the fact that the Chinese authorities in Lhasa appeared to redouble their efforts 
to coerce the Khaches to renounce their claims. On May 2, 1960, a young Barkor 
Khache, Abdul Ghani Shakuli, was initially charged with failing to have the proper 
licenses for his shop. It quickly became known, though, that the Chinese were in 
fact accusing him of being responsible for a series of anti-Chinese posters that 
had been posted anonymously on walls around central Lhasa.111 Later that month, 
Shigatse leader Muhammad Sayeed was arrested after nine Shigatse Khache fami-
lies refused to be strong-armed into attending daily political meetings.
It was on May 19 that Haji Habibullah, a wealthy Lhasa trader, was arrested 
after a search of his house uncovered a considerable sum of Indian currency hid-
den inside a quilt. That same day a second Khache, Gulam Muhammad Nyangroo, 
was also arrested. Although the Chinese found no incriminating evidence, they 
accused him of also concealing caches of illegal currency. The absence of such 
currency, the authorities decided, was evidence enough to prove that he must have 
illegally sent his profits to India.112
The intimidation and arrests continued into the next month. On the morning 
of June 20 and with virtually no advance notice, Chinese officials notified all local 
Lhasa residents, including the Barkor Khache, of a mandatory rally at the newly 
constructed Athletic Stadium. All Lhasa residents were instructed to gather at the 
stadium and to split up into their neighborhood units. When the Barkor Khache 
insisted they were not “local” and wished to remain as a single unit, they were 
“told they were not wanted at the meeting and should leave forthwith.”113 Later they 
learned that after they had left the stadium, seven Chinese and five Barkor Khache 
prisoners were paraded before the crowd in the manner of a show trial. Sentences 
for the Chinese were announced first, with six receiving lengthy prison sentences 
and the seventh receiving a death sentence. The Chinese prisoner was marched 
away at once and executed.
The Barkor Khache prisoners were then paraded out before the crowd “hand-
cuffed, and with their heads bent, [to] hear the sentences passed on them.” Two of 
the four prisoners were charged with “incitement of the [Khache] to claim a for-
eign nationality” and received prison sentences of eleven years. The third, Abdul 
Ghani Shakuli, the young Khache arrested in May, had the additional charge of 
illegally affixing anonymous posters with pro-India slogans on walls in the city 
and received a fifteen-year sentence. The fourth prisoner, Muhammad Umar 
Nyangroo, was acquitted and immediately freed after it was announced his father 
had publicly accepted Chinese citizenship. The message to the other Khaches was 
unmistakable, yet no other Khaches succumbed to the temptation of avoiding 
prison by agreeing to declare themselves Chinese.114
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By early July, the local authorities were again escalating their campaign of  terror 
tactics, as the Chinese broadened their efforts to menace, bully, and harass key 
members of the community. Already having shut down the Khaches’ shops, the 
government now attempted to extract as much of their wealth, property, and assets 
as possible. They were “called every day to area offices, subjected to severe abuse 
and then admonished to line up with other Tibetans and attend indoctrination 
meetings.”115 On July 8 and 9, they were summoned by Chinese authorities and told 
to provide lists of all their property. Then the Barkor Khaches were ordered to pay, 
retroactively, six months of sales tax set at an inflated rate. This arbitrarily high tax 
rate was undoubtedly punitive, and the action was especially galling given that the 
private exchange and sale of goods with India had been at a standstill for almost a 
year. In most cases, the shops had been closed since May 2.
Although the Khaches agreed to pay the taxes, a day later they were ordered to 
return to the municipal offices where, according to Indian consul Kaul’s sources, 
they were subjected to aggressive interrogation and beatings. Two of the Barkor 
Khache leaders, Barkat Ullah Shahkali and Ibrahim Naik, were singled out and 
charged with spearheading the “movement in the community for claiming Indian 
nationality.”116 The two then were beaten repeatedly, forced to stand bent forward 
with their arms behind their backs for hours on end while rifles were aimed at 
them, and were told that if they did not acquiesce and accept Chinese nationality 
“they would be shot dead.”117 Refusing to back down, they were released; however, 
as they left, officials told them to abandon their claims for Indian nationality and 
to attend the political meetings. If they did not, they were threatened, the “worst 
offenders would be shot” and the others imprisoned. Personal accounts describe 
the Lhasa Muslims as living “in constant terror” and in “constant fear of being 
deported or even executed.” Others describe how “living conditions were very 
 difficult in Lhasa” because rations were “fixed at ten kilos of cereals a month and 
one or two pounds of meat every two months.”118 Kaul informed his home office 
that the consulate, acknowledging their deprivations, quietly sold them food on 
the side, but even this only amounted to half rations.119
All summer long the Chinese had been mobilizing parades, political meetings, 
and propaganda sessions in Lhasa to promote the attempt by Chinese climbers 
to summit the Chinese (North) face of Mount Everest. On May 27, when news of 
a successful climb reached the city, the People’s Daily reported that “over 30,000 
people from all walks of life ebulliently poured into Lhasa’s stadium.”120 Banners 
declared, “The summiting of Everest is a victory of Mao Zedong Thought!” Over 
ten thousand of Lhasa’s residents lined the streets to welcome the climbers to Lhasa 
with a banner reading, “The conquest of Everest is the victory of the [Chinese 
Communist] Party’s general line.”121
At the same time, a new media campaign emerged spotlighting Tibetans who 
returned to Tibet from India after discovering that life there was worse than in 
Tibet.122 In addition, local cadres, speaking out in neighborhood meetings, began 
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suggesting that leaving for Nepal, Sikkim, and Kalimpong was a short-term 
 solution with long-term consequences, since these areas would “eventually fall into 
Chinese hands.”123 In the local schools, anti-Khache instruction was included in the 
children’s daily lessons.124 All of this occurred against a backdrop of increasing political 
radicalization, including the emergence of communal organization, such as the 
creation of common dining halls and day care centers.125 A Radio Tibet broadcast 
called for all Tibetans residing abroad to return to Tibet, claiming that the situa-
tion in Tibet had been normalized and that by returning they could “devote their 
creative energies for the development of their fatherland.”126
The Chinese attacks on the Khache peaked in the second week of July with 
 meetings called ostensibly to deal with the new sales tax on traders. At these 
 meetings a dozen Barkor Khaches were subjected to extreme harassment after 
being accused of crimes and were assaulted for four to five hours at a stretch. 
Then, almost as suddenly as it had begun, it stopped. In his monthly report for 
August, Kaul stated, in some bewilderment, that “after the extreme harassment of 
Kashmiri Muslims during the second week of July, there has been a complete lull 
in the Chinese attitude towards [them].”127
THE ROAD BACK TO INDIA
On September 2, 1960, with no advance notice, the top Chinese leaders from 
the Foreign Bureau in Lhasa convened a meeting of the Barkor Khache and 
informed them that although they were still considered Chinese nationals, “they 
would be allowed to proceed to India provided they put in requests voluntarily 
stating that they wanted to change their nationality from Chinese to Indian.”128 
Acknowledging that their earlier actions had had a dire effect on the Barkor 
Khaches’ food rations, Chinese officials discreetly issued provisions to tide them 
over until arrangements could be organized for their departure. The Chinese 
authorities also quickly facilitated the return to Lhasa of three Khache boys who 
had been studying at minority institutes in Shayan and Beijing so that they could 
leave China with their families.
Two weeks later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a succinct 
four-point diplomatic memo to the Indian ambassador in Beijing. The memo 
characterized the yearlong deadlock over the Khaches’ nationality as a misunder-
standing entirely of India’s own making. It asserted that “the Indian Government 
repeatedly ignored and distorted the theses of the Chinese government, flagrantly 
rejected the proposal for a sensible and rational settlement of the question of the 
nationality of the [Khache].”129 The Ministry then insisted that while the Khache 
had always been treated as Chinese, the “Chinese Government would natu-
rally respect the wishes of the concerned [Khaches] who do not want to remain 
Chinese.” The note went on to suggest that “should they, out of their own will, apply 
to the Chinese Government for exit or ask to settle their nationality, the Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs believes that the Chinese Government, in view of the friendship 
between the Chinese and Indian people, will as before effect a sensible and ratio-
nal settlement of their questions, and will be prepared to give whatever possible 
consideration to those who apply for exit.”130 The only caveat to this concession was 
that the Chinese would not release the five Khache leaders who had “committed 
offenses against the law.”131 In essence and in the face of mounting international 
pressure, the Chinese government conceded every point of the Barkor Khaches’ 
claim of Indian nationality. Within several days’ time, Indian consul general P. N. 
Kaul quickly drew up a list of the Barkor Khaches and issued identification cards 
with his seal and signature.
The Chinese, perhaps in an attempt to put a good face on what was  capitulation 
on their part or as a final gesture of goodwill prior to the departure of the Barkor 
Khache community, compensated them almost 40,000 yuan for their destroyed 
mosque, for the other buildings they owned in central Lhasa, and for any  immovable 
property they left behind. It should be noted, however, that the  government drew 
the line at offering them any payment for the other Lhasa mosques and the thirty 
acres of property that constituted the Khache Lingka (Ch. kaqi yuan). Perhaps 
peeved by this treatment, when government officials attempted to present the 
few destitute families with rations for the journey to India, the Khache council 
intervened, rejected the government’s offer, and instead paid for their food out of 
council funds.
The Chinese process of arbitrating who was a “Kashmiri Indian,” however, 
immediately became more fraught than originally anticipated. Although the 
Barkor Khache community initially provided lists of individuals to Kaul, all 
these individuals had first to receive approval from the Chinese authorities. All 
three entities—the Khache, the Chinese, and the Indian consulate—initially 
appeared relatively lenient, allowing most Khaches who identified themselves 
as Barkor Khache to be issued documentation. This approval included those 
Khaches who had declared themselves Chinese. Several individuals who had 
actively and openly advocated for the Chinese against the Barkor Khache also 
managed to be included. As did two Khaches with Tibetan parents who sup-
ported the March Uprising. In the end, the Chinese authorities permitted each 
of these cases to be allowed to leave for India.132 Perhaps the biggest act of leni-
ency was made for a Barkor Khache woman whose husband had worked at the 
Tibetan Daily and was arrested and imprisoned under “suspicion of their pro-
KMT [Guomindang Nationalist]  tendencies.”133 While he was not released and 
despite the politically charged  circumstances, she and her children were allowed 
to register as “Kashmiri” and depart to India.134
In the early phase of implementing the departures, it appears that several 
Wapaling Khaches received Chinese approval to leave by asserting some distant 
relationship to the Barkor Khache. In one case, a Muslim from Xinjiang attempted 
to claim to be of Khache descent.135 But as the Chinese leniency became known, 
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the Foreign Bureau soon began to be increasingly vigilant and to demand explicit 
and demonstrable proof of a relationship to the Barkor Khache.136 To be fair, the 
selection process was complicated. Chinese officials complained that “many 
 people claiming they are of Kaji [Khache] descent are fake. But we have no way of 
checking.”137
Given that Khaches lived in most of the cities in central Tibet, living in Lhasa 
was not a prerequisite for being allowed to leave. Five Khache families in Tsetang 
and nine families from Shigatse also came to Lhasa to be processed and were 
adjudged to be of Barkor Khache ancestry and allowed to leave.138 Conversely, 
some Barkor Khaches adamantly refused to leave. In one case, the daughter of 
one of the Tsetang Khache families who had been working in Lhasa for two years, 
“point blank refused [to leave Tibet] saying she was happier here.”139
LEAVING TIBET AND RETURNING “HOME”
In the third week of September, the first group of Barkor Khaches and their 
 families departed from Lhasa. By early October, nearly five hundred Barkor 
Khache were transported by Chinese military trucks to Nathula Pass and the 
 border of  still-independent Sikkim, where they were met by Indian transport and 
 eventually relocated to the Himalayan hill town of Kalimpong. Over the course of 
the next six months, nearly a thousand men, women, and children left Tibet, virtu-
ally  emptying the Barkor Tibetan Muslim communities in Lhasa, Shigatse, and all 
central Tibetan urban centers.140
For those unable to depart with the Barkor Khache, the situation was often 
bitter. There were others, though, who chose to believe the Chinese press and the 
rhetoric of the near-constant political meetings that told of India’s poor economic 
conditions. They mocked the departing Khaches, telling them that they were 
making a horrible mistake and that they were better off in Tibet. Kaul heard that 
one Chinese official told a teacher applying to leave that “it was no use proceed-
ing to India now as eventually the Chinese would be there in a decade’s time.”141 
Inevitably, as each group of Khaches departed from Lhasa, some of those left 
behind grew envious and despondent. Others, primarily the younger children 
who had received the greatest degree of Chinese political education, displayed a 
more “defiant demeanor.”142
Having altered their stance toward the Khache, the Chinese government then 
attempted to deal with the even more complicated issue of Nepalese and Khatsara 
residents. Despite relatively clear terms in the Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1956, the 
Chinese had initially refused to issue exit visas to Tibetan wives of Nepalis and 
Khatsaras. In May, the Chinese authorities finally agreed to issue passports and 
Nepalese visas to Tibetan spouses of Nepalese men. In August, the Chinese con-
sented to provide passports for the Tibetan wives of Khatsaras even taking the 
extra effort to issue them transit visas which allowed them to proceed to Nepal 
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via India.143 On September 20, 1960, about 250 Nepalese and Khatsaras and their 
Tibetan families left for Nepal via India.144 All told, under the terms of the Sino-
Nepalese Treaty of 1956, roughly a thousand Khatsara opted for Nepalese nation-
ality.145 A decade and a half later, Dor Bohador Bista, serving as Nepal’s consul 
general, estimated that the “Nepali population of Lhasa proper is about 350” and 
the total in central Tibet close to 500 individuals, with only roughly 40 having 
been born in Nepal.146
However, despite the fact that intermarriage with Tibetans was well docu-
mented among both the Nepalese Khatsara and the Khache communities, the 
Chinese refused to grant Indian citizenship to the few cases of half-Indians whose 
Indian parent was no longer resident in Tibet. The explanation given to the Indian 
officials was that “a child born of either father or mother who is a Chinese (now 
Tibetans are called Chinese) will acquire Chinese nationality.”147 If the manner 
in which the Chinese handled the Nepalese was protracted and resistant, it still 
appeared far more cordial than the manner in which they dealt with the Indian 
officials.148
By the end of the year, most of the Lhasa, Shigatse, and Tsetang Khaches who 
were declared eligible had departed for India.149 All that remained in the Barkor 
Khache neighborhoods were those who had decided to stay behind in Tibet, those 
Khaches who were imprisoned by the Chinese, and perhaps a dozen Khache 
 families whom the Chinese had rejected as not adequately demonstrating their 
case for Indian nationality.150 The dozen families who remained were often cases 
of mixed marriages with Tibetans or whose relationship the Chinese authorities 
adjudged to be too distant from the Barkor Khache. Most continued to receive the 
support of the Indian consulate to press their case with the Chinese authorities but 
with little success.151
The case of the Khaches who had been arrested was far less clear. The Chinese 
had asserted in their September note, “As to the few [Khaches] who committed 
offenses against the law, it is entirely correct for the Government to deal with them 
in accordance with the law.” 152 Initially, the Chinese resolutely refused to release 
any Tibetan Muslims who had been arrested even if their only “crime” was to have 
asserted their Indian citizenship, a status the Chinese government now agreed was 
correct. It was a decision made purely out of spite. Nor was there consistency even 
in this decision. Perhaps seeing the incongruity of their stance, a slow trickle of 
Khaches who had not been formally tried were released between October and 
December.153
On March 30, 1961, the last group of Barkor Khache, composed primarily of 
the families of prisoners, left Lhasa. Just moments before the group left Yatung 
for the Nathula Pass, Habibullah Naik was released from prison and allowed to 
join them.154 On the same day, forty Nepalese and twenty Khatsaras also left.155 
The border crossing of these two large groups marked the end of the two-year 
ordeal for over a thousand Khaches and some two thousand Nepalese. Left behind 
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were five prisoners: Hamibullah Shamo, Abdul Gani Shahkali, Hamidullah Maslie, 
Haji Abdul Kadir Malik, and Abdul Gani Naik. None would ever see their families 
again, and all but one, Abdul Gani Naik, would die in prison.156
KHACHE BUT NOT “KASHMIRI”
In a sad coda, just as the last Khaches were making their way over the Nathula 
Pass and into India, the Wapaling Khaches also began demanding to be allowed 
to emigrate to India. Witnessing the success of the Barkor Khache departures, 
many Wapaling Khaches immediately petitioned to be allowed to leave as well—
and some had succeeded, which only increased their aspirations. Given the large 
number of intermarriages and the complex family trees among the various Khache 
and Buddhist Tibetan communities, the maneuver is not as devious as might have 
appeared. However, Chinese officials quickly limited the criteria by which one 
could claim to be “Kashmiri Indian.”157
As 1960 came to an end, increasing numbers of Wapaling Khaches came to the 
Indian consulate to consult with Kaul, even though there was the risk of  having 
one’s name (and number of visits) noted by the ever-present Chinese guard. The 
Wapaling continued to press, using the legal channels that had succeeded for the 
Barkor Khache. From the outset, Kaul declared quite openly that “there is no 
 question of their being Indian citizens.”161
Throughout the spring, the Wapaling Khache slowly escalated their demands. 
They boycotted praying at the Grand Mosque (only just reconstructed after its 
destruction in the 1959 Uprising), with a majority of them beginning to carry out 
their prayers and activities in the Small Mosque in the Barkor neighborhood.162 By 
May they realized that the Chinese government had more or less finished  processing 
all the individuals they intended to allow to leave for India. It was then that a group 
of ninety Wapaling Khache families, roughly two-thirds of the  thousand-strong 
community, began adopting the same tactics as their now-departed neighbors. 
The remaining families resigned themselves to their circumstances and refused to 
join the increasingly belligerent actions of their neighbors.163
The Chinese government, realizing perhaps that they had the upper hand now 
that the worst of the crisis had passed, consistently told them that there was abso-
lutely no chance they would be allowed to leave. However, the government officials 
never reverted to the pattern of harassment and intimidation that had typified 
their actions in the past year, even opening a Muslim halal (Ch. qingzhen) bakery 
in the Wapaling neighborhood in an attempt to ingratiate themselves with the 
Wapaling Khaches.164
Such efforts by the Chinese did little to alter their stance. Desperate to obtain 
a positive response to their request, nearly fifty Wapaling Khaches resigned their 
government positions in August 1961, refused their ration cards, rejected the 
Chinese household registration (Ch. hukou), and moved north of Lhasa to the 
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Muslim cemetery and small mosque in Dokdé (Tib. dog sde; Ch. Duodi).165 There 
they pitched their tents and began a campaign of passive resistance. Other accounts 
describe protests in front of government offices, some Wapaling children being 
removed from the schools, and several older students, at university elsewhere in 
China, returning to join in their family’s protest efforts. Kaul stated that “local 
authorities have recently been warning Tibetan hawkers and others not to help the 
[Wapaling] with the sale of food and loan of tents as long as they continued to live 
in the said garden.”166 Local Chinese officials, showing continued restraint, labeled 
their actions simply as a “contradiction amongst the masses” rather than the much 
more severe designation “enemies of the state.”
As political tensions rose the sudden shift in the Chinese government’s position 
led to accusations of Chinese infiltrators among those early Wabaling Khaches 
allowed to leave for India. In India, concern centered on several pro-Chinese 
Wapaling Khaches who were suspiciously, some felt, included among the Barkor 
Khaches approved by the Chinese government’s Foreign Bureau in Lhasa to 
be allowed to emigrate to India. This struck many Khaches as particularly odd 
because other individuals with much stronger cases for Barkor Khache identity 
had been denied permission to leave Tibet. Attention quickly focused on the 
Wapaling Khache Habibullah Batt and his Nepalese Khatsara wife.158 With no close 
ties in the Barkor Khache community, distrust of his actual motives was accentu-
ated by the fact that the Chinese government had granted him an exit permit with 
other Tibetan Muslims instead of assigning him the seemingly more appropriate 
designation of Nepalese and returned to Nepal. The questionable circumstances 
surrounding his status, along with the highly charged political atmosphere, caused 
Batt and his family to be cast out of the Tibetan Muslim community and forced to 
leave Kalimpong only weeks after their arrival.
Batt’s swift return to Lhasa after leaving Kalimpong suggests that such 
 suspicions were not misplaced. In late 1961, Batt immediately came to the 
 attention of Arvind Deo, who had just arrived in Lhasa to replace P. N. Kaul as 
consul general for India. In his monthly report Deo identified Batt as a Wapaling 
Khache who repeatedly met with the disgruntled Wapaling Khaches attempting 
to leave India. In these meetings, Batt painted “a grim picture of life in India” and 
spoke of “grave reprisals” by the Chinese authorities if they continued to claim 
Indian  nationality.159 Batt’s special status seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
he received “special permission” to hold on to his Nepalese passport and “ carried 
on his [religious] work even when the Grand Mosque was closed from 1966 
to 1981.”160
In November, Habibullah Batt led a group of thirty Wapalings out to the Dokdé 
group in an attempt to convince those Wapaling holdouts to cease any further 
resistance and return to their homes. Habibullah Batt’s leadership role is signifi-
cant, given that as a Wapaling Khache (married to a Khatsara) he had managed 
to be among those allowed to join the Barkor Khaches in emigrating to India the 
122    CHAPTER 5
year before, and, it was believed among Chinese officials, his voice might help 
convince the demonstrating Khache that they would be better off remaining in 
China.167 When his efforts to convince the renegade Wapalings failed, he and his 
allies issued thinly veiled warnings of Chinese retaliation if they persisted in their 
claims of Indian nationality. As the Wapaling protests continued, the Chinese offi-
cials began to grow weary of the movement and to fear political reprisals from 
their superiors if the protests were discovered. The authorities began to bring the 
Wapaling leaders to Lhasa in order to interrogate them, and Habibullah Batt con-
tinued to be dispatched by Chinese officials in increasingly futile efforts to per-
suade the Wapalings to return to their homes in Lhasa.168
It was at this point, in mid-December 1961, that the State Council (Ch. guowuyuan) 
became involved. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive documents, the 
Wapaling Khaches had become increasingly disruptive, embarrassing Chinese 
officials by interrupting a banquet hosted for them at the Nepali consulate.169 The 
Lhasa municipal government and the Party committee met to discuss how to 
proceed. They agreed that the Khaches should be fully investigated and arrested if 
found guilty of resisting the government’s call for them to cease their demonstrations.170 
In what became known as the Lhasa Muslim Incident of 1961 (Tib. hu’i rigs kyi 
rnyog gra), the government’s patience came to an end.
More than a dozen individuals were arrested and threatened with the use of 
military force to compel the remaining families to return to the city. In the end, 
without food, deprived of income, and forced to beg to stave off starvation, they 
slowly returned to their homes, destitute and defeated.171 In his account of the 
period, Tubten Khétsun suggested that some Wapalings persisted in their resis-
tance into 1963: “a few families were still stubbornly refusing ration cards, and their 
children were among the beggars along the Lingkor path during the fourth month 
Saga Dawa (Buddha’s Birthday) holiday (Tib. sa ga zla ba dus chen) that year.”172
The Wapaling Khaches’ lingering reputation as collaborators and pro-Chinese 
diminished over the years, partly as a result of the manner in which the larger 
Khache community was split but also because of the hardships they had faced in 
1961–62. But even two decades later when Catriona Bass arrived in Lhasa as an 
English teacher and the topic came up among her Tibetan friends, they expressed 
sympathy and even pity, noting, “Life has been difficult for them. . . . In the begin-
ning of the Sixties, their situation was almost worse than ours.”173 Perhaps like 
many lingering prejudices, those past disputes, rifts, and altercations were forgot-
ten when the violent political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution reached Tibet 





Late on March 17, 1959, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama changed out of his customary 
maroon robes into khaki pants and a long black coat. Knowing he could carry 
 little, he hastily rolled up a favorite thangka of the Second Dalai Lama and slid it 
into a small bag. With this in hand, he slipped out the main gates of the Norbulinka 
Palace under the cover of darkness. Several trusted officials whisked him through 
the crowds, which had gathered there in an attempt to protect their revered leader, 
and down to the banks of the Kyichu River where several small coracles awaited 
to row him and his small group across the river. Early the next morning,  having 
reached the 16,000-foot Che-la Pass overlooking the Lhasa valley, he paused, 
turned, and cast a long last glance over the Tibetan capital. Implored to hurry 
by his small guard unit, he quickly began the descent and his march south to the 
Indian border.1 It would be the last time he would see his city.
Two weeks later, on March 31, having traversed some of Asia’s most treacherous 
terrain and protected by an escort that at times was more than several hundred 
strong, the Dalai Lama arrived at the Indian border.2 With the details of the March 
Uprising still largely unknown and with the Dalai Lama’s arrival along with the 
tens of thousands of Tibetans who eventually followed him, Sino-Indian relations 
entered a new era.
After working for more than a decade to establish a constructive relationship 
with China, Prime Minister Nehru was forced to make a choice he had long hoped 
to avoid. Nehru, facing extreme domestic hostility to his policy of promoting 
engagement with China, remained skeptical of calls to alter his strategy. A  mainstay 
of his Tibet policy was his conviction that only by maintaining friendly relations 
with China could India preserve its deep “sympathy for the people of Tibet.”3 Wary 
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of taking any step that might create an atmosphere of “unfriendliness with China,” 
he initially “rejected the suggestion that India should open her doors to all those 
Tibetans who might like to seek refuge in India.”4 His restrained stance stemmed 
primarily from his initial belief that the Chinese military presence in Tibet would 
prevent a mass exodus of Tibetans, and he was convinced that “it is not easy to 
move about from one place to another . . . and the few passes to India will prob-
ably be guarded by [Chinese soldiers].”5 By the end of April, China intensified its 
rhetoric. As Tibetan refugees, first in the hundreds, then in the thousands, began 
to pour into India, Nehru finally realized his decade-long formulation of peaceful 
coexistence had become untenable.
Nehru’s initial reluctance to modify his China policy lay in the dearth of solid 
information available regarding the 1959 March Uprising in Lhasa. Even weeks 
after the event, the outside world’s understanding remained largely limited to 
what S. L. Chhibber, India’s consul general in Lhasa, could glean from rumors, 
observable troop movements, and other basic information, all garnered while he 
was restricted to the consulate just outside the city. Many in India’s press, and 
Nehru himself, were quick to compare the situation to Alfred Hitchcock’s thriller 
Rear Window. When asked about Chinese reports admonishing India to “take an 
objective view on the Tibetan situation,” Nehru, in a press conference, obliquely 
likened Chhibber to Jimmy Stewart’s character in the film who is confined to his 
apartment and believes he has witnessed a murder. He said amidst laughter, “He 
takes an objective view. He sits near a window and looks at Lhasa. I think all these 
days he has been sitting there and taking this objective view.”6 India’s most famous 
political satirist, R. K. Laxman, captured the powerful allusion, lost in the actual 
transcription of Nehru’s comment, and also amplified it by placing Nehru himself 
in the window.
Few would have missed Laxman’s and Nehru’s broader point in comparing 
Rear Window to the situation in Tibet since the film’s denouement turned on the 
fact that people initially dismissed his claims only to discover that a murder had 
actually occurred. Although Chhibber, like the film’s star, Jimmy Stewart, finally 
succeeded in relaying the details of the uprising to India and the world, Nehru’s 
position remained tentative, as the details emerged slowly to paint a fuller picture 
of life in Tibet.
By early May 1959, it became clear that the Chinese could not stem the tide of 
refugees, nor would they passively accept that India was offering sanctuary to the 
Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees. It was then that Nehru, for the 
first time as prime minister, candidly asserted that India had to adhere to its basic 
values and beliefs “even though the Chinese do not like it.”7 With this assertion, 
and in the face of China’s virulent anti-Indian rhetoric, Nehru assented to provid-
ing accommodation and material relief to the Tibetan refugees who had begun to 
find their way into India. Within the month, the Indian government had begun to 
issue “Indian Registration Certificates” to the more than 15,000 Tibetans who had 
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entered the country. By the end of 1962, when the Chinese had effectively sealed 
the Indo-Tibetan border, no fewer than 80,000 Tibetans had traveled by foot from 
Tibet, with most of them settling as resident refugees in India.8 China regarded 
India’s actions in providing asylum for the Dalai Lama and the multitude of refu-
gees who flowed into India in the months and years following the March Uprising 
as prima facie evidence of India promoting Tibetan independence.
Nehru’s support of the refugees swiftly completed China’s turn away from India 
diplomatically. In the early 1950s, India had been a key non-Communist ally, 
but now in its internal propaganda China began to cast it as a pawn of Western 
imperialist powers. This about-face in attitude left Nehru few avenues to explore 
the international relations he had so desperately sought to achieve by diplomacy 
through his Panchsheel Five Principles, the Bandung Conference, and the 1954 
treaty between China and India.
The Dalai Lama remained appreciative of the steps Nehru took to welcome him 
and was fully aware that the position of the Tibetan refugees would be untenable 
without the Government of India’s help.9 In the Dalai Lama’s later writings about 
those first weeks in India, he recalled that Nehru initially “made it quite clear that 
the Government of India still could not contemplate taking issue with the Chinese 
over the question of Tibetan rights,” even reprimanding him, “You say you 
want independence and in the same breath you say you do not want bloodshed. 
Impossible!”10 The Dalai Lama’s early meetings with the prime minister produced 
a “profound feeling of disappointment.”11 He realized Nehru’s position offered little 
room for negotiation as he faced intense domestic opposition on the handling of 
the Tibet question in the Indian Parliament, as well as daily criticism by the press 
of his allowing China to seize control of Tibet. However, despite Nehru’s attitude, 
the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan leadership emerged from those first few weeks in 
India with an even deeper resolve to shape their own future.12
Central to this vision was the determination among Tibetans to form a func-
tioning Government in Exile, a decision that both eased and challenged the 
Indian government’s efforts to accommodate them. The exiled government, 
ultimately centered in Dharamsala and officially known as the Central Tibetan 
Administration (CTA), offered an organizational framework that gave coherence 
to the refugee community. More specifically, it established “a government-like 
structure that is able to negotiate with the Indian government.”13 Despite India’s 
initially tepid response (going as far as to issue a communiqué stating it did not 
officially recognize the Government in Exile), India did nothing to prevent the 
political activism of the Tibetans and continued to provide considerable material 
support to the Tibetan refugees. The fact that India had neither ratified the United 
Nation’s 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor enacted domes-
tic legislation regarding the status of refugees meant that “Tibetans in India do 
not enjoy the official status of refugees under either international or India law.”14 
The Dalai Lama, the CTA, and the Tibetan refugee population realized that all 
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protections and agreements operated at the pleasure and consent of the Indian 
government.
The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees’ primary objective remained the pur-
suit of an independent Tibet. In part, the lack of security with respect to their status 
in India mattered little because their main goal remained “to ensure the preserva-
tion of Tibetan identity and culture, and give a proper education to our younger 
generation.”15 Instead of seeking to bolster and stabilize their status as Indian citi-
zens, they sought to embrace their status as refugees. By remaining refugees, they 
defined themselves as displaced persons whose homeland remained Tibet. Their 
time in India was, they asserted, temporary. To suggest otherwise would be to pro-
pose that they intended to permanently abandon Tibet. Within weeks, the exiled 
Tibetans had quickly fused the definition of being Tibetan with that of being a 
refugee. The question few asked was if it was possible to be Tibetan and not be a 
refugee—until, that is, there emerged in fall 1960 a group of Tibetans who were 
not refugees.
FROM TIBETAN MUSLIMS TO INDIAN CITIZENS
In September 1960, when the Chinese government abruptly consented to the 
Barkor Khaches’ request for Indian citizenship, Faizullah Chisti, president of the 
Indian Tibetan Muslim Evacuees Welfare Association (IKMWA) immediately 
set in motion the work needed to welcome the dozens of—on some days, over 
a hundred—Khache refugees traveling over Nathula Pass through Sikkim and, 
ultimately, into Kalimpong, India. Unlike the thousands of refugees who had fled 
Tibet in the wake of the March Uprising, the Khaches who crossed over into India 
did so with the direct cooperation of the Chinese and Indian governments. Unlike 
many of their Tibetan Buddhist compatriots who faced a violent Chinese backlash 
to the March Uprising, many Khaches had chosen to remain in Tibet and to chal-
lenge the Chinese government. In this way they achieved a rare direct victory over 
the increasingly intransigent Chinese central government. The Khaches argued 
that, based on their Indian ancestry, they should be allowed to return to India. 
In the language of the time, the Khaches had not fled as refugees struggling across 
the Himalayas but as “evacuees.”
The Khache journey to India was an arduous one. On prescribed dates, the 
Chinese provided transportation for each group from Lhasa to Yatung before they 
made the slow climb in military trucks to the Sikkim-Chinese border at the top of 
Nathula Pass (14,000 ft.). At the border, Indian vehicles met them, and they were 
immediately transferred the thirty-five miles down to Gangtok. There they were 
quickly processed and allowed to proceed to Kalimpong. In Lhasa, Indian consul 
general P. N. Kaul had registered and issued each family an exit document with 
their photograph, certified with the consulate seal and Kaul’s signature. To prevent 
them from being unduly delayed at the border, Kaul also provided detailed lists 
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of their luggage, including contents, to be presented at the border check post.16 
The Khaches from Lhasa arrived in groups varying in size from several dozen to 
nearly a hundred at the height of their departures from Tibet. In the first week 
of October 1960, more than 500 Khaches arrived in Kalimpong.17 In early 1961, 
the last remaining Khache trickled in. When these were added to the hundred or 
so Khache boarding school students already in India for several years, the total 
number of those who had permanently left Tibet exceeded 1,500 men, women, 
and children.18
It is hard to imagine their thoughts as they were driven into Kalimpong, a city 
familiar to most of them, at least by reputation. As Tina Harris explains in her 
study of the Tibetan wool trade, “The economic connections between Kalimpong 
and Tibet were so important to the local geographical  imagination that many 
Tibetans would use the word ‘Kalimpong’ to refer to India as a whole.”19 For more 
than a century Kalimpong, the last commercial center before the major pass 
into Tibet, had emerged as the primary trading center for Indian-Tibet trade. 
Traditionally, the town’s populace of 10,000 or 20,000 had long been composed 
of Tibetans, Nepalis, lowlander Indians, and a diverse mix of other Himalayan 
peoples.20 But with the influx first of Tibetans in the immediate aftermath of 
the March Uprising and now the Khaches, the trading town had been utterly 
transformed.
Initially a small trading town, Kalimpong was ill equipped to handle such an 
inundation of new residents. As the weeks of their stay in Kalimpong turned to 
months, the Khaches’ concerns over their dwindling resources and no viable 
source of income led many to consider selling their valuable Tibetan jewelry or 
other sacred objects they had brought with them. Unfortunately, the Tibetan refu-
gees who had arrived in Darjeeling and Kalimpong months earlier had already 
saturated the market for such goods. The result was that only the most desperate 
sold their valuables, and only then at predatorily low prices.21 Added to this, at 
least 10 percent of the Khaches arrived widowed or destitute.22 Finally, despite the 
Indian consul’s repeated requests to the Chinese government for compensation 
“for all property left behind by Indian nationals in Tibet due to causes beyond 
their control,” the Chinese adamantly refused, suggesting that it was a “completely 
unwarranted demand.”23
At the end of 1960, the local newspaper, citing a recently completed census, 
estimated that the population of Kalimpong included over 4,000 Tibetans as 
well as “nearly seven hundred [Khache] and four hundred Chinese nationals.”24 
Another report described “3,390 refugees queued up” to receive free powdered 
milk, and in the neighboring town of Darjeeling, though the Dalai Lama’s rep-
resentative in charge of relief reported that only “1,200 destitute people came 
regularly for the twice-weekly distribution of powdered milk and a little rice.”25 
The indeterminate status of the Khaches as “evacuees” did little to mitigate their 
situation.
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As incursions along the Chinese-India border increased in frequency and 
as Cold War fears heightened tensions, the situation in the towns of Darjeeling 
and Kalimpong remained politically tense. Still fearful that the Chinese gov-
ernment would use refugees as cover for infiltrating India, the accusations of 
Chinese spies coming across the border were common.26 In the progressive 
weekly Thought, an editorial reflected ongoing concern with the possibility of 
continued Chinese territorial expansion in the Himalayas. Dismissing as irrel-
evant China’s protests over India’s offer of sanctuary for the Dalai Lama and 
refugees, the opinion piece warned that China would be unsatisfied with simply 
occupying Tibet:
The Chinese obviously have their eyes fixed elsewhere.  .  .  . Their dream of a so-
called federation of Himalayan States will ever remain unrealized unless Nepal has 
first been bagged. The rare promptitude they have shown in ratifying their so-called 
border and aid agreements with Kathmandu is an eloquent testimony of their re-
solve to push ahead in the Himalayan Kingdom, with or without an understanding 
with India. In truth they have in Nepal a wide field for practicing mock-generosity, 
whether it be the quantum of economic aid or concession on Mount Everest. To be 
wise, India cannot afford to trust either chance or the Chinese. Sedulous flirtation is 
not the same as genuine friendship.27
As Nepalese, Chinese, and Tibetans had all commonly called Kalimpong home for 
centuries, it is not surprising that accusations of collaboration with the Chinese 
soon began to appear.
Perched on the edge of Tibet and India, the city, since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China, had attracted a wide array of those agents interested in 
“listening-in to the echoes from Communist-occupied Tibet.”28 Nehru famously 
described the small community as a “nest of spies,” like a “detective story unravel-
ing itself there,” with individuals of “every variety and every shade of color.”29 The 
Sino-Indian tensions and the near-constant stream of Tibetan refugees had com-
pleted the transformation of Kalimpong from a sleepy backwater to a cosmopolitan 
town bursting at the seams with people with a hundred different political agen-
das. George Patterson, the former Scottish missionary in eastern Tibet who had 
made Kalimpong his home, described how “within a few months of the Chinese 
Communist attack on Tibet I had as my immediate neighbors in Kalimpong one 
of the Shapës, or Cabinet Ministers of Tibet, the Finance Minister, the Dalai Lama’s 
mother, sister, brother and brother-in-law and several other leading members of 
the Tibetan Government.”30
The Chinese government even accused India of allowing pro-Tibet agents to 
transform Kalimpong into a command center of the Tibet revolt.31 The Chinese 
protested repeatedly that pro-Tibet demonstrations were occurring there (and 
elsewhere in India) with the Indian government doing nothing to stop them. The 
Chinese government took India’s inaction as tantamount to encouraging them. 
Prisoners of Shangri-La    129
The Indian government patiently explained that in India free speech and demon-
strations were protected rights, and if carried out in a legal and legitimate manner, 
the Indian government could not intervene or prohibit them. The Indian govern-
ment, for its part, ultimately arrested and deported the Chinese headmaster of the 
local Chinese school and his wife for unidentified “undesirable activities.”32 It was 
into this toxic mix that the Tibetan Muslim evacuees arrived.
HELLO INDIA!  GO OD-BYE TIBET?
In late November 1960, amid the business of greeting the arriving Khaches, regis-
tering their presence, and sorting out their next steps, the president of the Tibetan 
Welfare Association, Faizullah Chisti, received a letter, addressed with only his 
name and marked “SECRET.” Chisti, who had corresponded with many high 
 officials, must have been slightly astonished upon opening the envelope to see 
the Dalai Lama’s red seal. Written in an elegant Tibetan script, the letter began 
by addressing “all the Khache and their leaders who came recently to India from 
Tibet.” Like others who had followed the tribulations of the Khaches over the 
previous year, the Dalai Lama expressed his distress over “how the Khache were 
subjected to the Chinese’s inhuman behavior, maltreatment, unlawful occupation 
of Tibet and their intolerable suppression and endless torture and had to evacuate 
to India.” The Dalai Lama’s letter then exhorted them to join the Tibetans in India 
to free Tibet from China and “to make other peace-loving countries of the world 
better understand our case.” Given the still tenuous situation of Tibetans in India, 
the Dalai Lama counseled Chisti, “[If] in recognizing the difference between a 
friend and an enemy you could support our case, it would be a great help and 
useful for better understanding our case by the other peace loving countries of the 
world.” The Dalai Lama concluded by urging the Khaches to remain in touch and 
to “write me without hesitation.”33
While the letter underscores what would later become the Dalai Lama’s 
 hallmark trait of initiating interfaith dialogue in order to achieve common goals, 
his open and intimate manner also demonstrates just how close and familiar the 
two communities had become over the preceding centuries. Both parties under-
stood the Khache to be Tibetan. Yet the letter appears to have unnerved Chisti 
with its open references to the Khache as his subjects, demonstrating just how 
quickly the experiences of the Tibetan Buddhists and the Khache had diverged in 
crossing from Tibet to India. Not daring to transgress an issue of Indian politi-
cal sensitivity so soon after the Khache had arrived, Chisti immediately wrote to 
the Indian political officer in Gangtok asking for counsel.34 After two months, 
the office finally responded, simply instructing them that any correspondence to 
“H.H. the Dalai Lama is entirely a matter between you and H.H. The Dalai Lama 
and we are unable to give any advice on the matter.” The two-month response 
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time to compose two sentences suggests Chisti’s initial concern about India’s 
stance was well founded.35
In early February 1961, Chisti’s eventual reply to the Dalai Lama, sent on behalf 
of the Khaches in Kalimpong, was equally careful. Certainly, Chisti’s response 
matches the Dalai Lama’s original missive in its affection and respect. He begins 
by assuring him that “we are sure that these difficulties are only temporary and 
one day the time will come that your Majesty’s holy steps will land on the sacred 
soil of Tibet and once again the peace-loving Tibetan people will inspire under the 
honest leadership of your Majesty.”36 Remarkable also is Chisti’s conviction of the 
Dalai Lama’s ecumenical tolerance when he adds that the Khache “earnestly pray 
that the Almighty Allah may fulfill the aspiration of thousands of peace loving 
Tibetan people.”37
The letter is filled with polite compliments, thanking the Dalai Lama for remem-
bering the “few humble Khache (Kashmiri Muslims) amids[t] your Majesty’s 
countless other problems” and expressing gratitude to the “kind-hearted Nehru” 
for saving them from the “hands of tyrant Red China.” And yet Chisti seems far 
more cautious about how to negotiate the Khaches’ newfound status as citizens of 
India.
The letter concluded with what might at first glance seem innocuous, yet in 
fact it broaches what weighs most on Chisti’s mind. Namely, he seeks to remind 
the Dalai Lama of both communities’ reliance on the good offices of the Indian 
government for their present circumstances:
We with all our abilities are with your Majesty and your Majesty’s fellow Tibetan 
 people in the task of li[b]eration of Tibet from the Red Chinese’s unlawful  occupation 
or their tyrant hands. And we are pleasure [sic] to inform your Majesty that every 
member of our community are very thankful for the facilities and hospitalities given 
by your Majesty’s Government in the past in Tibet to us as honest guests of your 
Majesty’s Government.38
Chisti’s closing comments hint at the uncomfortable balancing act the Khache had 
to maintain after their escape from Tibet.
It was not just the manner of their arrival—traveling in government-assigned 
trucks instead of stealing across the Himalayan passes on foot—that separated them 
from their Tibetan Buddhist compatriots. Certainly, both groups shared a desire 
to extricate themselves from their desperate situation in Tibet, but the manner in 
which they were received in India quickly divided them. The Tibetan Muslims, by 
asserting and receiving formal acknowledgment of their Indian  ancestry, arrived in 
India effectively as Indians, not Tibetan refugees. The  consequences of this differ-
entiation began to be manifested almost instantly, as they crossed over the moun-
tainous pass into India. Greeted as Indians, not Tibetans, as citizens, not refugees, 
as Muslims, not Buddhists, the Khache faced a very different set of circumstances, 
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choices, and reception in post-Partition India than did the Buddhist followers of 
the Dalai Lama.
On the one hand, the very criteria by which they exited China was that they 
were not Tibetan. On the other hand, by almost every measure—language, cul-
ture, centuries of intermarriage, and their recognition of the Dalai Lama as their 
ruler—they were Tibetan. The Dalai Lama’s tone in his letter to the Khaches 
was to fellow Tibetans. This was not a letter that could have been sent to others 
who might have witnessed the excesses of the Chinese, such as the Nepalese, 
Ladakhis, or Bhutanese. The Dalai Lama approached the Khaches as Tibetans, as 
the Tibetan government had for centuries. Yet it is the seeming immutability of 
such a relationship that made Chisti most uneasy. Chisti desperately wanted to 
reciprocate the Dalai Lama’s deep affection. However, he felt compelled to send 
the Dalai Lama a signal of the Khaches’ present status by adopting a new narra-
tive denoting the Khache as outsiders or “guests” of the Dalai Lama’s government. 
Their status had changed. Chisti’s language confirms the awkward struggle of 
the Khaches as they sought to make sense of the new world in which they found 
themselves.
The speed with which their experiences diverged from those of the Tibetan 
Buddhists who had fled Tibet only months ahead of their exodus underscores 
the pull of factors beyond their control. The Khaches left Tibet by virtue of 
being Kashmiri. By claiming Kashmiri ancestry, they arrived as Indian citizens; 
by accepting Indian citizenship, they forfeited any claim as Tibetan refugees (or 
exiles); and finally, they left behind a life as a beloved and respected minority and 
entered the post-Partition landscape of India. Each of these changes occurred 
inadvertently. The repercussions were swift and largely unanticipated. The clearest 
and most agonizing consequence took somewhat longer to become manifest: in 
the eyes of most of the world, the Khaches were no longer Tibetan.
To suggest it was only external circumstances that both the Tibetan Buddhists 
and the Khaches wrestled with upon their arrival in India does not fully articu-
late the complexity of the challenges that faced both communities. Internally both 
groups retained strong and visible ties to each other, ties that were evident even a 
half century after their desperate flights from Tibet. Carole McGranahan’s nuanced 
study of the impact of exile on Tibetan identity deftly articulates a central element 
of this dynamic when she suggests that “in exile Tibet, a nationalist identity both 
flourishes and flattens. The perceived need for internal cohesion, given the current 
political state of Tibet, resulted in the devaluing of diversity in the exile commu-
nity.”39 While McGranahan’s comment refers specifically to the Tibetan Buddhist 
exile community, the perception that their circumstances demanded uniformity 
at the expense of diversity is indisputably true for the Tibetan Muslims as well. 
The road to such a flattening and narrowing of identity can be seen by choices that 
began with their departure from Tibet in 1960.
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NEW BEGINNINGS,  OLD LESSONS
Minor political setbacks aside, Faizullah Chisti and the other local Khache lead-
ers quickly set about to establish the IKMWA in order to work through deci-
sions about their futures. In its first weeks, the association faced not only the 
difficult task of finding accommodation for the displaced Khaches but also 
helping with the psychological stress they felt from the strain of the previous 
two years. In the days and weeks after their departure from Lhasa, the Khaches 
began to realize that in the eyes of the Indian government, and increasingly the 
Tibetan Buddhists, they had ceased to be considered Tibetan. They could not 
openly declare their intention to return to Tibet one day in the indeterminate 
future as the Dalai Lama and his followers were doing. The Khaches’ dilemma 
was an entirely different one. United in their desire to leave Lhasa, they were soon 
divided as to how to begin their new lives as Kashmiri Muslims in India. The 
stark and unanticipated choices now facing the Khaches served as a reminder of 
how their abrupt departure from Tibet had altered both their circumstances and 
their identity.
This sudden imposition of Indian citizenship was manifested in bewildering but 
consequential ways. Immediately following the 1959 March Uprising, as detailed 
in the previous chapter, the Khaches successfully asserted that as Kashmiri they 
should be allowed to declare themselves Indian. Yet when interviewed several 
decades later, many Khaches admitted this was far less an expression of a long-held 
belief in their “Kashmiri” identity than a maneuver to extricate themselves from 
China. In the months before the Chinese finally acceded to their claims, many 
among them (under considerable pressure from the Chinese) did renounce their 
claim to be Kashmiri Indian, and others, even as they exited Tibet, became con-
fused about their nationality. Prior to their departure, the Chinese government 
had insisted that the Khaches be issued Chinese passports. But when numerous 
Khaches crossing the border into India were asked about their nationality, they 
replied they were Indian, believing that this was the answer they had worked 
for the past eighteen months to achieve. As a result, they were given the wrong 
forms, and their efforts to apply for Indian citizenship were made much more 
complicated.40 Others, who had family members who were Khatsara or Nepalese, 
responded to the immigration officials honestly by stating they were Nepalese.41 
This blend of externally confusing but internally legible Tibetan labels, Khache, 
Koko, and Khatsara, did not neatly fit into any of the available nation-state divi-
sions now being imposed by India.
The choices facing the Khache once they arrived were even more bewildering. 
Despite their claim to be Indian Kashmiri, most of them continued to identify 
themselves as Tibetan. In documents from the period and in talking with elder 
members of the community today, a profound apprehension had gripped the 
Khaches, much like that which Chisti expressed in his letter to the Dalai Lama. 
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They felt that they had to conform to the identity that had allowed them to escape 
Tibet. The problem was that few, including most Tibetans, treated them as “Tibetan 
refugees.” More pressing, although rarely stated explicitly at the time, the Khache 
did not want to appear deceptive or ungrateful to the nation that had championed 
their harrowing escape from Tibet.
The scars of their last months in Lhasa did not diminish quickly, and daily con-
cerns weighed on them, causing the community to question just how to begin to 
rebuild their lives. Within weeks after the first group’s arrival in Kalimpong, three 
general schools of thought on how best to push forward emerged. Each envisioned 
a starkly different vision of the Khaches’ future, correlating directly with the three 
major ways the Khaches began to perceive of themselves. The first group, headed 
by Chisti and others who had deep experience in India, implored the group to 
remain in the Himalayan hill towns of Darjeeling and Kalimpong, where they 
would have commercial opportunities and could remain geographically and cul-
turally close to Tibet. Others, caught up in the notion of their Kashmiri heritage 
and having safely preserved their community, exhorted their brethren to “return” 
to Kashmir (their ostensible homeland). The third group, embracing their iden-
tity as Muslims, urged settlement in Saudi Arabia (the birthplace of Islam).
The question of what the Khache should do was taken up in a spirited two-day 
meeting at the end of November 1960 with all the heads of the refugee families in 
attendance. A vote was taken, and the majority (roughly 600) decided to move to 
Srinagar in Kashmir. The motion and vote summarized the choice in this manner: 
“This meeting conveys to the Government of India that [a] majority of the mem-
bers Indian Muslims of Kashmiri-Ladakhi origin prefer the soil, climate, weather 
and scope of trade in Kashmir within the Indian Union, to be quite suitable for 
their health, habit, hygiene.”42 The vote was not binding on the group as a whole, 
and many of the elders, in particular, had been convinced by several Ladakhi 
Khaches of the merits of settling in Kashmir, even though they had visited but 
never lived in Srinagar. Still, more than a third of the Khaches, typically those 
who were younger and more cosmopolitan, stood firm and decided to remain in 
Kalimpong and Darjeeling.43 The remaining members hoped to emigrate to the 
Middle East.44 The final motion of the meeting voted Faizullah Chisti the “leader 
of the delegation” and “President-cum-secretary,” despite his personal opposition 
to settling in Kashmir.
Chisti’s job was not easy, though his selection was inspired given his inti-
mate knowledge of Indian bureaucracy and his tireless work ethic, even when 
it meant pursuing ends with which he personally disagreed. Chisti displayed 
an amazing degree of administrative acumen by keeping highly detailed lists of 
people, organized and enumerated by individual and by family. The day after 
the vote, Chisti contacted government officials asking that arrangements for the 
first groups be set in place so that their travel could be completed in time for 
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them to celebrate Ramadan in Srinagar. However, the bureaucratic wheels of 
India turned very slowly, with each administrative office referring the request 
to another, until the delay was so great that the departure had to be postponed 
until after Ramadan.45
Within weeks, Chisti began the complicated process of moving the six hundred 
Khache, of varying financial means, to Kashmir from Kalimpong across north-
ern India to Srinagar. He separated those who were going to Srinagar into three 
groups, and between March 28 and April 4 he personally oversaw each group 
board the bus in Kalimpong early on their appointed morning so as to ensure each 
of them made the journey down the steep twisting road to Siliguiri. In Siliguri 
each person in the group was issued a third-class railway ticket, boarded the first 
of three train journeys, and only at the end of the third day make the final stage of 
their trip to Srinagar by bus.46 While the bulk of the Khaches who desired to move 
to Kashmir had left Kalimpong by April, other groups continued to be organized 
for several more months. It was not until August 1961 that the very last group, 
which Chisti described as “quite ignorant, illiterate, and helpless,” departed. Chisti 
requested special attention from the government to help the group join those who 
had gone on ahead.47
Those Khaches who remained in Kalimpong and Darjeeling began to realize 
firsthand how precarious their documented status was. Despite the considerable 
and sustained involvement of the Indian government in facilitating their move 
from Tibet to India, it was at this moment that the Indian government almost 
instantaneously turned its attention elsewhere. The Tibetan Muslims did not 
receive any of the high-level, prolonged attention given to the Dalai Lama and 
Tibetan Buddhists, and they encountered sustained and widespread resistance 
from Indian and Kashmiri officials, who hindered their efforts to process their 
applications for full Indian citizenship.
As they sought to begin the process of buying property and setting up shops, 
“the authorities concerned ask[ed] such persons to produce proof of Indian 
Citizenship.”48 Nearly two years later, in 1962, local officials had still not taken 
action on the Khaches’ applications for citizenship.49 Chisti, courteous until the 
end, wrote to the deputy commissioner of Darjeeling District, “I regret to point 
out that so far nothing has been done. . . . [Khaches] are being subjected to unnec-
essary harassment and embarrassments at check posts and elsewhere.”50 In August 
1963, P. N. Kaul, now serving in the central government, wrote to Chisti indicat-
ing that he had reached out to “concerned authorities” and “presume[d] they will 
investigate it through the West Bengal Government.”51 Only then, nearly three 
years after their arrival, did the three hundred Khaches who had stayed behind 
in Kalimpong and Darjeeling begin to be properly registered and to receive their 
Indian Citizenship Certificates. All except Faizullah Chisti, whose application the 
deputy commissioner purposely delayed for another year, peeved at being made to 
look bad by going over his head.52
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Even after the departure of nearly two-thirds of the Khaches, Chisti continued 
to press for the Indian government’s support of those who remained behind.53 He 
appealed for government intervention regarding Sanaullah Shahkuli, an eighteen-
year-old Khache student in Beijing who was unable to return to Lhasa in time to 
join his family and was being detained in Lhasa despite promises that he would 
be allowed to join his family in India. Chisti kept in nearly continuous contact 
with the two Indian consul generals, Kaul and Chhibber, even after they moved 
on from their posts in Tibet. In addition, he organized classes for the Khache chil-
dren at the Anjuman Islamia School in Kalimpong and then, with government 
assistance, placed them in nearly a dozen schools. The degree to which he set aside 
his personal needs for the greater good of the community appears in his corre-
spondence for one small, heartbreaking moment. In a letter to an Indian official, 
seeking assistance yet again for the Khache prisoners held in Lhasa, he apologizes 
for the delay of his response, due to the “sad demise of my beloved wife.”54 In the 
very next sentence he returns to the matter at hand, not letting the death of his 
wife diminish his pursuit of government assistance. Perhaps feeling the need to 
continue for the greater good of the community, he remained in the position of 
president of the association and was the community’s foremost advocate until near 
the very end of his life.
Foremost in the minds of most Tibetan Muslims were the five Khaches who 
had been arrested and tried in June 1960 and who remained imprisoned in Lhasa. 
(Diplomatic records sometimes include a sixth, Abdul Ahat, whose father, an 
Indian, was the cook at the Indian consulate in Lhasa.) Their families had waited 
until the very last moment to leave Lhasa, but in the end they had been convinced 
there was little they could accomplish by remaining behind. Survivor’s guilt and 
witnessing, on a daily basis, the grief of those families prompted Chisti to continue 
to appeal and to actively seek ways to tangibly extend assistance to them. In a peti-
tion to the Ministry of External Affairs, he stated that the “wives and relatives . . . 
at the present moment steeped in deep worries and anxieties constantly brooding 
over the conditions of their men at Lhasa in Tibet and such worries and anxieties 
have seriously told upon their health.”55 Chisti organized a package of items to be 
sent to the prisoners, everything from shirts, trousers, and caps to items such as 
tea, biscuits, and cigarettes—items that allowed them a modicum of comfort they 
would otherwise have been denied.56
As relations deteriorated between China and India and as numerous small 
incidents of ill treatment of Chinese in India came to the fore, the issue of the 
five remaining prisoners slipped from view. At the end of 1962, India closed its 
Lhasa consulate, citing constant “restrictions of various kinds which were intensi-
fied after Chinese forces launched massive attacks on Indian territory.  .  .  . Food 
was difficult to obtain, communications were cut off and the personnel were 
harassed.”57 In this atmosphere, Chinese responses to all queries about the remain-
ing Khaches became tediously repetitive. Chinese officials repeatedly circled back 
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to their original September 23, 1960, communication in which they had stated that 
the “Chinese Government had always considered the [Khache] to be Chinese.”58 In 
October 1963, the Indian officials seemed at their wit’s end after finding “patently 
illogical” the Chinese government’s response indicating it had investigated the 
matter and “found there were no Indians in Tibet.”59
The following year, the Indian government again attempted to reason with 
the Chinese, stating that their stance on the Khache prisoners was “at variance 
with their own policy on the question of nationality of overseas Chinese” and 
noting that the only crime they committed was that they insisted they were 
Indian nationals and desired to emigrate India.60 Chisti continued to plead for 
government intervention as late as 1967 but to no avail.61 A month after that, 
he received a reply explaining that although the Indian government had made 
repeated claims for their release, the Chinese government had now “refused 
to enter into further correspondence with the Government of India” on the 
 matter and that no communication had been received since China’s last reply on 
December 5, 1964.62
If the road to Indian citizenship had been an uneven and difficult one for 
those Khaches who remained in Kalimpong and Darjeeling, their lives by 1964 
had begun to assume a sense of normalcy. Their children were attending quality 
local schools. Many of the Khaches had become leading citizens in the two cities. 
Realizing that the Indo-Tibetan trade, from which many of them had made their 
livelihood, was not likely to return any time soon, given the 1962 Sino-Indian bor-
der conflict, they invested their capital in opening shops and hotels or becoming 
tailors and hat-makers—skills that had served them well in Lhasa. Their success 
and general contentment contrasted sharply with those who chose to leave for 
Srinagar in 1961.63
HARD LESSONS:  KASHMIR
For those Khaches who chose to settle in Kashmir, arrival in Srinagar in the late 
spring and summer of 1961 was far from idyllic. While awaiting construction 
of forty two-bedroom apartments, intended to house roughly eighty to a hun-
dred families, the Khache endured their first Srinagar winter in a tent city on the 
Numaishi Exhibition Grounds.64 Their expectation that Kashmir would bring a 
return to a life as peaceful as they had once had in Tibet was quickly dashed. They 
were unable to speak the Kashmiri language, unfamiliar with local customs, and 
completely unaware of the complex political situation into which they suddenly 
found themselves. Claimed by both Pakistan and India, after the Partition in 1947, 
Srinagar’s political status remained a controversial and unsettled question when 
the Khaches arrived in 1960, as it remains today.
When British governance ended in 1947, Kashmir had, in a complicated set 
of still disputed steps, attempted to remain independent of both Pakistan and 
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India. Like many other princely states under British rule, Kashmir had remained 
officially autonomous but had largely adhered to British colonial leadership. Its 
position along the Indian-Pakistan border, with its complex Hindu-Muslim his-
tory, reflects the highly amalgamated past of many Himalayan states, their distinc-
tive legacies shaped by multiple influences and rulers. In the nineteenth century, 
Kashmir was ruled by Punjabi Sikhs before coming under the rule of a Hindu 
Dogra king. By the early twentieth century, Kashmir, along with Tibet, Sikkim, 
Bhutan, and Nepal, served as strategic Himalayan buffer states among the more 
powerful regional political forces. Their status, however, remained elusive and 
debatable. As a result, Kashmir never fit neatly into the religio-political categories 
of the lowlands; rather it reflected the typically diverse hybrid status found of other 
Himalayan states.
In 1947, under the British formula of partition, which viewed the future suc-
cess of their former colony through an almost exclusively Hindu-Muslim lens, 
Kashmir was offered the choice of joining either a Muslim-majority Pakistan or 
a Hindu-majority India. Such a choice made little sense for a Kashmir that was a 
Muslim-majority state with a still vibrant Buddhist historical tradition ruled by 
a Hindu ruler. The Kashmiris resisted being forced into a choice along religious 
lines, given that neither option reflected their culture or their political values. 
Thus Kashmir’s initial choice was to remain independent. This did not sit well 
with either India or Pakistan, both of which sought to claim the territory as 
their own.
Faced with the choice of military occupation by Pakistan or signing an “instru-
ment of accession” with India (in exchange for military protection), Kashmir 
chose to join the India Union under a strict set of conditions set out under Article 
370 of the Indian Constitution.65 This constitutional provision created a special 
status for Kashmir by placing it directly under the control of India’s president 
and by restricting the central Indian government’s powers to three areas: foreign 
affairs, defense, and communications. All other rights were retained by the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. To further clarify and institute an unambiguous and asym-
metric federalist relationship with India, the Jammu and Kashmir government, on 
January 26, 1957, promulgated the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The con-
stitution, among other things, declared that “permanent residents” were defined 
as those individuals who were resident in the state prior to May 14, 1954. This pro-
vision explicitly sought to maintain the precarious Hindu-Muslim demographic 
balance and to prevent in-migration that might swing the state in one direction 
or the other. The Khache who arrived in Kashmir had little understanding of the 
legal hurdles, religious complexities, and almost insurmountable identity politics 
that awaited them.
The consequences of this lack of understanding for the Khache were immedi-
ate and absolute. Many of those who decided to settle in Kashmir had based their 
decisions on the claims of just a few Khaches about weather, topography, and the 
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belief that they were fulfilling the Indian government’s claim to their Kashmiri 
ancestry. Almost every positive assumption the Khache held when they chose to 
settle in Kashmir was dashed on their arrival in Srinagar. Perhaps most dispiriting 
was the realization that in the eyes of the Kashmiri government, and under local 
laws, they were not welcomed as long-lost brethren but were forcefully and defini-
tively designated as non-Kashmiri Muslim immigrants.
From the moment of their arrival, Kashmiri officials, through small measures 
and large, made the Khaches’ efforts to settle permanently in Kashmir difficult, 
unpleasant, and stressful. It was the Kashmiri’s sense at the time that to offer the 
Khache permanent residency might set a precedent that would flood the state with 
other non-Kashmiri Muslims. It is an irony rarely touched on that the Khache, 
though technically retaining a pathway to Indian citizenship, would, if they settled 
in Kashmir, remain non-state subjects. And in the eyes of most Kashmiri, they 
would be treated as Tibetan refugees.66 This conundrum of being Indian citizens 
but not a state subject of Kashmir is a critical facet of the Khache experience in 
India that, if disregarded, renders their more recent past incomprehensible.
Initially, it was local Kashmiri officials who resisted allowing them to regis-
ter as Indian citizens.67 In part, this resistance was a legacy of those immigrants 
who had preceded them. The Khaches’ arrival a decade after thousands of Uyghur 
and Kazak refugees from Xinjiang had descended on Kashmir complicated their 
reception. Many Kashmiri officials erroneously equated the Khaches’ status with 
the Xinjiang and Tibetan stateless peoples who had preceded them to Srinagar.68 
After nearly a year, desperate for resolution, Khache representatives contacted 
Nehru, who had been vacationing in Kashmir, asking him to personally intervene, 
to no avail.69 To the many Khache it appeared that the Indian government, after 
working diligently on their behalf to secure their release from China, had become 
indifferent to their situation now that they had arrived in India.
The situation became far more serious on July 1, 1962, when local police notified 
the Khache that failure to “get all the Tibetan Muslim refugees” registered (as for-
eigners) within two weeks’ time would lead to the state taking “legal action against 
them under the Foreigners’ Act and Rules.”70 Attempts to approach the superin-
tendent of police to apprise him of the fact that as repatriated “Indian Kashmiri 
Muslims” the Foreigners’ Act and Rules did not apply to them were fruitless. Faced 
with immediate arrest, the Khaches in Srinagar were forcibly registered as for-
eigners and classified as Tibetans. Only at this point did the Khache leaders in 
Srinagar reach out to contact Faizullah Chisti in Kalimpong. He told them of the 
July 7 memo from Kaul advising them to “approach local Registering Authority 
for the grant of Indian Citizenship.”71 Even with his aid, it took until late 1963 and 
only with the forceful intervention of the central Indian authorities for the Khache 
to be properly registered as Indian citizens, like the Khache in Darjeeling and 
Kalimpong. While they had achieved Indian citizenship, the fact remained that as 
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long as they stayed in the state of Kashmir and Jammu, they would be “non-state 
subjects.”
Without state subjects’ status, the Khache continued to be ineligible for key 
documents, such as identity cards for Kashmiri elections and ration cards, the 
lack of which accentuated their outsider status. Being denied state citizenship also 
had broader implications. As non-state subjects in Kashmir, the Khache could not 
gain access to the many other privileges: they could not acquire immovable prop-
erty, were deemed ineligible for government employment, and were disqualified 
from applying to receive bank loans. Khache youth were denied access to state-run 
Kashmiri higher technical and professional education.
This was in stark contrast to the benefits granted to the Khache children who 
remained in Darjeeling and Kalimpong. There the Khache successfully registered 
as Bhotia, a scheduled tribe eligible for local postgraduate education benefits, such 
as lower admissions requirements. Any Khache youth who settled in Srinagar who 
was interested in pursuing a university education had to do so by incurring the 
high costs associated with going to other Indian states, an expense beyond the 
means of most Khache families. In the face of these obstacles, the Kashmir Khache 
established their own school and maintained their cohesive identity over the next 
several decades. Yet as the Tibetan Muslim Masood Butt would write in a fiftieth-
anniversary retrospective, for those Khache in Kashmir, the “lack of proper guid-
ance and leadership proved to be an obstacle in their development.”72 Without 
ways to earn their livelihood, the increasingly desperate community began to look 
for alternative solutions.73
Their harsh reception in Kashmir unsettled the many Khaches who had come 
to believe a myth of their own making, that as Khache they were Kashmiri. The 
contradiction between the case the Indian government made for their departure 
from Tibet, based explicitly on their Kashmiri heritage, and what they encoun-
tered when Kashmir refused to accept them as Kashmiri deeply disoriented the 
entire Khache community.
PURSUING MUSLIM RO OT S
By 1969, the Khache in Srinagar, Kalimpong, and Darjeeling became increasingly 
disenchanted with the lack of opportunities available to them in Kashmir, and 
more broadly in India. Many younger Khache were striking out in search of work 
and education in Nepal and elsewhere. Deep disillusionment over their inability to 
re-create or build on the previous lives they had had in Tibet was manifest. Unlike 
the difference of opinion between various Khache groups over where to settle that 
had occurred in November 1960, now, almost a decade later, an overwhelming 
majority were of a single mind: to make a move to Saudi Arabia. Much of the 
impetus for this move came about because several groups of Tibetan Muslims and 
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Chinese Muslims had successfully established numerous small communities in 
Saudi Arabia and in the Middle East.
The Khache based their wish to move on information from those who had 
already migrated to the Middle East. The Barkor Khache leaders in 1961 had 
noted Nehru’s assistance to a large group of Khaches who had become stranded in 
Bombay two years earlier. Even more influential in the Khaches’ resolve to move 
was the example of a second group of a hundred or so Khaches, led by Ghulam 
Muhammad, who decided in 1960 not to move with the bulk of the Khaches to 
Kashmir but instead to emigrate directly, or so they believed, to Saudi Arabia.74 
This group joined but soon outnumbered other Muslims who had immigrated to 
Saudi Arabia from China.
In a little known fact, many Muslims from China, Xinjiang, and Tibet had cho-
sen to settle in Saudi Arabia, often out of political expediency, and appeared to 
be prospering. According to a Republic of China 1961 survey of Chinese living 
in Saudi Arabia, only the Muslims from Qinghai and Gansu outnumbered those 
from Tibet.75 Though different from the Khache, many Uyghur, Kazakh, and Hui 
Muslims from northwest China fled China and settled in Saudi Arabia after the fall 
of the Nationalist Chinese government in 1949. Of the some 400 surveyed, nearly 
300 had become Saudi citizens or permanent residents. The immigration to Saudi 
Arabia was largely accomplished through the assistance of Ma Bufang, a Qinghai 
Muslim who served as the Republic of China’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 
1957 until 1961 and who would himself ultimately obtain Saudi citizenship.76 The 
welcome they received and the commercial success they achieved there remained 
well known because many of those who fled had traveled through India (often 
specifically Kashmir).77
Contrary to the beliefs of those Khaches who promoted the move to Saudi 
Arabia, these early groups had not had an entirely easy path to settlement. Both 
the Qinghai group and the group led by Ghulam Muhammad had arrived on Hajj 
visas that allowed them to stay only for one year. As their pilgrimage ended, these 
groups approached Saudi officials asking to be allowed to settle permanently. As 
the Saudi government had done with most such requests, it denied their appeal. 
The timing of their appeal proved fortuitous, though, since the inroads made by 
the People’s Republic of China in the Middle East had caused representatives 
of the Republic of China to redouble their efforts in the region, particularly 
in 1957 after the PRC had persuaded Egypt to sever relations with Taiwan and 
 recognize the PRC. The rising prominence of the PRC in the Middle East inter-
sected with the Tibetan Muslims fleeing Tibet. The Nationalist government saw 
an  opportunity in supporting the Tibetans: a means to foment broader internal 
dissent within Tibet and, in their calculus, aid their long-term plan to retake the 
Chinese mainland.78
In an effort to encourage the uprising in Tibet, U.S. State Department officials 
in 1959 urged Chiang to offer recognition of “Tibet as an independent state” to 
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solidify anti-Communist activities in Tibet.79 While Chiang did not in the end 
agree to this, the Nationalists did offer the roughly one hundred Khaches ROC 
citizenship and passports (they had left India prior to being granted Indian citi-
zenship).80 While this resolved the Khaches’ immediate dilemma of being stateless 
persons, it did not alter the fact that the Saudi government still refused to grant 
them permanent residency. In the end, after being granted residency by other 
neighboring states, it was the initiative of several Tibetan Muslim students who 
were enrolled at Medina University that convinced the Pakistani Islamic scholar, 
Imam Maulana Abu Ala Maududi, to assist them in writing and delivering a peti-
tion to the Saudi king.81
Adopting a compelling religious strategy, Maududi advised them to contrast 
their situation with that of the increasing global visibility of Tibetan Buddhists. 
At the heart of the appeal was the portrayal of the Tibetans’ flight from “Chinese-
occupied Tibet” as consisting of two peoples: the Buddhists who had success-
fully founded a new community and government in Dharamsala; and the Khache 
Muslims who remained stateless. Maududi personally took the appeal to the king, 
and two months later, thirty Tibetan Muslim families received an invitation from 
the king to move to Saudi Arabia. The community quickly decided to settle in the 
Jabal Bazim area of Taif. Located in the Sarawat Mountains about 62 miles south-
east of Mecca, it was the city that served as the unofficial summer capital of the 
Saudi government. There the Tibetan Muslims quickly established themselves as 
proficient tailors and hat makers. Although allowed to reside there permanently, 
their status as foreigners deprived them of many rights given to Saudi citizens. 
Several years later, after the discovery of oil, the requirements for obtaining 
 citizenship, even for those Tibetan Muslims born in Saudi Arabia, became ever 
more circumscribed.
It is likely that at least some of the Khaches back in India knew some of these 
facts, though most deemed their options in the Middle East no worse than the 
 situation they faced in Srinagar. The Khache leader Muhammad Ramzan Butt 
arranged a meeting with the Indian government to broach the idea of their 
 assisting the Tibetan Muslims to emigrate to Saudi Arabia. Realizing they were 
unhappy and that perhaps such a move would make things easier for the Indian 
government, an Indian official advised Butt to collect a list of those individuals 
wishing to leave India and to once again approach Kaul for his guidance and assis-
tance. In their appeal to Kaul, the hardships of the Khache became apparent. The 
1969 letter first explained that the “main reason of our desire to migrate in Saudi 
Arabia is for easy earning of our livelihood” and then went on to explain that 
“because most of our community members are tailors and it is reliably learnt that 
the tailoring business particularly cap making, etc. (which is easy for us) is one 
of the best means of earning in Saudi Arabia, and also our old aged men desires 
are this, that ending of the life be in that holy place.”82 The letter described how 
the Khache, with limited but not insubstantial capital, had “started business[es] 
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of shoes, caps and many other items” while others “opened restaurants, hotels, 
etc.”83 According to the letter, within the first five years most Khaches in India had 
run through the bulk of their capital assets. Over 120 of the original families who 
arrived in India in 1960 included their names on the petition asking to be allowed 
to leave India to resettle in Saudi Arabia.84
With no objection from the Indian government, the Khache communities 
appealed directly to the king of Saudi Arabia through the offices of the Saudi 
embassy in India. Playing to Saudi Arabia’s anti-PRC stance, the letter began, 
“With due deference we the helpless Muslim Tibetans who have migrated to India 
from Tibet, forcibly occupied by the Red China, beseech your Majesty kindly grant 
us permission to migrate from India to Saudi Arabia and settle down there perma-
nently.”85 The letter stressed that due to their faith, the Chinese in Tibet had “plun-
dered and tortured” them, that their honor had been “robbed,” and “the irreligious 
Chinese threatened us with dire consequences if we did not give up our faith in 
God and the Holy Prophet.”86 The Dalai Lama’s representative, Thupten Ninje, also 
wrote a three-sentence note to the Saudi embassy on their behalf asking the Saudi 
government to permit them to settle in Saudi Arabia. The exact response from 
the Saudi government was not recorded, but the gist was clear: the Khache would 
not be welcome. With their final appeal to leave India dashed, the Khache, by and 
large, turned to making the best of a life there.
THE GIFT OF CITIZENSHIP AND THE PRICE OF BEING 
TIBETAN
Leaving Tibet in 1960 and accepting Indian citizenship affected the Khache in 
ways that they could never have anticipated. The most unexpected consequence 
of that choice was how quickly they ceased to be Tibetan in the eyes of other 
Tibetans, Indians, and the international community. As McGranahan has compel-
lingly explored, citizenship for refugees is often conceived of as a “gift” bestowed 
by the host countries.87 Often the host nations, focusing on the presumed benefits, 
rarely consider the consequences that citizenship may bestow. So while Indian 
citizenship played a key role in the Khaches’ ability to leave Tibet, the Tibetan 
Buddhist refugees had long refused citizenship. For the Khache, the acquisition of 
Indian citizenship had indeed been a gift. It was the means by which to escape the 
untenable circumstances they had found in Tibet after the March Uprising. Rarely 
addressed is the fact that for the Khache, the gift of citizenship was not presented 
in a manner that could be refused, and it came with the immediate consequences 
of losing the Tibetan identity held by many of their fellow Tibetans.
While the Khaches regarded their Indian citizenship as a political means to a 
desired end, the Tibetan Buddhists saw their refusal of Indian citizenship as evi-
dence of their commitment to an independent Tibet. Their defiant rejection of cit-
izenship served as a means by which their loyalty to Tibet was authenticated. Not 
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surprisingly, then, to be a refugee was, by definition for the Tibetan Buddhists (and 
their supporters), to be a Tibetan. The exiled Tibetan community’s emphatic rejec-
tion of citizenship is overshadowed by the fact that India never publicly offered 
them citizenship. As McGranahan pointedly concludes, “One cannot receive a gift 
that is not offered.”88 In this formulation, then, it might be correct to suggest that 
Tibetan Buddhists who flowed into India “refused and were refused citizenship in 
South Asia.”89 The Khache, by accepting the “gift” of Indian citizenship that was 
offered to them, were thus perceived as rejecting the privileged label of refugee, 
and subsequently they were refused the right to be Tibetan, at least among the 
Tibetans in exile community.
This is not to say that the two groups avoided each other. In Darjeeling and 
Kalimpong there were individuals, like Faizullah Chisti, who spoke all three 
key languages of the Himalayan front range, Nepali, Tibetan, and English, and 
who aided both the Khaches and the Tibetan Buddhists in their daily commer-
cial, political, and social interactions. Yet the swiftness with which the Khache 
pursued the Kashmiri/Indian and Muslim dimensions of their identities and the 
response of the Tibetan Buddhists in distancing themselves from fellow Tibetan 
Khaches was, while perhaps predictable, startling. Predictable because the ratio-
nale by which they exited Tibet was based on their Indian, not Tibetan, ancestry. 
Startling because they remained culturally Tibetan and highly integrated with 
other Tibetans and the Tibetan government up to the moment of their departure.
While the Indian government undeniably championed the Khaches’ exit from 
central Tibet, it was Tibetan Buddhists, not the Khache, who received the bulk of 
the Indian government’s attention and resources, largely as a result of the swift 
international repercussions that accepting them into their country had for India. 
In the face of an ever-increasing number of refugees, the Indian government grew 
concerned over the very real need for housing, disease prevention, and infrastruc-
ture in the refugee camps. With few options, the Indian government coordinated 
a response with the Dalai Lama, a response that resulted in the creation of per-
manent Tibetan Buddhist settlements.90 By 1969, more than twenty agricultural, 
industrial, and handicraft settlements involving more than 30,000 refugees were 
established in India, Nepal, and Bhutan.91 India took other actions that indicated 
their strong pro-Tibetan stance, such as choosing in 1962 not to renew the Sino-
Indian 1954 Agreement in which India acknowledged China’s sovereignty over 
Tibet, thus intimating, but never formally stating, that the nation had changed its 
position on Tibetan independence.
The benefits of being Tibetan in India initially appeared to be advantageous 
but slowly became a point of contention within the exiled Tibetan community. 
Their refugee status often limited their ability to purchase property, to vote, and 
to travel internationally. In the eyes of many exiled Tibetans, however, keeping 
their refugee status became a litmus test for remaining politically committed to 
a “Free Tibet” and/or being committed to an eventual return to their homeland. 
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To be labeled “refugee” made a political statement, one that would be greatly 
diminished by acquiring citizenship. Since the 1970s the issue of accepting 
Indian citizenship has been a highly contentious one. The question of the status 
of the Tibetan refugees has been a charged topic full of conflicting realities. On 
a very basic level, refugee status represented one’s personal views on Tibetan 
politics, that is, one’s commitment to a free Tibet. More broadly, there was the 
Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” and the political meanings it held for the Central 
Tibetan Administration. Finally, there were the myriad legal ramifications that, 
in India at least, restricted one’s movements and limited one’s legal rights. As one 
Tibetan refugee put it, “We aren’t Indians. We don’t get benefits. We can’t buy 
land. There is no Indian citizenship for us. There is only a residential certificate 
that we have to renew once a year. We can’t take loans, no buying land, and we 
can’t get good jobs.”92
To be a refugee was to be a Tibetan patriot, yet it rarely translated into an 
easy life. And regardless of the spectrum of beliefs among the Tibetan refugee 
community, most Tibetan refugees perceived the Khaches’ acceptance of Indian 
citizenship as a sign of their disloyalty to Tibet. What is overlooked with such a 
perspective is how similar the Khaches’ non-state status in Kashmir was to that of 
the Tibetans-in-exile refugee status in India.
The clearest indication of the Khaches’ new status as non-Tibetan seems to be 
the decision by the newly established Tibetan government in exile not to actively 
include them in their early elections, thus limiting their ability to acquire rep-
resentation in that governmental body. Many have noted that the exile govern-
ment was dominated by Gelug followers but that the other branches of Tibetan 
Buddhism (e.g., Sakya, Nyingma, Kagyu) were only given a small amount of rep-
resentation. Little or no representation, however, was given to the non-Buddhist 
Bon, the Christian, or the Muslim Tibetans.93 The exclusion of the Khache, even if 
it was a result of expediency rather than doctrinal purity, runs counter to the more 
secular position in which they were held by the Dalai Lama, the ruler of Tibet for 
non-Buddhist Tibetans.
Why the Khache, as a group, never approached the Dalai Lama and why the 
CTA never officially invited the Khache to participate in their Tibetan gover-
nance in exile were, in the end, not so much conscious decisions as a series of 
misunderstandings. From the Tibetan perspective, the Khache seemed to repeat-
edly show little loyalty to Tibet and Tibetans, first by declaring themselves Indian 
and then by seeking to immigrate to the Middle East. From the Khache perspec-
tive, many older Khache point to the fact that when the national assembly was 
formed, the “body gave equal representation to each of Tibet’s three regions and 
four Buddhist sects” but not to Muslims.94 This is not to suggest that Tibetan 
Muslims were uniformly excluded, for several Khaches were recruited to work 
in the CTA.95 Trine Brox’s research on the exile government has demonstrated 
that the bottom line is that although Tibetan Muslims have been allowed to hold 
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offices in the Dharamsala administration, “they are otherwise excluded from 
receiving special treatment or representation in the [Tibetan Government-in-
Exile] parliament.”96
When Khaches were asked about the Dalai Lama in interviews carried out in 
the past decade, they were uniformly positive, yet they often expressed confusion 
over the reluctance by the CTA to issue Green Books (Tib. lag deb ljang khu) to the 
Khache. Also commonly referred to as “Freedom Books” (Tib. rang btsan lag deb), 
the Green Books serve as the primary marker of the exiled Tibetans’ affiliation 
with the government in exile and are sometimes referred to as a pseudo-passport. 
A primary requirement of the Green Book is that the holder pay an annual contri-
bution to the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and those Tibetans who have income 
are expected to make an extra contribution equivalent to 2 percent of their salary.
The Green Books are far more than a simple indication of support for the CTA, 
for they also serve as a condition of admission to Tibetan schools and of access to 
scholarships.97 Limiting voting to Green Book holders runs counter to the broader 
definition of Tibetan “citizenship” often touted by the CTA. In its 1991 Charter, 
the CTA defines being Tibetan as follows: “All Tibetans born within the territory 
of Tibet and those born in other countries . . . [w]hose biological mother or bio-
logical father is of Tibetan descent has the right to become a citizen of Tibet.”98 As 
many have noted, the Tibetans-in-exile have created a Tibetan identity that proj-
ects itself outwardly as a singular entity, but internally it is limited to those who 
embrace the collective goal of returning to a “future self-ruled and democratic 
Tibet.”99
The fact that the Khaches resisted association with any of the other Tibetans 
living in India is striking, as it contrasts with the deep respect that the Khaches 
hold for the Dalai Lama. In his 1960 reply to the Dalai Lama, Chisti wrote on 
behalf of the entire community, “We, with all our abilities are with your Majesty 
and your Majesty’s fellow Tibetan people in the task of li[ber]ation of Tibet from 
Red Chinese’s unlawful occupation or their tyrant hands.”100 If there is one con-
stant across the twentieth century, it would be the Khaches’ clear and ardent 
regard for both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Dalai Lamas. Yet it is clear that 
the Khache leaders did not see their reverence for the Fourteenth Dalai Lama as 
affecting their status in the eyes of the CTA. They seemed to abstain rather than 
to engage, not out of disdain for their fellow Tibetans, but because of a harsh 
pragmatism and recognition that the two communities faced starkly different 
challenges.
By 1970, the Dalai Lama began to reach out to the Khaches in Srinagar in an 
overt attempt to rekindle and repair their relationship. In his first visit to a Tibetan 
Muslim community since his arrival in India in 1959, the Dalai Lama visited the 
Khache settlements and donated 10,000 rupees to the “refugee camp” at Idgah. 
The following year, the Tibetan Review published its first full-length article on 
the Khache in India. Adopting an openly supportive tone, the article highlighted 
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the harsh Khache experience in terms that must have deeply resonated with the 
Tibetan Buddhist readership, quoting extensively from an unnamed Khache:
Sixteen years have now lapsed and these years speak a story of adaptation, 
 re-structuring and of conditioning to new social mores and a language distinct from 
our own. The road has not lacked its trials, but it would have been rougher had it not 
been for the Indian government’s initial assistance to us on our arrival in India, and 
to them we issue our grateful thanks. Through these years, we Tibetan Muslims have 
invested every energy in trying to salvage what would otherwise seem wrecked lives, 
and have attempted to rebuild and reorganize an integrated life. But even superhu-
man powers would not have helped us tide over financial and educational crisis.101
Clearly seeking to break down the refugee-citizen division, the article consistently 
referred to the Khaches as “refugees.” While the term was not totally inappropriate 
for the Khaches living in Srinagar, it was technically incorrect given that legally 
they remained Indian citizens. The reference by a Tibetan Buddhist author for a 
Tibetan audience appears to be a deliberate attempt to link the Tibetan Muslim 
experience with that of the Tibetan refugees. In the article’s conclusion the author 
finally comes out and makes the connection explicit:
The Tibetan Muslims were not very different from the rest of the Tibetan refugees 
who sought shelter in India since 1959. But quite unlike their refugee counter-
parts the Tibetan Muslims entered India as Indian citizens. . . . Though the Tibetan  
Muslims were genuine refugees, yet their status designating Indian citizenship pre-
empted them from being included in rehabilitation schemes, organized for the host of 
other Tibetan refugees, as they did not fall within the category of Tibetan refugees.102
By making being a refugee a virtue, the Dalai Lama not only invoked compassion, 
but sought to bridge the divide between the two communities.
Despite the relationship with the Dalai Lama and these seemingly genuine 
overtures, the two communities remained estranged. Over the next decade the 
Dalai Lama made several more visits to Srinagar and used the leverage of his 
growing international prestige even more explicitly in pressuring the government 
of India “to sanction [additional] land for settlement somewhere in Srinagar.”103 
There were periodic attempts at inclusion, such as the admission of a small num-
ber of Tibetan Muslims to schools run by the CTA and an invitation to Tibetan 
Muslims to visit Dharamsala.104 Yet it would not be until 1995 that the CTA invited 
thirty Khache leaders and scholars to Dharamsala in an attempt to delve into the 
various reasons such a division between the communities still existed. When que-
ried as to why more Khache had not become active in the Tibetan community, the 
invited Khache leaders, clearly embarrassed, “agreed that the main reason [was] 
their inability to pay the monthly voluntary contribution” required by Green Book 
holders. The meeting concluded with an agreement to hold conferences every two 
years “to review progress and exchange ideas.” No meeting of Tibetan Muslims by 
the CTA was ever reconvened.105
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In 2012, after an absence of nearly twenty-five years, the Dalai Lama again 
returned to Srinagar, a visit that marked a true renaissance in Tibetan and Tibetan 
Muslim relations. In his speech he “recalled that in the past there had been Tibetan 
Muslims working in the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.  .  .  . As 
this arrangement has lapsed, . . . it would be very good if any among them would 
like to come and work in Dharamsala again.”106 Two years later he returned and in 
a warm speech reminded the community, “In the small village where I was born 
near Kumbum Monastery there were Muslim families so I have long been familiar 
with people of Islam. When I reached Lhasa at the age of five, about 1,000 Muslims 
lived there and whenever there were government functions Muslim representa-
tives took part.” He continued by saying that for many years he had been unable 
to visit them and had “renewed his acquaintance” with them two years earlier. He 
“spoke of being surprised and touched to discover that their young children spoke 
good Tibetan with a Lhasa dialect, an indication that they still use Tibetan within 
their families.”107
The Fourteenth Dalai Lama has always had a close relationship with Tibetan 
Muslims. Equally, Tibetan Muslims continue to accord him a high level of respect. 
When asked, during the Dalai Lama’s latest visit to Kashmir in 2012, why Tibetan 
Muslims supported his visit, one Tibetan Muslim replied, “His Holiness, the 
Dalai Lama, is our king, our leader. We all love him. That is why we are here.”108 
The Khaches’ continued reverence for the Dalai Lama accentuates his  traditional 
secular role as a leader for all Tibetans, regardless of religious orientation. 
However, his high-profile visits aside, the communities remain distant. In the 
spring of 2016 when a four-day conference titled “Freedom, Justice and Equality” 
was being organized, a conference expressly focused on dissidents from China’s 
ethnic and religious minorities, Tibetan Muslims were again left off the initial 
invitation list. This led Masood Bhat, one of the few Tibetan Muslims to have 
worked in Dharmsala, to remark that while they were aware of the conference, 
“none of us have received any invitation.”109
If relations between the Muslim and Buddhist Tibetan communities have 
improved after nearly half a century, the improvement most likely comes from 
realizing that their experiences, up to the present day, were along two different 
but parallel paths. As Alfiani Fadzakir noted in his study of one Tibetan Muslim 
 family that had first gone to Kashmir, then to Saudi Arabia, before finally settling 
in Kathmandu, their experiences “in two ‘homelands’—Kashmir and Mecca—
taught them that they could not deny or abandon their Tibetan identity.”110
The Tibetan Muslims who greeted the Dalai Lama in Srinagar are still facing 
many of the same obstacles they found on their arrival. A recent survey of Tibetan 
Muslim housing in Srinagar noted that “about one-fifth of the houses were in a 
dilapidated condition.” The population has grown roughly threefold since their 
arrival, from about 600 persons in 1960 to some 1,600 in 2000 and to 2,000 in 
2011. A new settlement of 125 apartments, located in the Hawal (Sangeen Darwaza) 
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area of Srinagar, has considerably relieved the pressure for housing within Tibetan 
Muslim settlements.111
On one level, this reawakening of the relationship between the refugees in India 
and the Khaches in Srinagar is related to the fact that the Srinagar Tibetan Muslims 
have, through their status in Kashmir as “non-state subjects,” come as close as one 
can to being refugees. Despite having lived in Srinagar for over six decades, the 
Khache still remain outsiders, owing to the political constraints that have made 
their acceptance by the Kashmiri community difficult. While always citizens of 
India, they are refused “citizenship” in Kashmir. Their status as citizens of India but 
refugees in Kashmir has caused many Kashmiri to confuse the Khaches’  situation 
with that of the Uyghurs and Kazaks who had arrived as refugees in the early 1950s, 
suggesting it was the Kashmiri government in 1959 that granted the Khache citi-
zenship and settled them in Srinagar.112 There is great irony in noting that it was in 
Lhasa that foreigners often cast the Khache as Kashmiri and now, having settled in 
their ancestral homeland of Kashmir, they are treated as Tibetan.
Today, most Khaches in Srinagar prefer to be called “Kashmiri,” and they 
 bristle at any implication that they are Tibetan. As one Tibetan Muslim explained, 
“In Tibet we are called Kashmiris and in Kashmir we are being called Tibetan.”113 
When asked to comment further by a Kashmiri newspaper reporter, one elder 
Khache explained, “We are basically Kashmiri, but people still call us Tibetans, 
which hurts us.”114 Another puts an even a sharper edge to his response, “Don’t 
call us Tibetans. We are not refugees. We are Kashmiris.”115 One could perhaps 
dismiss these responses as a reflection of lingering fears from a bygone era if such 
 distinctions did not remain of consequence. When asked, many younger Kashmiris 
expressed disbelief and even exasperation about their parents’ or  grandparents’ 
decision to settle in Kashmir, a place where they were unwelcome, even as other 
Khaches lead relatively more prosperous lives in Kathmandu, Kalimpong, and 
Darjeeling. Like many second-generation immigrants, this younger generation 
feels only a distant tie to their grandparents’ homeland. “Even if tomorrow Tibet 
might be liberated from China, we will stay here only,” said twenty-year-old Irfan 
Trumboo.116
The paths of the Tibetan refugees in India and the Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir 
seem to have come full circle. In both communities they are separate, and they are 
both often contentious in their pursuit of full rights in India and Kashmir. Indian 
courts had long ruled that they were unable to intervene in the rights of non-state 
subjects because Article 370 of the Indian Constitution dictates that the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir govern all matters except those surrendered to the Union 
of India. Recently, however, in a case challenging the limitations of Indian federal 
guidlines as they relate to federal finance laws, the court asserted broadly (and 
against decades of legal precedent) that the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir 
did not supersede that of India:
Prisoners of Shangri-La    149
It is rather disturbing to note that various parts of the judgment speak of the abso-
lute sovereign power of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It is necessary to reiterate 
that Section 3 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, which was framed by a 
Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise, makes a 
ringing declaration that the State of Jammu & Kashmir is and shall be an integral 
part of the Union of India.117
The judgment went on to assert that Jammu and Kashmir residents are “first and 
foremost citizens of India” and that “there is no dual citizenship as is contemplated 
by some other federal Constitutions in other parts of the world.”118
Faced with the choice of clinging to a Tibetan past or a future in Kashmir, 
the Khaches who have lived most of their lives in Kashmir have chosen to marry 
Kashmiris to ease the lives of their children, and they have pressed to be accepted 
by Kashmiris. But as the Dalai Lama noted on one of his recent visits, the Tibetan 
Muslims of Srinagar, to a far greater degree than the Tibetan refugees spread across 
South Asia, Europe, and the United States, have managed to stave off accultura-
tion and maintained Tibetan as their language of communication. If the litmus 
test of citizenship lay at the heart of differences between the two communities, the 
dilemma facing Tibetan Buddhists over the ideological benefits of retaining their 
refugee status has also worn thin.
It is not that this renewed affinity between the two groups can be attributed to 
any political shift as much as that both groups have seemingly arrived at a com-
mon position by two totally different routes. After more than a half century of liv-
ing in India, there is an increasing difference of opinion among Tibetan refugees 
over whether the refusal of citizenship comes at too high a price.
India has remained undeniably generous to the Tibetans who reside in exile in 
India, though they remain only by the grace of executive policy. As a recent report 
by the Tibet Justice Center on Tibetan refugees in India concluded, “In India, most 
undocumented Tibetans and their children remain stateless: India does not recog-
nize them, legally speaking, as refugees under either international law or its own 
national laws, which do not provide for the adjudication of refugee status.”119 Under a 
special arrangement known as the Gentleman’s Agreement, Tibetans, once they are 
in India, are recognized as “foreigners” and are required to hold a valid Registration 
Certificate that must be renewed every six months for a period of up to five years. 
The status of Registration Certificate holders is inherently precarious. It is by its very 
nature temporary, and it legally provides the holder with only an informal status that 
exists largely at the discretion of local officials (and varies by state). The certificate 
is also a prerequisite for acquiring an Identity Certificate that allows its holder to 
travel internationally to those countries that accept it as a legitimate travel document 
 (currently the United States and Switzerland and several other states in Europe).
It is often suggested that the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, in an implicit 
accord with the government of India, has promoted a policy of Tibetans retaining 
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their position as “stateless” refugees. More complicated is the fact that as holders 
of Green Cards, they are registered “nationals” of the government in exile and its 
formal CTA government. Karma Yeshi, a member of the Tibetan parliament-in-
exile, stated that the CTA would not prevent Tibetans from seeking Indian citi-
zenship but acknowledged, “Our aim is not to settle in India, but eventually go 
back to Tibet.”120 And yet as the decades have passed, many Tibetan refugees have 
grown weary of the uncertain nature of living in the stateless netherworld the exiled 
community demands. As Tenzin Pelky pointed out, it is with few clear-cut legal 
protections for Tibetan refugees that the “harsh penalties, including incidents of 
arrest for the mere failure to renew these documents have further heightened fears 
over the tenuous nature of exile in the settlements.”121
Beginning in 2010, several younger Tibetans (most born in India to Tibetan refu-
gee parents) began to challenge the ostensible legal barriers preventing them from 
their theoretical birthright citizenship under Indian laws. Similar to the Tibetan 
Muslims’ dilemma in Kashmir, many within the Tibetan community still sensed 
the pursuit of Indian citizenship as being irreconcilable with retaining one’s support 
of the government in exile’s claim to Tibet. For decades, the unspoken agreement 
between the government in exile and India was the notion that pursuing citizenship 
was a sacrilege for Tibetans. But in a series of legal challenges brought by young 
Tibetans, cracks began to appear in that belief. In 2010, Namgyal Dolkar, born in 
India, denied citizenship, and officially “stateless,” wondered how “according to the 
Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1986, any person born in India on or after January 
26, 1950 but prior to the commencement of the 1986 Act on July 1, 1987, is a citizen 
of India by birth.”122 In the verdict in favor of her application, the court noted that 
Dolkar’s description of herself as “a Tibetan ‘national’ is really of no legal conse-
quence as far as the CA [Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003]123 is concerned, or for 
that matter from the point of view of the policy of the Ministry of External Affairs.”124
India’s Ministry of Home Affairs remained opposed to giving voting rights to 
Tibetan refugees, and in 2014 it asked the Ministry of External Affairs to express 
an opinion on the impact such a decision would have on India-China relations.125 
Although Dolkar won her case, the Indian government continued to resist. In 
2016, three Tibetans, all born in India prior to 1987 (or born to parents born in 
India), were denied Indian passports and again took their case to trial. The court’s 
verdict decided definitively in favor of the Tibetans. Its opinion explicitly cited 
the Dolkar verdict, brushed aside internal ministerial objections, and directed 
the Ministry of External Affairs to “issue the India passports to the petitioners, 
who have been declared to be Indian citizens, within a period of four weeks.”126 
The question of citizenship being a “gift” remains awkward, however, among the 
Tibetans, with the verdict eliciting considerable consternation among many exile 
Tibetan leaders. By and large, those who are against Indian citizenship cling to the 
notion that accepting it would “dilute the struggle” for a free Tibet. The Tibetan 
activist Tenzin Tsundue suggested that that those who accepted citizenship in 
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another country would “continue to be culturally Tibetan, but now they can be 
supporters not claimants for Tibet.”127 Yet such ideological differences aside, the 
tribulations of living as stateless persons in India seem to be winning the day, as 
many younger Tibetans seek to decouple their ideological beliefs in a free Tibet 
from the security of having Indian citizenship. Perhaps as more Tibetans in exile 
accept Indian citizenship, the relationship between the Tibetan Buddhists and the 
Khaches will again grow strong.
AMBIGUOUS,  ANONYMOUS,  AND OVERSHAD OWED
For three centuries the Khache lived as Tibetans among Tibetans. Their place 
within Tibetan society was never disputed. The arrival of Chinese Communist 
forces, officials, and cadres in 1951 created, particularly in the traditional Chinese 
ethnic categorization and the narrower PRC framing of Hui, a semantic breech 
between being Tibetan and being Muslim. The Wapaling Khaches who remained 
in Tibet continued to be a vibrant community, but they faced a large influx of 
Hui in-migrants who altered the face of Islam in central Tibet. As a result, the 
definition of “Tibetan Muslim” became more “Muslim-in-Tibet” (or more recently 
“Hui-in-Tibet”), leading to the common but ambiguous term, Zang-Hui, being 
employed to designate all Muslims in Tibet. The conflation in the minds of many 
Chinese that being a Hui-in-Tibet and a Khache were one and the same cre-
ates new divisions between the Tibetans and Tibetan Muslims since the Hui are 
increasingly perceived as working alongside the Han and Chinese government to 
undermine and overwhelm traditional Tibetan culture. According to research car-
ried out in the past decade, Hui migrants who arrived in Tibet, in comparison to 
their Han migrant counterparts, tended to stay longer than the Han. As a result, 
most Khache have adopted Tibetan (Ch. zangzu) as their official ethnicity, largely 
out of a growing hostility to the in-migration of Chinese from Central China.128
Adding to this confusion, all Muslims tended to be uniformly referred to as 
Hui in the Chinese language, a linguistic twist that only furthered a conflation 
of the terms “Wapaling” with “Barkor Khache.” It also served to emphasize the 
assertion that the Barkor Khache were not Tibetan. In the wake of the Barkor 
Khaches’ departure for India, when the Wapaling moved from the Grand Mosque 
in the Wapaling neighborhood and began praying in and caring for both the 
Barkor Small Mosque and the Khache Lingka Mosque outside of Lhasa, the 
strong Barkor and Wapaling neighborhood subidentities among Lhasa Khache 
became distorted and increasingly forgotten. This move led many to believe that 
all Khaches were, in the absence of the original Barkor Khache, “Chinese” to 
some degree or another.
The dramatic shift in attitudes became clear in 2008, when Lhasa again erupted 
in anti-Chinese violence. Tibetan demonstrators attempted to once again burn 
down the Grand Mosque. Many articles in the mainstream press linked the 
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violence to the 1959 March Uprising, when the Grand Mosque in the Wapaling 
neighborhood was first burned to the ground. These reports inferred the violence 
was long-standing anti-Muslim in nature without understanding how the circum-
stances had changed. In both cases, the violence was not anti-Muslim but anti-
Chinese, or, perhaps more accurately, anti-collaborationist. For our purposes, the 
distinction that should be made is that the 2008 hostility was anti-Hui in its orien-
tation, not anti-Khache.
Not only had the primary occupants changed, but the new, often semiperma-
nent Chinese Muslim Hui residents of the Grand Mosque were perceived to be 
Positioned at the southern edge of the Barkor, the Small Mosque faced the sacred Linkor 
circumambulation route. After 1960, many of the Wapaling Muslims began to use it for their 
daily prayers. Hui from outside of Tibet had an increased presence in the Grand Mosque. 
Source: Kevin Bubriski.
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handmaidens of the Chinese state. Since the Wapaling Khache had moved to the 
Small Mosque, the symbolism of the 1959 and 2008 attacks seemed similar, but the 
occupants were no longer the same and the circumstances were fundamentally 
different. As one Tibetan Muslim put it, in recent years there continues to be a 
division between “Tibetan Muslims whose families have lived in Tibet for genera-
tions” and “Hui and other Muslims who have migrated to Tibetan areas to work.”129 
If the Barkor Khache lost their Tibetan identity by leaving Tibet, those Khache 
who remained behind suffered the similar, if different, indignity of being forced 
to choose between being Tibetan or being Hui. For most Khache, the choice to be 
Tibetan was the more obvious one.
Since 1959, the Tibetan Muslims have remained frustratingly illusive in the 
 historical treatments of Tibet and Tibetans because they fail to conform to the 
internal Chinese notions of what it means to be Tibetan or Hui, or because of 
the increasingly narrow external definition of a Tibetan-in-exile as only being a 
Buddhist refugee living in India. Although the Tibetan Buddhists who followed 
the Dalai Lama to India did face numerous hardships, their situation differed 
substantially from that of the Tibetan Muslims. Due to a variety of economic and 
political factors, the exiled Tibetan Buddhists became increasingly dependent 
on Indian and Western support, and they often found themselves compelled 
to play to romanticized Western ideas of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan Muslims 
escaped the fate of the Tibetans-in-exile community who successfully fled Tibet, 
only to become, in the words of Donald Lopez, “prisoners of Shangri-la.”130 The 
fate of the Tibetan Muslims, on the other hand, was to quickly lose any claim 
to being Tibetan in the face of this newly popular globalized version of Tibet. 
It was through their participation in the Indian government’s political artifices 
as that government negotiated with China that the Tibetan Muslims earned 
Indian citizenship and lost, in the eyes of the Tibetan Buddhists, their claim to 
be Tibetan citizens.
India and China’s increasingly fraught relationship reached its nadir with the 
1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict. Scholars of this period tend to characterize 
Sino-Indian relations in terms of either security concerns or conflicting world-
views. On the surface, it is tempting to see China and India as two regional powers 
battling for ideological and territorial supremacy: as in the Dalai Lama’s har-
rowing escape from Communist China to a democratic India or as in escalating 
clashes over a geopolitically significant boundary. Such explanations tend to be 
overly deterministic as a result of a narrow, selective, and even teleological order-
ing of events. Positioning the Lhasa Khaches’ claim for Indian citizenship and that 
claim’s importance to the Indian government and its Indian citizenry among these 
other events of the time—those that were creating front-page headlines in both 
China and India (and around the globe) for many months—suggests something 
different was at work.
154    CHAPTER 6
This excision of the Tibetan Muslims from historical treatments of the period 
is more than an overly deterministic and selective ordering of events. In the 
Asian context, transnational histories are particularly prone to the nation-state’s 
interpretation of its past as a result of systemic deficiencies, or alternatively, as 
an exploitation of the periphery by the center. The political scientist Manjari 
Chatterjee Miller has recently suggested an alternative reading of Chinese-
Indian relations with an emphasis on “post-imperial ideology.” As she describes 
it, “The goal of victimhood led both countries to emphasize their past suffering 
and anti-colonial credentials . . . [in order to] become a key player in the newly 
decolonized Third World community.”131 Seen through this corrective lens, China 
and India perceived any major encounter, meeting, or incident as an opening 
for them to demonstrate to Asia and the broader world how one might hold a 
 preeminent position over the other.
Miller’s postimperial ideology creates a space that previous Cold War or 
 conflict-centered analyses did not. The ascendency of such interpretations of the 
period also explains, in part, the speed with which the Khache quickly dropped 
out of sight in scholarly analyses. The swiftness with which the Tibetan Muslims 
faded from general conversation among the public, the media, and governments 
is, in retrospect, striking. While victimhood might have been a potent strategy 
against former colonizers, it was less effective among the colonized. It was this 
dilemma on which China and India’s relationship ran aground, as the Bandung 
Conference clearly demonstrated that both sought to be the dominant leader 
among the Asian nations.
Nehru’s objective was to guide the newly independent nations of Asia and 
Africa, through an amorphous combination of the Panchsheel Five Principles, 
nonviolence, and ideological neutrality, in order to avoid serving as proxies in 
the larger Cold War. Mao chafed at the idea of Soviet and U.S. dominance of the 
global political dialogue. However, Mao sought to position China as an appeal-
ing alternative leader to these same nations in anticipation of, not in an effort to 
avoid, a coming global conflict. Both men realized that politics was a messy busi-
ness, but the two diverged over the manner in which they sought, through their 
influence, to precipitate change. Nehru’s influence was one founded on dialogue 
and compromise. Mao’s interpretation viewed the world as a more zero-sum for-
mula whereby were China to gain influence, another must lose it. In this light, the 
Sino-Indian solidarity of the 1950s, based as it was on the outward deployment 
of victimhood and influence, collapsed in the 1960s when such strategies proved 
incapable of resolving conflicts between themselves.
Similar to the ways in which the Bandung Conference is often dismissed as hav-
ing largely achieved only symbolic outcomes, the 1960 Tibetan Muslim Incident, 
when it is remembered, is often cast as subsidiary to the more substantive 1962 
Sino-Indian Border Conflict. Framed in this manner, the history of Tibetan 
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Muslims reveals how the ethnic, religious, and political categories of postcolonial 
Asian nationhood often conceal significant dimensions of Asia’s past. The Khaches’ 
experiences in the post-independence period bring into sharp relief those—often 
minority peoples—who reside in regions that fall outside both the former colonial 
regimes and the “new” Asian nations. Even the oddly oxymoronic sense of the 
ethnonym “Tibetan Muslims,” as applied in these more modern analyses, points 
to the tremendous pressures the Khache resisted in order to retain their identity, 
an identity that had prevailed for centuries within premodern Tibet. Inherently 
transnational, inter-Asian, and transcultural, the Khache, by simply stepping 
across the political border of Tibet into India, had their existing South Asian nar-
rative of community rewritten in a manner that repositioned them primarily, not 
as Tibetans, but as Muslims. In this modern age of complex and highly politicized 
post-Partition ethnic, subnational, and religious identities, they found none that 
could accommodate the Tibetan dimension of their identity.132 Stripped of their 
hybrid Tibetan identity, excluded from any formal position in the government in 
exile that emerged in Dharamsala, and shunned in Kashmir, the Khache became 
exiles manqué—recognized neither by the land they had left nor by the “home-
land” to which they had fled.
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David Atwill transports readers to the heart of the Himalayas as he traces the rise 
of the Tibetan Muslim community from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century. Radically altering popular interpretations that have portrayed Tibet as isolated 
and monolithically Buddhist, Atwill’s vibrant account demonstrates how truly cosmo-
politan Tibetan society was by highlighting the hybrid influences and internal diversity 
of Tibet. In its exploration of the Tibetan Muslim experience, Islamic Shangri-La pres-
ents an unparalleled perspective of Tibet’s standing during the rise of post–World 
War II Asia.
“Atwill’s groundbreaking book traces a forgotten Muslim thread through the knot of 
identity, subjecthood, and citizenship in twentieth-century Tibet, offering a fresh per-
spective on the region’s tumultuous modern history. It is a highly readable narrative of 
a Muslim community that has often been rendered invisible, and an important state-
ment on the transition from empires to nation-states at the Inner Asian nexus of Tibet, 
China, India, and the Islamic world.” RIAN THUM, author of The Sacred Routes of 
Uyghur History
“The history of the Tibetan Muslims, which at first may seem like yet another border-
land oddity, actually provides a remarkable vantage point from which to survey Asian 
history anew. Not only does Atwill’s use of untapped archival sources and interviews 
produce original scholarship, but his innovative framing of the material provides valu-
able perspectives on a history we thought we knew quite well.” JOHAN ELVERSKOG, 
author of Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road
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